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ABSTRACT 
Personalization algorithms perform a fundamental role of knowledge management in 
order to restrain information overload, reduce complexity and satisfy individuals. 
Personalization of media content in mainstream social media, however, can be used for 
micro-target political messages, and can also create filter bubbles and strengthen echo 
chambers that restrain the exposure to diverse, challenging and serendipitous 
information. These represent fundamental issues for media law and ethics both seeking 
to preserve autonomy of choice and media pluralism in democratic societies. As a result, 
informational empowerment may be reduced and group polarization, audience 
fragmentation, conspiratorial thinking and other democratically negative consequences 
could arise. Even though research about the detrimental effects of personalization is 
more often inconsistent, there is no doubt that in the long run the algorithmic capacity 
to steer our lives in increasingly sophisticated ways will dramatically expand. Key 
questions need to be further discussed; for instance, to what extent can profiling 
account for the complexity of individual identity? To what extent are users, media and 
algorithms responsible in such practices? What are the main values and trade-offs that 
inform designers in such a fundamental societal algorithmic arbitrage? How is social 
media’s personalization directly or indirectly regulated in the European Union? Is there 
the need for further regulation to tackle its challenges? 
 
The thesis firstly presents a critical overview of information societies, analyzing social 
media content personalization practices, dynamics and unintended consequences. 
Secondly, it explores the role of serendipity as a design and ethical principle for social 
media. Serendipity is also a metric for assessing personalization quality. With serendipity 
being both limited and cultivated in the digital environment, the research reveals a 
theoretical trade-off between relevance (what a user is supposed to want) and 
serendipity (what a user may want). As such, it represents not only a cutting-edge 
technical challenge but it also underlies a powerful metaphorical and educational value. 
Thirdly, the European legal landscape with regard to personalization is analyzed from a 
regulatory, governance and ethical perspective. It is thus advocated co-regulatory 
approach to tackle the outlined risks of social media personalization. Finally, it is 
introduced the concept of ‘algorithmic sovereignty’ as a valuable abstraction to begin to 
frame technical, legal and political preconditions and standards to preserve users’ 
autonomy, and to minimize the risks arising in the context of personalization. 
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0. Thesis Outline 
This thesis is based on seven articles published during the Ph.D. period (5 individual 
articles and 2 collaborations in which I was the correspondent author as well as the main 
contributor). The research was focused on increasing concerns resulting from mainstream 
social media’s personalization, that is, the design and algorithmic systems that provide 
affordances for managing information filtering and that automatically adapt information 
to users’ (supposed) interests. In particular, information asymmetries between service 
providers and users, biases in algorithms, so-called ‘informational bubbles’ and the 
threats to autonomy, privacy and self-determination are analyzed. As such, the thesis 
explores these risks drawing from the phenomenon of online personalization, with a 
special focus on news personalization in social media, with the aim to understand its 
effects on identity, societies, to eventually analyze its ethics, regulation and governance. 
In particular, the following research questions are addressed: 
 
 RQ1: What are the challenges of social media’s personalization for democratic     
 societies? 
 
 RQ2: How social media’s personalization is regulated? More specifically, is the 
 European legislation able to prevent the risks arising from personalization? 
 
 RQ3: Should social media’s personalization be further regulated? If yes, how? 
 
Taking into account that the interdisciplinarity of the proposed research spans from 
sociology to ethics, from governance studies to European regulation, the research 
methodology benefitted both from direct sources of documentation and from data 
collection, processing, interpretation and verification. The method of triangulation was 
therefore the preferred one. In order to carry out the analysis, the methodological 
approach was based on the established methods of interpretive research and analysis of 
Science and Technology Studies, critically reviewing literatures from an interdisciplinary 
perspective. The thesis is developed as follows;  
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Chapter 1 introduces a critical overview of information societies. In the last decade, an 
oligopolistic social media market emerged, as well as a new ‘economy’: the attention 
economy. The goal of mainstream social media platforms is chiefly to engage users and 
maximize data collection. Data is the core element of information societies. Users are 
thus surveilled and data is analyzed for the purposes of generating profit. Subsequently, 
data is refined in order to offer users increasingly sophisticated services. Yet, while big 
corporations ‘win and take-all’, dramatically enhancing their capacity to analyze such 
data and provide useful and persuasive services, human beings are overloaded and unable 
to effectively manage this new form of life and to properly navigate the complexities and 
risks that digitally-mediated information consumption and social relations actually imply. 
In a personalized and weaponized infotainment landscape, many individuals often 
experience an illusion of knowledge and socialization that, among several potentially 
negative consequences, tend to lead to narcissism, isolation and political polarization. A 
major consequence is the pollution of public debate, in which truth becomes increasingly 
subjective, thus contested; an era in which misinformation and disinformation strive to 
capture users’ attention, either for profit or to persuade and control them. This chapter 
introduces the main characteristics and limitations of current mainstream social media as 
a public sphere. 
 
Chapter 2 unveils and discusses the phenomenon of online personalization, with a 
special focus on news recommender systems in social media. Online personalization 
performs a fundamental social role of knowledge management in order to restrain 
information overload, reduce complexity and, ultimately, satisfy individuals. Among 
several challenges, online personalization – particularly in social media – can create 
phenomena such as ‘filter bubbles’ and strengthen ‘echo chambers’ which tend to restrain 
the exposure to diverse, challenging and serendipitous information. These represent 
fundamental issues for media law and ethics seeking to preserve autonomy of choice and 
pluralism in democratic societies. The risk is the reduction of individual agency and the 
polarization and fragmentation of society at large. Even though research on the 
detrimental effects of online personalization is often unconvincing, there is no doubt that 
in the long term the algorithmic capacity to steer our lives in increasingly sophisticated 
ways will dramatically expand. Therefore, key questions are addressed; for example, to 
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what extent profiling accounts for the complexity of individual identity? And what are 
the main values and trade-offs that inform designers in the fundamental societal arbitrage 
of information filtering and design choices?  
 
Chapter 3 presents and discusses the phenomenon of serendipity, its metaphorical, 
political and design value in digital environments, especially in social media. Often 
undervalued because of its unpredictable nature, operational difficulty and wide or 
sometimes vague definition, serendipity as a design and ethical principle is attracting ever 
more interest, especially ‘artificial’ and ‘digital’ serendipity. Being influenced by 
environmental and human factors, the experience of serendipity encompasses 
fundamental phases of production, distribution and consumption of information. On the 
one hand, design for serendipity can increase media diversity, information quality and, 
more generally, discoverability. On the other hand, serendipity is a capability that has a 
strong political value. It helps individuals to internalize and adopt strategies that increase 
the chances of experiencing it. As such, the pursuit for serendipity can actually help to 
burst filter bubbles and weaken echo chambers in social media. The chapter firstly 
analyzes serendipity and its study. Then, it discusses the role and the ethics of digital 
serendipity and its design from an interdisciplinary perspective. The conclusion is that 
serendipity can be conceived as a metaphor, a technical challenge, an ethical design 
principle, and an educational goal. Limitations are also discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 analyzes the phenomenon of personalization from a regulatory (4.1), ethical 
(4.2) and governance (4.3) perspective. The analysis takes into account the 
interdisciplinary nature of personalization and it is focused on the European legal context. 
To begin with, modes of regulation and an overview of social media regulation are 
broadly introduced. Then, an analysis of the European Legislation is provided. After 
having discussed a human rights perspective, there are briefly analyzed the E-Commerce 
Directive, E-privacy Directive, the General Data Protection Regulation and, more 
generally, media law. In the second Section, an ethical approach to personalization is 
presented, introducing the role of ethics in European legislation and Artificial Intelligence 
and other relevant issues such as ‘group privacy’ and the ethics of nudging. In the third 
Section the governance of personalization as a synthesis of regulation and ethics is 
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explored. Additionally, it is questioned the role of Public Service Media (PSM) in 
cultivating a healthier digital public sphere.  
 
Chapter 5 draws conclusions and provides some general recommendations. By doing so, 
it is initially framed and discussed the notion of “algorithmic sovereignty” as a 
fundamental concept to further develop in order to ultimately provide, defend and 



























1. An Introduction to Information Societies 
 “Every technology is used before it is completely understood” 
―  Leon Wieseltier, Critic and writer 
 
We live in Information Societies, where the information flowed by Information 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) have profoundly changed many aspects of our lives. 
This shift is now pervasive and it is still changing many aspects of social life. In essence, 
it is blurring the distinction between reality and virtual; public and private; truth and 
opinion; and between human, machine and nature. We now live onlife, in the sense that 
the majority of people are always hyper-connected and rely on Internet as a second skin 
for almost everything. We have thus moved inside the “infosphere”, that is the whole 
informational environment constituted by all informational entities, their properties, 
interactions, processes, and mutual relations (Floridi, 2014). Our information society is 
now better seen as a neo-manufacturing society in which data and information are 
replacing raw materials and energy; not just communication and transactions but the 
creation, design, and management of data and information.  
   In information societies, networks constitute the new social morphology. The ICTs 
revolution, in fact, brought societies from information scarcity to information abundance, 
and from the primacy of entities to the primacy of interactions. Communication networks 
are indeed the fundamental networks of power-making in society, giving rise to a 
‘Networked Information Economy’ based on digital information (Castells, 2011), whose 
disruptive features are the zero-marginal cost of reproduction and the non-rivalry feature 
of data (Benkler, 2006). At the same time, media convergence, namely the merging of the 
old media over a single digital network - the Internet - is also profoundly changing our 
social relations and the production and consumption of information (Jenkins, 2007).  
   Internet creates a number of incomprehensible therabyte of data, a number expected to 
double every year, this has exponential growth potential. Everything and everybody will 
be increasingly connected to the Internet of (every)Things (so-called IoT or IoE). We have 
only recently entered into the era of big data, in which the use of predictive analytics or 
other certain advanced methods to extract value from large amounts of data is becoming 
increasingly pervasive and effective. Several risks and opportunities arise from such a 
revolution; for example, private firms, government and academic research often 
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uncritically accept this socio-technical phenomenon which carries particular 
epistemological and cultural views on scientific praxis and the nature of reality.  
Conversely, critics note that big data contributes to the creation of an Orwellian society, 
in which privacy and civil rights are disregarded to favour corporate interest and state 
control. While many advantages are clear, contrastingly the challenges are unpredictable 
and, eventually, extremely complex to govern. 
   Data is not only changing individuals, but is also demonstrative of collective processes 
of knowledge and decision-making. Pentland (2015) anticipates the emergence of a truly 
Comtian “social physics”, the possibility to finally create a data-driven mathematical 
model of social behaviours from big data. It appears indeed imminent a profound change 
at the levels of epistemology and ethics. This trend led some scholars like Chris Andersen 
(2008) to even argue “the end of theory”. In his famous article, he claimed that science 
can nowadays advance even without coherent models, unified theories, or really any 
mechanistic explanation at all. Yet, as Thomas Kuhn (1962) famously argued, any data is 
always “theory-laden”, and any data correlation is useful only under certain background 
assumptions, which ultimately come from theory. Without it, correlations can be as 
misleading as they are informative (so-called apophenia). The assumption that big data 
alone will always result in more predictive power is hubris: it might have profound 
consequences on information societies. It may even climax in what historian Noah Yuval 
Harari (2016) provocatively defines as “dataism”, a worldview that perceives “the entire 
universe as a flow of data, see organisms as little more than biochemical algorithms and 
believe that humanity’s cosmic vocation is to create an all-encompassing data-processing 
system and then merge into it (p.134).” ‘Dataists’ would believe in the invisible hand of 
the dataflow. Thus, given enough biometric data and computing power, this all-
encompassing system could understand humans much better than humans understand 
themselves to the point that they will uncritically and willingly delegate their autonomy 
and any other shared authority to algorithms. This temptation is frequently becoming a 
reality that many do not fully recognize, specifically within its ethical and socio-political 
consequences. 
    In this emerging and fast-paced landscape, the challenges and the opportunities of the 
governance of data and the Internet are unique and extremely complex. No other network 
in the past has exhibited the Internet features, a fact that poses unprecedented 
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methodological challenges for scholars. The search for concepts, tools, and categories in 
order to make sense of the governance of the Internet is very much open-ended. Moreover, 
it is becoming an area with profound socio-economical and geopolitical conflicts. Its 
increasing privatization also poses nascent issues. Commercial entities, in fact, 
increasingly undermine the Internet's pioneer spirit and, thus, its traditional democratic – 
and to some extent libertarian – values. They often use closed systems and integrate 
proprietary technologies that constitute new modes of economic domination that are 
imposed on the users without a method of opting out entirely. More often, these tech 
giants are quasi-monopolies in the markets in which they operate. Similarly, nation States 
are becoming mutually dependent by the services they increasingly offer to society. These 
trends radically challenge societal functions. More than ever Internet needs to be 
safeguarded critically and reflexively. The negotiation of competing values on these 
conflicts, in fact, will have a significant bearing on global innovation policy, national 
security, freedom of expression and societal cohesion. 
   Social media, in particular, are fundamental gatekeepers of information societies. They 
are increasingly more essential for individuals to discover information, form opinions and 
participate in public life. Though in social media and search engines individuals receive 
unprecedented access to information and people of widely varied backgrounds, this 
increasing availability of information does not guarantee the quality of information and 
communication. In particular, the exposure to diverse and challenging information, 
viewpoints and worldviews is fundamental for promoting critical thinking and informed 
decision-making, and even preventing or correcting inaccurate beliefs or dangerous 
radicalizations. Several concurring phenomena constrain the supposed power of the 
Internet to connect people and ideas, depending on the main actors involved: individuals, 
information intermediaries (e.g. platforms or newspapers) and technology itself (e.g. 
algorithms or design). 
   Naturally, there are human proclivities that limit the quality of debate in the public 
arena. In general, selective exposure to information, confirmation bias and homophily 
negatively affect the processes of information seeking and knowledge acquisition. Then, 
the increasingly complexity of interconnected societies, along with the rapid development 
of science and technology, make these processes even more difficult. Secondly, Internet 
itself as an artifact shapes how we acquire information: the so-called ‘information 
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overload’ and the risks that it leads to illusionary knowledge. Thirdly, the role of 
information intermediaries is prominent. They design the platforms that mediate our 
social relations and the algorithms that filter information and provide us a personalized 
Internet experience. These can produce two intertwined phenomena: at the individual 
level filter bubbles while at the collective level echo chambers. Yet, whether these 
ultimately lead to collective political action or simply more audience fragmentation and 
political polarization is a question that has been contested by social and political theorists 
since the Internet has developed into a topic for academic enquiry. Lastly, the current 
social media landscape is weaponized by states and private actors willing to micro-target 
users in order to persuade them and, in some cases, for manipulative purposes. As a 
consequence, trust and truth are also undermined. 
   This chapter will briefly analyze the Internet as a ‘public sphere’, in the Habermasian 
sense. After having highlighted the ambiguities of the Internet, an introduction to social 
media will be done, firstly from a more general perspective and, consequently, from the 
perspective of all the actors involved. It will be analyzed through the role of information 
intermediaries and governments in their sustainment and benefit of a surveillance-
complex industry. Followed by, a user-perspective on the limitations of acquiring 
knowledge and socialization in the information era. Finally, it will analyze how the 
Internet is increasingly fragmented and weaponized by several actors, and how this may 
lead to what has been referred to as the ‘post-truth era of politics’. 
 
1.1 Internet is a Public Sphere? 
Most of the debate on the public sphere is based on the normative prerogatives of 
Habermas' theory of public sphere, which is the “realm of our social life in which 
something approaching public opinion can be formed” (Habermas et al., p.49, 1974). 
Castells (2011) presented the idea that the public sphere has moved from the physical 
world to the network. Indeed, Internet can be viewed as a new type of networked public 
sphere that allows all citizens to change their relationship to the public sphere. They no 
longer need to be consumers and passive spectators, they can become creators and 
primary subjects. In this sense the Internet is a democratizing force (Benkler 2006). 
Papacharissi (2008) also described the emergence of a “virtual sphere 2.0”, in which 
citizen-consumers participate and express “dissent with a public agenda […] by 
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expressing political opinion on blogs, viewing or posting content on YouTube, or posting 
a comment in an online discussion group” (p. 244). Yet, the Internet is a network of 
different communication spaces rather than one monolithic public sphere. Certainly, 
mainstream social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter and Youtube represent a major 
space of the western public sphere. 
   According to Habermas, two conditions are necessary to structure a public space: 
freedom of expression, and discussion as an integrating force. The architecture of the 
Internet was said to articulate these two conditions. Currently, however, it deviates from 
these ideals, and its development into a public sphere without the limitations inherent in 
this model has been proven to be largely false hope. As Splichal (2007) argues, the public 
sphere has actually never materialized because of “unequal access to communication 
channels, uneven distribution of communicative competence, and the reduction of public 
debates to a legitimisation of dominant opinions created by either the ‘business type’ or 
the ‘government type’ of power elites” (p. 242). For these reasons, Fuchs (2015) argues 
against idealistic interpretations of Habermas and advocates for a cultural-materialist 
understanding of the public sphere concept that is grounded in political economy. 
Habermas’ theory should then best be understood as a method of immanent critique that 
critically scrutinizes limits of the media and culture grounded in power relations and 
political economy or, better, the political economy of knowledge. 
   Yet, it is also true that over the last decades Internet has – to some extent – democratized 
knowledge. This occurred chiefly in three ways (Lynch, 2015): 
1. Availability. First, and most conspicuously, the Internet, like the printing press 
before it, has made bodies of knowledge more widely available. It has greatly 
expanded this process whilst also changing both the amount of different kinds of 
information available and also, the speed at which that information can be 
accessed. A prominent example is piracy for books and academic papers with 
websites such as Scihub (for academic articles) and Libgen (for books). 
2. Inclusivity. The Internet has also democratizing knowledge by making its 
production more inclusive. One common example is open source software like 
Mozilla’s Firefox web browser. When security vulnerabilities or bugs arise, a 
diverse and widespread community of volunteers work on fixes and plug-ins. 
Open source software is software by the people, for the people: it is crowd and 
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collective intelligence in action purely for the common good. 
3. Transparency. A third way that the Internet has democratized knowledge is by 
making what is known more transparent - particularly with regard to information 
held by governments. The most obvious and controversial example of this is 
WikiLeaks, a nonprofit organization that publishes news leaks and classified 
governmental information online. The Internet can be used to shine a light on all 
sorts of activities, arguably empowering citizens. 
On the one hand, it is often argued that the Internet, by promoting equal access to 
diverging preferences and opinions in society, actually increases information diversity. 
Many scholars characterize the online media landscape as the "age of plenty", with an 
almost infinite choice and unparalleled pluralization of voices that have access to the 
public sphere (Karppinen, 2014). Some argue that social media will disrupt the traditional 
elite control of media and amplify the political voice of non-elites (Castells, 2011). Some 
argue that digital tools such as social media will inevitably lead to the pluralization of the 
public sphere giving way to non-mainstream political actors to influence the political 
agenda. It is well known that traditional media have a bias in selecting what to report and 
in choosing perspective on a particular topic. Selection bias, organizational factors, 
advertisers, and government influences can all affect which items will become news. 
Evidence of bias may range from the topic choice of the New York Times to the choice of 
think-tanks that the media refer to. Yet, even in social media it is a small number of users 
that generally determine political communication gatekeepers that exert strong and 
selective influence on the information.  
   On the other hand, there are skeptical voices that argue that the Internet has not 
fundamentally changed the concentrated structure typical of mass media, but reflects the 
previously recognized inequalities (Karpinnen, 2008). It is also argued that it has brought 
about new forms of exclusion and hierarchy. While it has increased political participation 
to some degree, it has also empowered a small set of elites that strongly shape how 
political material is presented and accessed. Others have pointed out the danger of 
fragmentation of information caused by personalization algorithms (Pariser, 2011; 
Sunstein, 2017). They argue that the filters we choose on the internet, or the filters that 
are imposed upon us, are weakening and will weaken the democratic process. On the one 
hand, they allow citizens to be exposed mostly to what they like and join into groups that 
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share their own views and values, and cut themselves off from any information that might 
challenge their beliefs. Group deliberation among like-minded people can create 
polarization; individuals may lead each other to falsehoods, simply because of the limited 
argument pool and the role of social influences. Increased polarization makes it more 
difficult for society to find common ground on important issues. On the other hand, the 
ability of online intermediaries such as recommender systems and social networks to 
customize their items to the taste of individuals, together with users’ preference to reading 
opinions which reinforce their own viewpoints, raises the phenomenon referred to as filter 
bubbles, which might limit the discovery of novel, serendipitous information and, 
eventually, interests. 
    The changes in how knowledge is produced and distributed affect the politics of 
knowledge because they directly influence the ‘economy of knowledge’. The economy 
of knowledge (Lynch 2015) refers to the structure of relations that divides epistemic labor 
and governs its exchange. The globalization of the economy of knowledge, however, has 
some of the same effects as the globalization of the economy in general. The unfettered 
global economy is not only increasing economic inequality, it is also encouraging 
epistemic inequality. The value of epistemic equality is that all persons have a basic claim 
to the same epistemic resources. An epistemic resource is a structure or institution that 
provides information and, at least, the basis for knowledge. Thus, epistemic inequality is 
the result of an unfair distribution of structural epistemic resources. Thus, even if 
knowledge is more “democratized” now it means little in conditions of increasing 
epistemic equality. Social media has the potential to be a public sphere where inequality 
is reduced, however, this is limited by the steering media of political power and money 
so that corporations own and control and states monitor users’ behaviors on social media.  
 
1.2 An Introduction to Social Media 
Social network sites (SNS) are the epitome of the web 2.0, and of the internet in general. 
Boyd and Ellison (2007) define SNS as web-based services that allow individuals to (1) 
construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of 
other users – friends, contacts, followers, fans – with whom they share a connection, and 
(3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system. 
The nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to site. The 
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terminology is also unclear, with some referring to social networking services as social 
media. 
    Instead, ‘social media’ became a buzzword in the mid-2000s. Most of the people 
understand SNS, blogs, wikis, user-generated content sharing sites and microblogs as 
social media. This, however, depends on what we define as “social” about social media 
(Fuchs, 2015). Sociality can in fact correspond to the social theory concepts of social 
facts (how human thought is shaped by society), social relations (humans exchange 
symbols by communicating in social relations), co-operation (humans work together and 
thereby create use-values) and community (how humans form and maintain 
communities). Described as information processes, it can also be expressed as a threefold 
interconnected process of (a) cognition, (b) communication and (c) cooperation. Today’s 
social media afford all of these processes to a different extent. One of the main 
consequences is that traditional media is declining in their gatekeeping role in 
determining the agenda and selecting which issues and viewpoints reach their audiences. 
Most citizens have moved from traditional mediums such as newspapers and television 
to using social media. Political discussions on these platforms are becoming an 
increasingly relevant source of political information, often used as a source of quotes for 
media outlets, they are nowadays still the main gatekeepers.  
    Yet, social media are not just communication companies that uniquely afford 
socialization processes, but also – and mostly – large advertising agencies. It was already 
Marx’s (1842) concern that the primary freedom of the press lies in not being a trade. 
There are indeed several problems of how capitalist media limits the public sphere:  
• Market concentration. On the web, this is evident on the light of the “network 
effect”, that is the service becomes more valuable when more people use it, in a 
self-reinforcing spiral effect. Today the social media landscape is mostly 
constituted by a bunch of platforms: Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, LinkedIn and 
Snapchat. The remaining platforms represent a rather small minority. 
• Infotainment. Ads-financed media tend to focus on entertainment more than news, 
documentaries and educational content because this content is better suited for 
attracting advertisers. The influence of economic logic on the media would result 
in ‘tabloidisation’: “Reporting facts as human-interest stories, mixing information 
with entertainment, arranging material episodically, and breaking down complex 
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relationships into smaller fragments – all of this comes together to form a 
syndrome that works to depoliticize public communication” (Habermas, 1996, p. 
377). 
• Power inequalities. There are power differentials in commercial media that 
disadvantage individuals and groups that lack financial weight, political influence 
and reputation, and disempower their voices and visibility. Private media 
ownership gives owners the possibility to influence media content (i.e. 
Facebook’s Instant Articles in which the more you spend the larger the audience 
you reach). To some extent they become dependent on market and commodity 
logic, and prone to exclude voices that question these logics. Finally, there is an 
educational and economic gap that can privilege educated and wealthy individuals 
in the consumption of demanding and costly culture. 
The contemporary social media world is thus shaped by three antagonisms (Fuchs, 2015): 
a) the political antagonism between users’ privacy and the surveillance-industrial 
complex as well as citizens’ desire for accountability of the powerful and the secrecy of 
power, b) users’ data and social media corporations’ profit interests, and c) the civil 
society antagonism between the creation of public spheres and their corporate and state 
colonization. These dimensions will be now briefly explored in order to outline their main 
characteristics and, especially, their main misconceptions. Followed by, a broader 
analysis of the limitations of socialization and knowledge acquisition processes in the 
digital era will be undertaken. 
 
1.2.1 The Surveillance-Complex Industry 
“These programs were never about terrorism: they're about economic spying, social control, and 
diplomatic manipulation. They're about power.”  
― Edward Snowden, Former CIA analyst and whistleblower 
 
Surveillance has become a key dimension of the contemporary world. Since 9/11 there 
has been a massive intensification and extension of surveillance that is based on the 
ideology that monitoring technologies, big data analysis, and predictive algorithms can 
prevent terrorism. It has been justified with a typical modern dichotomy, between security 
and freedom: we need both, but we cannot have one without sacrificing the other at least 
in part. The more we have of one, the less we have of the other (Bauman and Lyon, 2013). 
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Thus, instead of an “iron cage” of Weberian memory, around each of us is built 
relentlessly a more powerful “digital cage”. This, however, will never thwart terrorism 
because terrorists are strategic enough not to announce their intentions on the Internet. 
On the contrary, evidence has shown that social media surveillance does not solely target 
terrorists, but has also been directed at protestors and civil society activists, while at the 
same time inducing the “chilling effects”, which describes situations in which rights are 
threatened by the possible negative results of exercising these same rights, namely a 
deterrent effect of self-restriction (Büchi et al., 2019). This occurs not only in State 
surveillance but also in commercial surveillance. In other words, a significant negative 
externality of commercial algorithmic profiling is the potential threat to autonomy. 
   Edward Snowden’s revelations about the existence of the Prism system have shed new 
light on the extension and intensity of state institutions’ Internet and social media 
surveillance. Today, in light of the Datagate scandal and the dissemination of new systems 
of pervasive surveillance – Video-surveillance, Facial Recognition, Predictive Models, 
Emotion Detectors, Social Credit Systems, brain readers applied to workers, Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons etc. – we can say to live increasingly in a ‘society of control’ 
(Deleuze, 1992). In several countries – particularly in China – it emerged a massive 
“surveillance-industry complex” that risks to escape democratic control and 
accountability and threatens the free and open character of our societies (Hayes, 2012).  
    The concept of the military-industrial complex stresses the existence of collaborations 
between private corporations and the state’s institutions of internal and external defence 
in the security realm. Sociologist Charles Wright Mills argued there is a power elite that 
connects economic, political and military power: “there is no longer, on the one hand, an 
economy, and, on the other hand, a political order containing a military establishment 
unimportant to politics and to money-making. There is a political economy linked, in a 
thousand ways, with military institutions and decisions. […] there is an ever-increasing 
interlocking of economic, military, and political structures” (Mills, p.4, 1956). In fact, 
according to the Snowden’s leaked documents, the NSA in the PRISM programme 
obtained direct access to user data from seven mainstream online/ICT companies: Aol, 
Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Paltalk, Skype, Yahoo! (Fuchs, 2015). 
    Despite the hopes that the Datagate scandal could have triggered a serious debate on 
human and digital rights, the effects have been very limited. Dataveillance is an invisible 
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and complex practice so that most of the users argue that a lack of concern proves they 
have “nothing to hide”, a fallacious argument resulting from a narrow conception of 
privacy (Solove, 2007). Snowden brightly summarized this incongruous widespread 
attitude: “arguing that you don't care about the right to privacy because you have nothing 
to hide is no different than saying you don't care about free speech because you have 
nothing to say” (Ha, 2014). Instead, the attempts to rule the Internet in order to constrain 
it have steadily increased since the Datagate scandal. Social media is still facing an 
economic and political antagonism between “users’ interest in data protection and 
corporate tax accountability on the one side and corporations’ interest in user data’s 
transparency/commodification and corporate secrecy on the other side.” (Fuchs, 2015, 
p.83). Exactly the opposite of the cyberpunk philosophy who animated many Internet 
pioneers – privacy for the weak, transparency for the powerful – and this is evident in the 
configuration of social media data-driven business model. 
    The currently capitalistic logic of accumulation produces “hyperscale assemblages of 
objective and subjective data about individuals and their habitats for the purposes of 
knowing, controlling, and modifying behavior to produce new varieties of 
commodification, monetization, and control” (Zuboff, p.85, 2015). This new global 
architecture of data capture and analysis indeed produces rewards and punishments aimed 
at modifying and commoditizing behaviour for profit. Many of the practices involved in 
what Zuboff famously defined as surveillance capitalism are challenging social norms 
associated with privacy and, thus, are contested as violations of rights and laws. 
Consequentially, big tech corporations have learned to “obscure their operations, 
choosing to invade undefended individual and social territory until opposition is 
encountered, at which point they can use their substantial resources to defend at low cost 
what had already been taken” (Ibid). In this way, surveillance assets are accumulated and 
attract significant surveillance capital while producing their own surprising new politics 
and social relations. 
   Why has such ‘surveillance capitalism’ emerged? There are a variety of reasons. Firstly, 
it was constructed at high velocity and designed to be undetectable. Structural 
asymmetries of knowledge and rights, in fact, made it impossible for people to learn about 
these practices. There was no historic precedent, so there were few defensive barriers for 
protection. Leading tech companies have been over-estimated, in a way respected and 
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treated as ‘emissaries of the future’. On the other hand, individuals quickly came to 
depend upon the new information and communication tools as necessary resources, 
requirements – at times even preconditions – for social participation. Finally, as Zuboff 
(2015) critically argues: “the rapid build-up of institutionalized facts (…) produced an 
overwhelming sense of inevitability (p.85).” As Hildebrandt (2015) also put it: ‘The 
temptation to accept that things are the way they are because technology is the way it is, 
has a strong hold on public imagination […] once a technology has consolidated it 
acquires a tenacity that is not easily disrupted.’ (p. 174). 
    This totalizing system of control stands on users’ attention and, eventually, money. And 
to capture them, increasingly sophisticated design systems are put in place without a true 
social awareness and, thus, defence and oversight. It is a pervasive and perverse system 
that might be detrimental for individual’s well-being, social cohesion, and, ultimately, 
democracy.  
 
1.2.2 The Attention Economy  
 “The average person checks their phone 150 times a day. Why do we do this? Are we making 150 conscious 
choices?”  
― Tristan Harris, Former Google employee and founder of Time Well Spent 
 
An overwhelming amount of information stimuli compete for our cognitive resources, 
giving rise to the ‘attention economy’. In 1971 Herbert Simon articulated the concept of 
“attention economy” ante-litteram: “[T]he wealth of information means a dearth of 
something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What information 
consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of 
information creates a poverty of attention”. (Simon, 1971, p.40). The establishment of 
value in the attention economy is a dual register of what one pays attention to and what 
one chooses to ignore. Even if mainly used by economists, the notion of attention 
economy has also become an important object of critical analysis in recent years. 
   Big Tech companies conceives the attention of each user as a “sign of intention” of his 
or her individual interests and desires, and it is then used to identify patterns of consumer 
behaviours, preferences, tendencies, etc. Thus, it uses it a mechanism for the harvesting 
of large amounts of data (i.e. big data). The aim of the attention economy as a specific 
power apparatus is not to repress a given set of differences nor to normalise them under 
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a given norm but, indeed, to dispose them in a certain way so as to achieve the most 
effective economic result. 
     The attention of the users is, therefore, exploited, as it was – to a more limited extent 
– also in the pre-digital era. Click-baiting is, above all, based on titular sensationalism. 
For example, unfinished article titles create a “curiosity gap” that triggers the user to 
click. Today, however, information intermediaries' techniques for increasing profit 
through users’ engagement also manifests itself in the development of more complex, 
often unconscious, addictive rituals. Algorithms, in fact, raise interesting questions with 
regard to psychological hedonism, that is the view that all human action is ultimately 
motivated by the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain (Gal, 2017). What if we 
create algorithms that could predict our choices and simply grant them to us? Emerging 
persuasive techniques can indeed create addictive behaviours that function acting directly 
on the system of the neurotransmitter dopamine (Turel et al., 2014). This may explain, 
why the majority (59%) of the URLs mentioned on Twitter are not clicked at all 
(Gabielkov et al., 2016). Users crave to share in order to receive notifications but, in the 
end, they rarely have enough attention to read each other’s. 
    Internet users, of course, are not simply hedonistic consumers, but also producers or, 
more accurately, unpaid workers who generate economic value. Information societies can 
be seen as a global click-farm. In this context, the notion of ‘digital labour’ has been 
coined (Scholz, 2013). In order to access any social service platform, users have to give 
up the social data they generated. It is the business of the meta-data that allows the 
existence of “free” services. Thus, every time users surf the internet they leave their 
digital fingerprint, as if we were at the scene of a crime. Indeed, profiling is an activity 
that comes from criminology. In a sense, Internet users are like criminals to get to know 
in order to predict our desires and satisfy a compulsive thirst of consumerism (Ippolita, 
2011). This is the chimera of the data-driven society, in which the human role is widely 
irrelevant and in which sociality is turned into economic value. Thus, users hold in a 
subordinate position, firstly being raw data producers without any reasonable possibility 
to opt-out rather than agree or leave their social networks and, secondly, by being fed 
with addictive habit loops, alienated by attractive multifunctional smartphones, more 
often with low quality information, even if they keep in their hand one of most powerful 
tool ever created by mankind (Ippolita, 2016). 
 18 
   It is also true that traditional commercial broadcasting treats audiences as a commodity. 
On mainstream social media, however, this is qualitatively different in a number of 
respects. For example, measuring audiences in traditional media has been based on 
studies with small samples of audience members, whilst on corporate social media it is 
constant, total and algorithmic; audience commodification on social media is based on 
the constant real-time surveillance of users; user measurement uses highly accurate 
predictive algorithms (i.e. collaborative filtering, if you like A, you may also like B 
because 100 000 people who like A also like B); user prices are often set based on 
‘algorithmic auctions’ (pay per view, pay per click). 
   Turning user data into a private good controlled by social media companies is 
prominently legitimised for the sake of efficiency and innovation – in order to ‘provide 
better services’ – even with the help of privacy policies – in order to ‘protect users’ 
interests’ – and finally with the “sharing is caring” narrative. Sharing, in effect, is not 
primarily a sharing of data with friends and the public, but sharing with social media 
platforms, who are the largest data processors and data profiteers in the world. This 
explains not just the recent rise of the term “big data”, but also their interest in hiding 
their commercial interests ideologically behind the ideas of sharing and openness. 
Certainly, there is no easy-solution to make this system more ‘sustainable’ and ‘socially 
acceptable’. Innovative principles and legal frameworks can certainly strengthen privacy. 
Still, most issues lie in the economic model in the first place. One of the most appealing 
and viable alternative models for social media – subscription fee – would not even 
represent a solution as it would likely increase inequalities further. Who is able to pay has 
the right to privacy, the rest have to give up their digital rights on a platform where even 
the quality of socialization is highly disputed. 
 
1.2.3 The Limits of Digitally-Mediated Socialization 
 “We expect more from technology and less from each other.”  
― Sherry Turkle, Sociologist, Psychologist, Technologist 
 
Nowadays, people join social media mostly to socialize with friends they already know 
offline (Marwick and Boyd, 2014). Hence, instead of connecting across vast spaces, for 
many users Internet is a mere intermediary of daily social relations. As well-known in 
cyber-psychology, however, Internet is changing our ability to experiment and recognize 
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emotions. Since the mediated interaction substitutes our body with the medium, to some 
extent this impedes the activation of the mechanisms of body simulation that make people 
understand each other's emotions (mirror neurons, namely those who unfold empathy) 
(Turkle, 2017). Thus, emotions are ‘disembodied’. This is not a problem in itself; it is a 
natural form of evasion as literature and movies always represented. The problems indeed 
arise when most of people’s emotions are disembodied because it brings, especially to the 
so-called “digital natives”, a widespread “emotional illiteracy” (Galimberti, 2010). This 
phenomenon may explain the ailments of recent generations as their limited empathy 
which hampers their ability to understand themselves. An extreme and debatable example 
of this trend may be that of Hikikomori, which emerged in Japan but extended in the rest 
of the world to different degrees. It regards young individuals socially atomized and living 
mostly at home – or even only in their own bedrooms – while living and socializing 
mostly or only online. 
    Based on the literature available at this time, it seems that social media affects 
individual’s well-being dependent on how it is used (Verduyn et al., 2017). On the one 
hand, social media has the potential to increase our subjective well-being by allowing us 
to increase our social capital and feeling of connectedness due to active usage. On the 
other hand, they can also be a significant cause of distress, especially when they elicit 
social comparisons and envy due to passive usage. Apparently, this seems to depend on 
how active you are on the platform: the more the better. More research, of course, is 
needed. In particular, to answer other relevant questions like: How do “active users” 
actually use platforms? What really drives them? Or: why do “passive users” not fully 
participate? How to design more inclusive platforms? 
    In mainstream social media, friends are often counted as followers and everything is 
gamified and accountable to be translated in the language of performance and efficiency, 
so that “everything that is not accountable cease to exist” (Han, 2015, p.51). As such, 
most of the users are dramatically persuaded to compete to seek more likes, whatever it 
takes. Ippolita (2016) defines this widespread proclivity as “emotional pornography”, 
stressing the compulsive need of the users to share their own intimacy, namely valuable 
data for both advertising and mass surveillance. Bauman and Lyon (2013) explain this 
trend exemplifying a new strategic change, what they call “post-panoptic society”: "on 
the one hand, the old ruse panoptic (you'll never know when I look at your body, and in 
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this way your mind will never stop feeling observed) is implemented gradually but 
consistently and seemingly unstoppable, on a scale almost universal. On the other hand, 
now that the old nightmare of panoptic "never alone" has given way to the apparent hope 
of "never to be alone" (or abandoned, ignored, rejected and excluded), the joy of being 
noticed takes the upper hand on the fear of being revealed” (p.39). In other words, the 
fear of loneliness overcomes the hope to preserve freedom. 
    Currently, mainstream social media does not manifest as a public space but falls within 
in the frame of the private and the exposure of the self. As a consequence, the public 
sphere is hampered and the growing narcissism can lead, parallel to informational 
bubbles, to a de-politicization of society (Byung-Chul Han, 2013). A paradigm of this 
phenomenon is the so-called slacktivism, which refers to the act of showing support for a 
political or social cause with the main purpose of boosting the egos of participants in the 
movement, with very limited involvement required nor concrete effect. On the other hand, 
those who conform to such a system becomes popular, and their content goes viral. To 
some extent, the resulting environment impedes many users to express themselves, 
sometimes becoming lurkers, mere watchers of what’s happening, and often making them 
fall into a spiral of silence in which they do not publicly express their (likely critical) 
opinions (Noel-Neumann, 1984). 
 
1.2.4 The Limits of Internet Knowledge 
 “We live in a world where there is more and more information and less and less meaning.” 
 ― Jean Baudrillard, Philosopher (p.79, 1994) 
 
The digital revolution is not only deeply changing how individuals think and socialize, 
but even more how society and knowledge are structured and constructed. While some 
deterministically argue that the consequent multitasking and disintermediation of 
information are worsening our capacity of problem-solving and critical analysis (Carr, 
2011), providing a “google-knowing” which represents a form of receptive knowledge far 
from a true understanding of reality (Lynch, 2015), other scholars stress the primary role 
of digital literacy in tackling such risks (Rheingold, 2012).  
   People generally believe that the more information they have the better their decisions 
will be. Yet, more knowledge can reduce the accuracy of prediction of uncertain 
outcomes and simultaneously can increase confidence in their prediction (???). In the 
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pyramid of knowledge there is data at its base, with information above, then knowledge 
and, finally, wisdom at the top (see Figure 1). It is not just about accumulating data and 
information: it’s more about turning data and information into knowledge and, eventually, 
wisdom. The fast-paced media environment short-circuits the training processes of 
individuals and collectives, upsetting and putting at serious risk cognitive faculties, social 
cohesion and relationships (Stiegler, 2014).1 
                                   
               Figure 1. The Pyramid of Knowledge. 
 
According to Lynch (2015) information technology even if they expand our ability to 
know in one way, is actually impeding our ability to know in other, more complex ways. 
In particular, ways that require to 1) take responsibility for our own beliefs and 2) work 
creatively to grasp and reason how information fits together. Because the Internet has 
promoted such passive way of knowing, it makes real objective knowledge harder to 
reach. With objective knowledge can be intended a correct belief that is grounded or 
justified, and which can therefore guide our action. It is then possible to frame three main 
 
1 The encyclical Laudato Si by Pope Francis (2015) shares such criticism with convincing simplicity: ‘when media and 
the digital world become omnipresent, their influence can stop people from learning how to live wisely, to think deeply 
and to love generously. In this context, the great sages of the past run the risk of going unheard amid the noise and 
distractions of an information overload. Efforts need to be made to help these media become sources of new cultural 
progress for humanity and not a threat to our deepest riches. True wisdom, as the fruit of self-examination, dialogue 
and generous encounter between persons, is not acquired by a mere accumulation of data which eventually leads to 
overload and confusion, a sort of mental pollution. Real relationships with others, with all the challenges they entail, 
now tend to be replaced by a type of Internet communication which enables us to choose or eliminate relationships at 
whim, thus giving rise to a new type of contrived emotion which has more to do with devices and displays than with 
other people and with nature. Today’s media do enable us to communicate and to share our knowledge and affections. 
Yet at times they also shield us from direct contact with the pain, the fears and the joys of others and the complexity of 
their personal experiences. For this reason, we should be concerned that, alongside the exciting possibilities offered by 
these media, a deep and melancholic dissatisfaction with interpersonal relations, or a harmful sense of isolation, can 
also arise’ (47). 
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forms of knowledge: 
1. Receptive knowledge. It occurs when we absorb information from expert 
textbooks or reputable Internet resources. Toward digitally acquired information 
we often adopt an attitude of default trust because, overloaded by information, it 
is what we need. As we strive to filter the good (true) information from the bad 
(false)—and do so quickly, mechanically and reliably – we need to be receptive. 
Receptive thought, however, is also non-reflective and it works under the surface 
of conscious attention, allowing us to more easily select and choose sources that 
validate our existing opinions (confirmation bias). 
2. Responsible knowledge. The second is the sort of knowing we value whenever 
possessing reasons or experience matters. You can give some evidence on a 
matter, you know many facts, but still lack comprehension. 
3. Understanding. And the third is different still—it is the sort of knowing we expect 
of our most creative experts—even if those experts are more intuitive than 
discursive in their abilities. Understanding is what we have when we know not 
only the “what” but the “why.” Understanding involves knowing not just the facts, 
but also the how or why something is the case. You understand when you see not 
just the isolated aspects, but how those aspects hang together. In turn, 
understanding is a form of knowing that involves grasping relationships—the 
network, or parts and whole. 
Thus, there is a very sharp difference between knowing facts and knowing how. Knowing-
which, then, is another fundamental element of understanding. Understanding increases 
the ability to ask the right questions. Experts (those who understand a given subject best) 
are often able to increase their understanding even further because they have the ability 
to know which question they should ask in the face of new information. “Downloading 
knowledge” other people have acquired via experience isn’t the same as having that 
experience yourself, isn’t the same as personal trial and error and creative adaptation in 
the face of circumstance, so it does not give mastery, and not even the understanding that 
comes with it. Even worse, somehow paradoxically, it is often the case that the ones who 
really have a certain expertise likely feel the so-called “impostor syndrome”, which means 
that even if they are experts they are full of doubts about their knowledge, while those 
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who really don’t understand often have an “overconfidence effect”, which means that one 
is so confident about its own knowledge. Similarly, as the philosopher Bertrand Russell 
famously and concisely argued in a never confirmed quotation: “the whole problem with 
the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, and wise people 
so full of doubts.” 
    As a result, conspiracy theories find a natural medium for their diffusion in social media 
and, also, for their validation through search engines. Certainly, the growth of knowledge 
fostered by information societies with the unprecedented acceleration of scientific and 
technological progress has exposed society to an increasing level of complexity to explain 
reality and its phenomena. Narratives grounded on conspiracy theories tend to reduce the 
complexity of reality and are able to contain the uncertainty they generate (Bessi et al., 
2015). Literature addresses the study of social dynamics on socio-technical systems from 
social contagion up to social reinforcement. The extent of the phenomenon is dramatic. 
Human imagination, paranoia and self-deception in order to reduce complexity, indeed, 
are extremely powerful and influencing a significant amount of population. Consider that 
4% of U.S. population, 12 millions of people endorsed the notion that ‘shape-shifting 
reptilian people control our world by taking on human form and gaining power’ (Oksman, 
2016). Other more widespread beliefs nourished by suspicious, ill-informed thinking 
raise greater concerns. Notably, the no-vax movement that moved from theoretical 
accusations to practical consequences, namely no-vax-supporting politicians. Inevitably 
conspiracy theory results, in the dissemination of distrust for media, politics and science. 
While the formers may even deserve to be highly contested in order to be reformed, the 
latest should remain democratic societies’ safety net. 
   To conclude, the internet is – to some extent – causing a collective deception: users 
consume a lot of information but rarely internalize it and act upon it. Google-knowing, 
while a basis for understanding, is not itself the same as understanding because it is not a 
creative act. Also, social media, as a novel source of information, are designed in a way 
that makes us comfortable with our pre-existing beliefs while making it more difficult to 
confront dissonant information. Reaching understanding is something that one must do 
for oneself as involves an element of individual cognitive achievement, without 
delegating to the medium, and it requires an open and constructive confrontation with the 
otherness, preferably offline. A true understanding needs a reflexive element and, most 
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importantly, reliable sources of information. Apparently, internet and social media do not 
openly sustain these preconditions. 
 
1.2.5 The Risks of Misinformation 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) listed massive digital misinformation as one of the 
main risks for modern society (Howell, 2013). Internet and in particular social media are 
increasingly weaponised, especially for propaganda reasons. Certainly, it is not a new 
phenomenon. Yet, the manipulation of our perception of the world is taking place on 
previously unimaginable scales of time, space and intentionality (EU commission, 2018). 
There is indeed plentiful of information wars among several actors — state or non-state 
political actors, for-profit actors, media, citizens, individually or groups — to the 
detriment of citizens and societies at large. The risk of harm includes threats to democratic 
processes, including electoral integrity, and to democratic values that shape public 
policies in a variety of sectors, such as health, science, finance and more. Bot, “fake-
news” and micro-targeting are the primary weapons. This has become evident in the last 
years, especially after Brexit and Trump’s election, with the potential role played by 
Russia and other actors. Fake-news, intended as “fabricated information that mimics news 
media content in form but not in organizational process or intent” (Lazer et al., 2018), 
became a buzzword - not to be confused with overlapping concepts like: misinformation 
– “which is information that is false, but not created with the intention of causing harm” 
–disinformation – “which is information that is false and deliberately created to harm a 
person, social group, organization or country” – and malinformation – “which is 
information that is based on reality, used to inflict harm on a person, organization or 
country” (Wardle and Derakhshan, p.20, 2017). 
  Social Media in particular, and the Internet more generally, faces accusations of 
deteriorating civil debate to the point that facts and truth are now fertile ground for dispute 
and subjectivity, while trust with experts and authorities have decreased. This is 
particularly relevant on political issues. Politics no longer functions through “rational 
discourse”, if ever. Traditionally, politicians bend the truth, in the sense that if they are 
found lying they would provide justifications. This tradition is deteriorating. More 
recently, the distrust with media led many people to accept politicians (prominently the 
president of United States Donald Trump) to refuse to justify their actions and words. On 
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the one hand, what is occurring is that voters are treated as malleable – aiming at the 
visceral and emotional level – rather than convinced with reason. On the other hand, the 
optimism about the coexistence of democracy and expertise may be well displaced. If the 
“post-truth era” starts to implode current knowledge structures, then it is not 
democratization anymore, rather it is the path to authoritarianism.  
    Epistemic competition is as much about which truth can be relevant and about which 
claims can be considered true or false, and these choices have important consequences. 
Civil society not only needs a common currency to exchange money but they also need a 
common currency to exchange reasons. This could be what philosopher David Hume 
called a “common point of view”— reasons that can move some universal principle of 
the human frame, and touch a string, to which all mankind have an accord and symphony 
(in Lynch, 2015). The point, as Lynch (Ibid) argues, is not that we should all agree but 
that if we cannot agree on what counts as evidence, on our epistemic principles, then we 
are not playing by the same rules. When you can’t agree on your principles of evidence 
and rationality, you can’t agree on the facts and, in turn, you can hardly agree on what to 
do in the face of the facts. This just increases tribalization, and so on and on in a recurring 
loop. That is the major risk of a post-truth era.  
   The paradigm of the extent of information war is that it has grown to such proportions 
that the idea of “fact-checking” is treated with suspicion. The main reason is that our 
politics are governed by passion. Reasons are indeed far less influential than intuition and 
emotion. Trying to draw reasons to convince our cultural opponents usually fail. At the 
same time, the Internet makes it considerably easier to manipulate people’s expectations, 
partly due to its relative anonymity. Partly because the expectation-setting context is 
increasingly difficult to track. The Internet is a bloodied, chaotic battleground for the truth 
wars. And as we can’t extricate ourselves from our perceptions, how can we decide which 
of those perceptions reflect things as they really are and which are the products of our 
own minds? 
   Social Media could undermine the importance of objectivity. But what we mean by 
objective truths? Truths are objective when what makes them true isn’t just up to us, when 
they aren’t constructed. Yet, they can always be in part constructed. Rather, one can be 
objective. According to Lynch (2015), a person is objective, or has an objective attitude, 
to the extent to which he or she is sensitive to reason. Being sensitive to reason involves 
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an awareness of individual limitation, being alert to the fact that beliefs may not stem 
from reason but prejudice, a viewpoint alone. Objectivity requires open-mindedness. 
Being objective, or sensitive to reasons, however, is no guarantee of certainty. A simpler 
explanation is that the apparent ‘post-truth’ can be explained as the result of the 
manipulations of trust brought by echo chambers, where certain communities have a 
vastly divergent set of trusted authorities. Members of an echo chamber are not irrational 
but misinformed about where to place their trust (Nguyen, 2018). What is, then, the role 

































2. Online Personalization and Its Challenges 
Algorithms play an increasingly important role in the media; smart tools that assist 
journalists in producing their stories, fully automated production of news stories (so-
called robot journalism), audience analytics that inform editorial board decisions and, of 
course, recommender systems and personalization systems. They are more than a 
technology. They can actually affect the news ecosystem on at least three levels: news 
production and distribution, individual users, the broader media ecology and society more 
generally. They in fact need to be intended as ‘a socio-economic construct, that is, as 
technologies that are embedded in organisations with their own goals, values and 
fundamental freedoms, and that mediate and impact interactions with the 
human/economic/social environment in which they are functioning’ (CoE, 2020, p. 3). 
While still in their early days, these tools can have profound implications for the overall 
quality and diversity of the information offer provided by the news media. They also 
promise several opportunities; for example by featuring societally relevant stories from 
the long tail, identify the most relevant stories for a user, taking into account the context 
of news use, cater to different reading habits related to our different social roles, enabling 
new forms of investigative data-driven journalism, enhancing diversity on various levels, 
and fostering a deeper understanding between societal groups.   
   In this chapter, we focus specifically on the role of online personalization in social 
media, mainly driven by recommender systems but, also, by design choices that can affect 
the algorithmic outputs as well as users’ behaviors. As such, we try to shed lights on what 
is personalization, how can we define it, how it works, what are its limitations, challenges 
and opportunities, how users think of and know about it, how platforms are currently 
using it, and, ultimately, how future personalization might look like. By doing this, we 
implicitly apply the analytical toolbox of Science and Technology Studies to analyze 
online personalization as a complex socio-technical construct, reviewing the most up-to-
date literature from an interdisciplinary perspective, and highlighting challenges and 






2.1 What is Online Personalization? 
Nowadays, personalization has become ubiquitous and it underlies every social media 
engagement, many apps and platforms. Yet, personalization remains an ambiguous and 
under-examined concept, lacking of consensus on its essential characteristics. With 
personalization it can be broadly intended “data-driven profiling of consumers or citizens 
to deliver a customised or personalized service, advert or legal response. Personal data is 
interpreted in conjunction with big data, using sophisticated algorithms, to create a picture 
of who someone is based on who they were - their past preferences, activities, networks 
and behaviours - in order to make a future-oriented prediction of what they might like 
(i.e. which film), what might persuade them (i.e. which ad), how they might act (i.e. 
commit a crime or succeed in a job) or what they might deserve (i.e. promotion or public 
housing).” (Kohl et al., 2019). More concretely, in everyday Internet usage most people 
usually benefit from such personalization when Netflix suggests them a movie, Youtube 
a video, Facebook a stream of information, Spotify new music and Amazon related 
products. Still, what is intended with personalization need to be further discussed. 
   Basically, how does personalization work? Normally, it relies on data used to build 
profiles with which one can infer certain predictions through more or less sophisticated 
algorithms. As humans naturally categorize, generalize and classify the world around 
them to reduce complexity, algorithms can indeed be programmed to automatically 
process information in similar ways. Profiling practices, thus, create, discover or 
construct knowledge from large sets of data from a variety of sources that then are used 
to make or inform decisions. In the book Profiling the European Citizen, Hildebrandt and 
Gutwirth (2008) gave a concise definition of profiling: “Profiling is a matter of pattern 
recognition, which is comparable to categorization, generalization and stereotyping 
(p.365).” Of course, profiling can occur in a range of contexts and for a variety of 
purposes. In the case of social media personalization, profiling makes or informs 
decisions (presumed preferences) that personalize a user’s media environment (e.g. 
content selection and ordering). With large media providers no longer serving a 
gatekeeping function, the consumption of information turned on the choices of individual 
users and algorithms, mediated by profiling. 
   Clearly, these complex predictive processes of decision-guidance and decision-making 
raise serious theoretical issues, offering limitless benign opportunities as well as 
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dystopian realities. Before to analyze these, in order to better grasp the outcomes and 
potential undesirable and unintended consequences of personalization, it is worth provide 
an overview on the major notions, processes and theories involved in these techniques. 
Some general questions are addressed, such as: what are the technical steps for 
personalization? How data is collected and how inferences drawn? What kind of data and 
decisions are inferred? What is (or what could be) the individual role in such process? 
Ultimately, what might look personalization in the future? 
 
2.1.1 Personalization in Social Media 
Another useful definition of personalization is provided by Thurman et al. (2013); 
personalization is defined as “a form of user-to-system interactivity that uses a set of 
technological features to adapt the content, delivery, and arrangement of a 
communication to individual users’ explicitly registered and/or implicitly determined 
preferences” (p.2). This definition highlights a fundamental issue: personalization can be 
explicit or implicit, that is, it can depend on user’s requests and/or user’s behavioural data 
(which is more often created unknowingly and unwittingly). Personalization can thus be 
based on the individual autonomy of choice or on the algorithmic/platform delegation to 
infer one’s personal preferences. In more detail, personalization can be: 
• Explicit: the user customizes the information source himself. The user can register 
his interests or other personal information before the personalization starts. The 
user can also rate topics of interest. Explicit user information collection will allow 
the user to know that the personalization is taking place and he can tailor it to his 
needs. Yet, one problem with explicit feedback is that it places an additional 
burden on the user. Because of this, or because of privacy concerns, the user may 
not choose to participate. It is also known that users may not accurately report 
their own interests or demographic data and that the user’s interests may change 
over time. 
• Implicit: the system determines what the user is interested in through various 
factors, including web usage mining (i.e., previous interaction with the system 
such as click throughs, browsing history, previous queries, time spent reading 
information about a product), IP address, cookies, etc. Implicit user information 
collection, on the other hand, does not require any additional intervention by the 
user during the process of constructing profiles. It also automatically updates as 
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the user interacts with the system. One drawback of implicit feedback techniques 
is that they can typically only capture positive feedback. When a user clicks on an 
item or views a page, it seems reasonable to assume that this indicates some user 
interest in the item. It is not clear, however, when a user fails to examine some 
data item whether it is an indication of disinterest. 
Both implicit and explicit personalization increased dramatically in the last years, though 
many websites have acted to make passive forms of personalization the fastest growing 
forms (Thurman, 2011). This is concerning and need further discussion (as will highlight 
in Chapter 4). 
 
                          
Figure 2. Basic User profile construction for personalization (from Bozdag and van de Poel, 
2013). 
 
         
Figure 3. A General Taxonomy of the Main Algorithms Employed in Online Recommendations (from Lepri 
et al., 2017). 
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2.1.2 Recommender Systems 
Among the diverse algorithmic functions, in this research we are more interested in 
information filtering and ranking. Specifically, in recommender systems (RSs). With RSs 
is intended computer-based data-driven software tools and techniques that provide 
suggestions for items to be of use to a user (Ricci et al., 2015). These systems represent 
the most important engines of personalization. They have emerged in the early ’90s and 
in 2006 they attracted much attention with the famous Netflix prize to improve movies’ 
recommendations with hybrid RSs. Then, the widespread of social media and 
smartphones providing a lot of contextual information such as time, place, the emotion 
of people and groups opened up a new avenue of recommendation known as contextual 
RS.  
   In essence, RSs try to analyze how a user values certain products or services and then 
predict what the user will be interested in next. “Item” is the general term used to denote 
what the system recommends to users. RSs are primarily directed towards individuals 
who lack sufficient personal experience or competence to evaluate the potentially 
overwhelming number of alternative items that a platform, for example, may offer. To 
carry out this task every RS employs some information retrieval techniques such as 
Machine learning and different algorithms like logistic regression, decision tree, 
association rule learning, cluster, Bayesian networks and support vector machine, etc. 
Peoples from various disciplines such as data mining, information retrieval, knowledge 
discovery, artificial intelligence, approximation theory, forecasting theory, information 
security and privacy, and business and marketing have contributed extensively with 
diverse research approaches. 
   Personalization and recommender systems are often used interchangeably. Actually, a 
recommendation is a form of personalization, but personalization is not a form of 
recommendation. For example, YouTube might suggest related videos based on previous 
viewing habits, this is a recommendation based on what other YouTube users also 
watched. A restaurant, however, might suggest a table by the window based on a previous 
booking you have made. This is personalization, as it is based on the specific habits of 
the individual and not a broad algorithm. The more you know about a person, not just 
their viewing habits, the better. In other words, a recommendation is often built around 
items (e.g. collaborative-filtering), whereas personalization is built around individuals 
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(i.e. individual profiling). There is of course much overlap, and the more informed and 
well designed a recommendation engine becomes, more on that in a moment, the closer 
to personalization such methods become. Also, personalization is depending on explicit 
inputs and design choices and, therefore, it is much more adjustable. 
   This distinction is important also for the subject choice of this research and need to be 
clarified. In fact, one could have chosen RSs as the paradigm of personalization and 
potentially a more specific object of analysis to undertake. Instead, personalization is a 
more complex and comprehensive phenomenon of interest; it is indeed more specific to 
the individuals, it is composed of design choices that affect and influence recommender 
systems and, eventually, it sustains a marketing rhetoric that is more attractive than RSs 
themselves. Personalization is thus a broader subject that ultimately shape the whole 
personal information environment online. 
   Going back to RSs, recommendation mechanism typically does not use an explicit 
query but rather analyses the user context (e.g., what the user has recently purchased or 
read) and, if available, a user profile (e.g., the user likes x or y). Then the recommendation 
mechanism presents to the user one or more descriptions of objects (e.g., books, people, 
movies) that may be of interest.  
   Generally, RSs can be divided into three main types: content-based (also called 
“semantic filtering”), collaborative (also called “social filtering”), and hybrid (most of 
the RSs) (Ricci et al., 2015): 
▪ Content-based filtering. If recommendations are done solely by analyzing the 
associations between the user’s past choices and the descriptions of new objects.  
▪ Collaborative filtering. It automates the process of “word-of-mouth” 
recommendations: items are recommended to a user based upon values assigned 
by other people with similar taste. The system determines which users have 
similar taste via standard formulas for computing statistical correlations.  
▪ Hybrid. The most common form of RSs today are hybrid recommenders, which 
combine features from both content-based and collaborative systems or other 
elements such as demographics, communities or editorial selections. 
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What we are interested in this paper-based thesis, however, is, in particular, news2 RSs – 
that are essentially used by media organizations, news aggregators and social media 
platforms – and, more generally, social media’s personalization. They are in fact 
increasingly relevant. According to recent findings (Newman, 2016), almost 70 percent 
of online news users surveyed across 37 different markets worldwide identified 
distributed forms of discovery as their main way of accessing and finding news online, 
with search and social media being by far the most influential factors, followed by 
aggregators, email and mobile alerts. 
   With the advent of the Internet, traditional models of information and news production, 
distribution and consumption have indeed radically changed. In order to provide relevant 
information to users, the epochal transition from information scarcity to information 
abundance brought the need for a balance between a pull and a push approach or, in other 
words, between user requests and algorithmic delegation (Thurman and Schifferes, 2012). 
This legitimized mainstream social media’s gatekeeping role. The gatekeeping process is 
studied extensively by multiple disciplines, including media studies, sociology and 
management in order to address traditional media bias, namely how certain events are 
being treated more newsworthy than others and how institutions or influential individuals 
determine which information passes to the receivers (i.e. what are the values or moral 
perspective from which select the news). In this context, some major changes occurred: 
a) the increasing role of the audience in which users can determine what is newsworthy 
through social networks, b) the changing role of the journalist, from a gatekeeper to a 
gatewatcher, and c) the delegation to increasingly sophisticated algorithms (i.e. news 
RSs). 
   As such, scholars argued that by using online services, the audience can exert a greater 
control over news selection and can focus on issues that they consider more relevant, 
which in turn empowers audiences and erodes the degree of editorial influence over the 
public’s issue agenda. Others even argued that the gatekeeping role performed by the 
traditional media becomes irrelevant and gates are disappearing. Importantly, in general 
user interests become more important than content quality or social significance (DeVito, 
 
2 While in this thesis the word ‘information’ is used more generically, news is considered as a specific kind of 
information with respect to its unique function in society, namely “information that should enable citizens to know 
what is regarded as important, contested, or an issue of public interest that should be deliberated upon (p.5)” (Bernstein 
et al., 2020). 
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2017). This kind of rhetoric makes data-driven personalization very appealing in our 
hyper-individualized societies. As Kohl et al. (2019) notes, terminology offers some 
insights on the acceptability of the phenomenon. In the market place where predictive 
profiling is welcomed by users and offered by businesses as added value, it is referred to 
as ‘personalization’, ‘customisation’, ‘optimisation’ or ‘smart’ technology. 
   To provide a paradigmatic example of a RS, Facebook uses a collaborative filtering 
called Edgerank, which adds a weight to produced user stories (i.e. links, images, 
comments) and relationships between people. Depending on interaction among people, 
the site determines whether or not the produced story is displayed in a particular user’s 
newsfeed. In this way, a produced story by a user will not be seen by everyone in that 
user’s contact list. All stories produced by user X can be completely hidden in user Y’s 
newsfeed, without the knowledge of both users. In fact, social media platforms are not 
just communication companies that uniquely shape social networks and their dynamics 
processes, but also large advertising agencies driven by profit (Fuchs, 2015). The 
underlying automated ‘engagement maximization’ of mainstream platforms brings 
several concerns that we will highlight throughout the thesis to which they add also other 
challenges.  
   Some of the most relevant technical and methodological challenges that arise from RSs 
– especially relevant to the context of social media’s personalization – are summarized as 
follows:  
• Data collection. Above all, data collection, validity and reliability of data are some 
of the most pressing issues. For example, there is the need to acknowledge the gap 
between behavioral data and actual user experience (Loecherbach and Trilling, 
2019). 
• Time. The performance of most RSs evolves over time and an increasing 
familiarity of the users with the system also changes how they interact with it 
(Ricci et al., 2015). Especially in news RSs, it is also very important as well as 
challenging to focus on timeliness (e.g. while an old book might still be 
interesting, the news of yesterday might be not). 
• Design. For example, objectively acknowledged practical challenge is the small 
screen size of mobile phones, which nowadays constitute most of the accesses to 
Internet platforms. This becomes ever more relevant when designers want to 
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empower users with tools to use during navigation. 
• Interdisciplinary Debate. There is a fragmentation of the debate, partly because 
of the newness of the technology, partly because of the proprietary algorithms and 
privacy issues involved (Milano et al., 2019). 
• User’s RSs Control. Balancing implicit and explicit personalization is 
fundamental both for RSs quality and, also, for users’ autonomy and, eventually, 
dignity. 
• Trust. A significant issue is the so-called black-box problem which occurs when 
the system is opaque towards the end-user, causing decreased levels of 
confidence. The potential of the recommendation is thus diminished leading to 
unsuccessful attempts of recommendation. By providing the transparent reasons 
to the user, such as ratings on an item provided by similar users, the users are 
motivated to place their trust and confidence in the recommendation as well as the 
recommended items. 
• Generalization of Results. Fundamentally, the assessment of mainstream private 
social media RSs is restricted for outside researchers. Given that each user is 
served a personalized selection of recommendations, it is difficult for any 
individual observer to make generalizable conclusions about the performance of 
the system as a whole. As we only know our own news feeds we can only guess 
what others are seeing (Leersen, 2020). 
• Performance Assessment. Most studies often remain in an evaluation setting 
where RSs are compared without user interaction. To better understand the risks 
of RSs, it might be also meaningful to confront participants with ‘failed’ 
algorithms that lock them in filter bubbles or ignore their wishes (Loecherbach 
and Trilling, 2019).  
• Metrics. It is paramount the development of metrics to evaluate the quality of RSs 
(e.g. accuracy, diversity, serendipity etc.). 
• Values. In general, it is fundamental to understand how to identify, operationalize, 
inscribe and assess values into the system (Helberger, 2019). 
• Diversity. Similarly, identifying, measuring and optimising for diverse 
recommendations is acknowledged as relevant. For example, the over-
specialization problem, as the risk to provide too many narrow and similar items 
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or the long-tail problem, as the risk that if an item is initially not well-rated or not 
rated at all then over the time it will perish from the recommendation catalog, 
despite its potential quality. 
To conclude, it should be highlighted that RSs are highly context-dependent, that is, they 
depend on often changing parameters: dataset (what the space of options is), values, (what 
counts as a good recommendation) and assessment (how RS’s performance can be 
evaluated) (Milano et al., 2019). Furthermore, RSs serve multiple goals and a purely user-
centered approach does not allow all such goals to enter into the design so that the 
perspectives and utilities of multiple stakeholders (e.g. companies, investors, news outlet 
and, broadly, society) must be taken into account. For example, a multistakeholder 
approach could be applied based on a utility-oriented approach so as to integrate concerns 
from all actors involved, not only users, nor platforms, (Abdollahpouri et al., 2017). Such 
approach is also useful to conceptualize explicitly the impact that RSs have on different 
levels. 
 
2.1.3 Future Personalization 
To date almost all of the RSs have been designed for sellers, producers, and service 
providers; i.e., they are designed to attract potential customers. Future RSs will not only 
be limited to business, but they will have a much greater impact on our daily life. If we 
imagine the future of personalization, we can quite confidently argue that algorithms with 
powerful design (e.g. smart assistants) will guide us and make ever more sophisticated 
and reliable decisions for us and about us. Imaginative efforts of this emerging worlds 
have been done from literature to academic books and papers. It is often told that 
algorithms will wake up us softly with our most preferred music, make the perfect 
breakfast, the one that our physician recommended us, choose the street we take, the 
people we meet, the books and news we read, similarly to nowadays, but even suggesting 
the most important choices of life – what to study, whether to accept a job offer or whether 
to marry. These kind of cognitive outsourcing are provided by AI-driven algorithmic 
decision-making and decision-guidance. They promise us to enhance our lives preserving 
our time and energy and nudging us towards healthier behaviors and better decisions. The 
ethical questions of this potential development will be discussed in Section 4.2.6. Here 
only general expectation towards the development of personalization is done. 
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   The ideal RS should be like someone who knows us better than we know ourselves. 
They should sense our need and will suggest instinctively, even if we do not express 
explicitly. Few other fields like the Internet of Things (IoT), Internet of Everything (IoE), 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), Cognitive Computing, Affective Computing (cognitive 
science and psychology), etc., will play a significant role in future RSs. Clearly, there is 
a fair amount of unpredictability in communication technology development, preventing 
precise predictions regarding what future implementations of personalization will look 
like. Yet, it is expected the rising of Ambient Intelligence related to the Internet of Things. 
This construct offers a vision in which automatic smart online and offline environments 
and devices interact with each other, taking an unprecedented number of decisions for us 
and about us to cater to our inferred preferences, representing a new paradigm in the 
construction of knowledge (Hildebrandt and Koops, 2010). 
   The major differentiating point of future RSs will be the intelligent use of ubiquitous 
data. Data will be captured, assessed and analyzed literally from anywhere and for 
anything. Though tackling the ever-increasing data will be a great challenge for the future 
RS designers because the current algorithms may not be straightforwardly scalable to 
cope up the unforeseen amount of data. The major challenge in designing the RSs will be 
to restrict them to be irritatingly interfering in the personalized domain. On the other 
hand, existing RSs are generally generic in nature. They don’t really reflect each user’s 
individualized taste. So, the future RS designers have to set a balance between the two, 
i.e., it will neither be too generic nor too intrusive. 
 
2.2 Personalization and Its Challenges 
Personalization occurs largely beyond the control of users as it is based on implicit 
personalization—behavioural data collected from subconscious activity—rather than on 
deliberate and expressed preferences. Even though there is a fair amount of 
unpredictability in communication technology development, it seems that implicit 
personalization is likely to become a default choice in future personalization (Thurman 
and Schifferes 2012). It is indeed imagined the idea of Ambient Intelligence related to the 
Internet of Things. This construct offers a vision in which automatic smart online and 
offline environments and devices interact with each other, taking an unprecedented 
number of decisions for us and about us in order to cater to our inferred preferences. This 
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may represent a new paradigm in the construction of knowledge (Hildebrandt and Koops, 
2010). This often uninformed delegation can lead to several undesirable unintended 
consequences. For example, it increases political selective exposure—people’s ability to 
see information that conforms to their pre-existing ideas and priorities— as it makes 
information avoidance less psychologically costly (Dylko et al., 2018).  
   Personalization algorithms are novel and complex entities, and they require novel 
solutions and public discussions around their development and regulation. There are, in 
fact, three main intertwined ‘paradoxes’ that highlight the complexities to fairly govern 
personalization. Firstly, the ‘personalization paradox’, that is, a trade-off between privacy 
and personalization accuracy. Secondly, and strictly related, the ‘privacy paradox’, that 
is, the infamous users’ inconsistent will to protect their own privacy. And thirdly, the 
‘paradox of choice’, that is, the more choices users have, the more easily they rely on 
simple-to-use personalization tools.3 In other words, in order for personalization systems 
to provide a ‘better service’, users are surveilled and datafied to extract ever more value. 
Even if they disagree – as they more often do – they do not proactively react. Even in 
cases where the users are provided with more agency, they are unlikely to take advantage. 
Relatedly, there are arise other specific-related concerns, such as reductionism – in 
particular various related biases – information asymmetry, privacy, diversity and 
autonomy concerns. 
 
2.2.1 Reductionism  
Profiling technologies that allow personalization create a kind of knowledge that is 
inherently probabilistic. Moreover, data used are derived only from what is actually 
observed and are a small subset of possibly observed behaviors. Then, this narrow subset 
of recorded behaviors must be converted into a digital (database) representation. In this 
process, Information may be lost. Thus, three key characteristics of personalization arise:    
1. Personalization is highly behaviorist its assumptions. Behaviorism seeks to 
eliminate theoretical causal mechanisms of human behavior (beliefs, intentions, 
goals, etc.) and focus instead on what can be observed measured and recorded. As 
such, behaviors most amenable to measurement tend to be recorded.   
 
3 A paradigmatic example is Youtube’s recommendations which already drive more than 70% of the time spent in the 
video sharing platform and 90% of the ‘related content’ is indeed personalized. 
See https: //www.cnet.com/news/youtube-ces-2018-neal-mohan and https://youtube.tracking.exposed/data. 
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2. Personalization focuses on predicting a very narrow set of possible behaviors, 
often limited by the context of the application. This can make it seem more 
powerful and accurate than it really is, especially when predictive performance is 
evaluated.  
3. Personalization uses data not only from the individual user, but also from other 
users. This is clear in the case of RSs using social network data (e.g. collaborative 
filtering). This questions the extent to which personalization are actually 
personalized.   
As a matter of fact, profiling technologies that fuel personalization cannot produce or 
detect a sense of self (Hildebrandt, 2009). The problem is that they can influence the 
individual’s sense of self, especially in the long-run daily social media information 
consumption. The underlined – somehow inevitable – reductionism is concerning because 
it can undermine the sense and development of the self and may ultimately serve only the 
interests of service providers.  
   On the one hand, profiling algorithms are naturally stuck in the past, and this can steer 
individuals to conform to the status quo of their past actions chosen by past selves. 
Individuals might even start to want what is recommended to them without even 
recognizing it, in a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. This could perpetuate existing 
inequalities and other pathologies, while threatening the foundational microeconomics 
principle of preference formation. Individuals, in fact, have different “orders” of 
preferences: “first-order preference” is expressed in how we behave in the moment that a 
stimulus or temptation affects our consciousness. In contrast, “second-order preference” 
is the choice we make for ourselves upon further reflection, generally separated from the 
immediate temptation. Think of the snake offering the forbidden fruit in the Garden of 
Eden (first-order preference: eat fruit), and the initial resistance (second-order preference: 
don’t eat it). Online behavior seems to enable much more fluid expression of first-order 
preferences. In this way, personalization algorithms can shrink the individual 
“aspirational self” (or second-order preferences). In the longer term, this process might 
undermine individuals’ capacity to develop and maintain an integral sense of self, that is 
preconditional to autonomy.  
   On the other hand, under cover of “personalizing” information, services and products 
we are witnessing a colonization of public space by a hypertrophied private sphere. Social 
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structures and social relationships, which are historically contingent, find themselves 
reduced to an algorithm and/or a computer application. They imply the reproduction and 
naturalization of diverse power relations and forms of social inequality.  Such algorithmic 
governance is indifferent to individuals, insofar as it simply focuses on and controls our 
“statistical doubles”, in other words combinations of correlations, produced automatically 
and using big data, themselves constituted or collected “by default”. In general, 
engineers’ approach can take two directions: build more advanced techniques, or simplify 
the user interface to convert the recorded human activity in a defined set of possibilities, 
reducing complexity. Modern advancements in technology use both (Harris, 2019). In 
many cases, in fact, personalization relies on the comparability or even sameness (by 
some simplified categories) of the user with others (e.g. collaborative filtering). Thus, 
personalzsation paradoxically denies individual uniqueness through a “smart” 
homogenization that negotiates the diversity of humankind (Yeung, 2018). Through 
constructing, manipulating, and reinforcing such homogenizing categories, data-driven 
personalization thus works on the premise of “divide et impera”—that is, segment 
individuals into markets and sell as much as possible personalized ads. 
 
Figure 4. From humanistic concepts of the person to personalized scores: ML operationalization requires 
narrowing a person embedded in social and cultural space to a feature vector embedded in feature space 
(from Greene and Shmueli, 2019). 
 
Eventually, here it lies difficult philosophical questions such as: which information 
should constitute me as a person? And, ultimately, what is a person? These questions are 
problematic as "person" is often justified through a particular worldview (Greene and 
Shmueli, 2019); It could mean "human animal,” "moral agent,” "rational, self-conscious 
subject” etc.. Yet, Western thought has historically focused on two general aspects of the 
person, one of which is revealed through the etymology of the word itself. "Person" comes 
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from the Latin persona, which derives from the Ancient Greek word for a type of mask 
worn by dramatic actors. For the Ancient Greeks, the idea of a person was inherently 
connected to context and role. One’s persona was a specific kind of self-identity that was 
public, socially defined, and varied depending on context. Over time, the outward-facing 
Greek conception was complemented by a Christian emphasis on self-reflection and 
awareness, resulting in a focus on the human capacity for rational introspection. As a 
result, Western thought has generally viewed the person as consisting in two co-existing 
inner and outer domains. 
   The inner aspects of individuals, however, are inaccessible through observational 
methods. Individual, subjective input from the same person is therefore crucial in 
measuring the level of personalization. Hildebrandt (2017) also argues that the 
‘multiplicity of the self’ is not computable and that such incomputable nature of the self 
should be somehow protected. In fact, not only no personal profile can ever entirely 
identify an individual, but there are always many—and sometimes radically different— 
ways of computing the same person. 
   Understanding the person in fact requires description at multiple levels. Personality 
psychologists define personality as a an organized set of relatively enduring 
psychological traits that guide a person’s interactions with her "intrapsychic, physical, 
and social environments." These traits can be expressed as the "Big 5" dimensions of 
personality: Openness to New Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (known as OCEAN), and have been shown to have 
varying levels of predictive power. Consider that just dozens of Facebook ‘likes’ can 
reveal highly accurate correlations on personality (Youyu et al., 2015).     
   Yet, identity/self/personality are complex and intertwined concepts that cannot be 
easily reduced. Personality and social psychologists highlight the power of the cultural 
context in defining identity. For identity theorists in sociology and psychology, the self 
is fluid and occupies multiple social roles (identity theory) or group identities (social 
identity theory) that coexist and vary over time. The dynamism of the self-concept is 
reflected in its numerous sub-components or self-representations: the past, present, and 
future self; the ideal, "ought," actual, possible, and undesired self. These views ultimately 
highlight the processual, dynamic, and emergent nature of the self that, in mainstream 




One of the primary challenges for RSs is, consequently, privacy. Algorithmic biases, 
information asymmetries and reductionism, all raise the question of how to better protect 
privacy. Furthermore, there is an obvious trade-off between privacy and accuracy of 
recommendations, thus making privacy fundamentally at stake in personalization 
practices. Yet, privacy is not a clear-cut concept and, therefore, we need to problematize 
it providing an overview of its meaning as well as a brief history of its debate. 
   Privacy is a very broad concept encompassing “freedom of thought, control over one's 
body, solitude in one's home, control over information about oneself, freedom from 
surveillance, protection of one's reputation, and protection from searches and 
interrogations.” (Solove 2002, p.1088). The lack of a consensus on the substance of 
privacy notwithstanding, there have been considerable efforts to conceptualize the notion. 
Drawing from the privacy literature, Bygrave (2001) posits that privacy as a concept 
could be classified into four types: 
• Privacy in terms of ‘non-interference’ advanced by Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis in their 1890 Harvard Law Review article titled ‘The Right to be Let 
Alone’. 
• Privacy in terms of ‘information control,’ popularized by Alan Westin’s definition 
of privacy (1967)  as ‘the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others’. 
• Privacy in terms of ‘limited accessibility’ popularized by Ruth Gavison which 
presupposes a condition consisting of three elements: ‘secrecy’ (‘the extent to 
which we are known to others’); ‘solitude’ (‘the extent to which others have 
physical access to us’); and 'anonymity' ('the extent to which we are the subject of 
others' attention'). 
• Privacy in terms of those aspects of persons' lives that are 'intimate' or 'sensitive', 
defined by Julie Inness 'the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate 
decisions, which includes decisions about intimate access, intimate information, 
and intimate actions’. 
More generally, Fuster (2014) observes that privacy in the sense of serving the realization 
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of individuals’ own lives has furthermore been coupled with the notion of human dignity; 
the basic assumption being that it is inherent to the human condition to develop freely 
without any form of external dictation (from the community or the State).  
   Despite the variety of research and attempts to categorize it, privacy has been 
principally regarded in terms of control and autonomy over (personal) information. Over 
the years, the paradigm has evolved from the control of the communication of information 
to others to an emphasis on the individual’s control over their information. The control-
based definition of privacy has remained largely unchanged since then. Yet, it has been 
criticized for several reasons, among them, for being “counterintuitive” and for relying 
on the false assumption that information is something that can be controlled, but also 
because privacy as control rarely aligns with the reality of people’s practice with their 
personal information and it ignores information asymmetries and ‘bounded rationality’ 
(Nissenbaum, 2011; Acquisti et al., 2015). Also, it is argued that privacy can promote an 
individualistic approach that can go against the common good and that can even be used 
to carry out illegal or antisocial activities (e.g. financial privacy). 
   Despite inevitable criticism to the above privacy conceptions, there emerges a 
significant theoretical tension: the classical Western conception of privacy based on the 
idea of individual autonomy as opposed to relational autonomy, based instead on a 
contextualized perspective of autonomy. The concept of individual autonomy has been 
questioned by many critics from many other areas other than privacy studies, including 
psychiatry, moral philosophy, medicine, etc.. Instead, the term relational privacy 
(Bannerman 2019) is used to broadly categorize all conceptions of privacy that rest on 
relational autonomy and hence adopt a contextualized (or networked) perspective. 
Feminist theory, in particular, rejects the classic Kantian concept of autonomy as being 
atomistic, advocating relational autonomy as an alternative. In different forms, that 
perspective is also embraced by Japanese culture, Confucianism, Buddhism, Indian 
culture and the African Ubuntu philosophy (Reviglio and Alunge, 2020). 
   The application of big data and machine learning further challenges the existence of a 
clear information boundary that can be used to build a clear definition of personal 
information. For example, it is unclear if information inferred by machine learning 
algorithms about a person falls within the categorization of personal information.  In 
theory, if all data has a potential to impact people, then all data could be considered 
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personal data (Purtova 2018). In addition, algorithms can often conflict with existing 
human understanding of personal information, and it may not even be clear how they can 
be interpreted. Therefore, the focus on individual control over data already seems 
problematic and too narrow and may eventually need to be supplemented by an 
interpretation of privacy which takes account of broader data uses, interests and practices.  
   Two aspects of the understanding of relational autonomy from this perspective are 
especially relevant. First, relational autonomy recognizes the social embeddedness of the 
person; the person, instead of being deprived of any social relations, is influenced by all 
sorts of social contingencies. Second, relational autonomy conceives of autonomy as a 
competency that is contextualized and, most importantly, that it can be developed.  
   A relational autonomy perspective supports a networked conception of privacy. 
Network privacy conceives the context and norm as not only co-constructed by 
participants but they also evolve over time (Nissenbaum 2011). Thus, it considers the 
possibility that individuals may interpret contexts differently, that contexts may be 
destabilized or collapse, or that other people may have control over the context in ways 
that are beyond the purview of the individual (e.g. surveillance, information leakage, or 
data-mining). Therefore, networked privacy requires individuals to not only refer to some 
external rules/regulations but also to construct on their own a clear expectation of privacy. 
   Relatedly, there is a more concrete development of the concept in what has been defined 
as ‘group privacy’ (Taylor et al., 2016; Mittelstadt, 2017). Algorithms can create ad-hoc 
and temporary groups to which none of the existing interpretations of privacy can be 
applied; for example, a group can be “female students in the city of Nairobi who received 
a university grant”, or ‘private sector workers in Accra below the age of 40 who own a 
car’. Being identified as a member of this group could drive a variety of automated 
decision-making with harmful or even beneficial effects for individual members, such as 
a preferential rate for health insurance. The existence of such groups is essentially 
informational, and these informational traits are only meaningful to algorithms on the 
group level when a multitude of individuals’ information are considered together.  
   The above considerations suggest that (a right to) group privacy is a materialization of 
the concepts of relational as well as networked privacy. The view that the individual self 
is considered constrained from the start of its own existence by social factors (relational 
privacy) and that people are not always in control of information regarding them 
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(networked privacy) necessitates the consideration of top-to-bottom norms which 
emphasize the dignity of humanity (as a community or group) over the dignity of 
individuals. The challenge is indeed how to translate such principles into practice, for 
example due to the widespread focus on Artificial Intelligence ethics tools development 
on the need to protect the individual over the collective (Morley et al., 2019). 
   Milano et al. (2019) stress how privacy risks occurs in at least four stages in 
personalization systems: 1) when data are collected or shared without the user’s explicit 
consent. 2) once data sets are stored, there is the further risk that they may be leaked to 
external agents, or become subject to de-anonymization attempts. 3) clearly, privacy 
concerns can also arise at the stage of inferences that the system can (enable one to) draw 
from the data. Thus, sensitive information can be inferred without the user knowledge of 
the nature of such inferences. And finally, 4) at the stage of collaborative filtering the 
system can construct a model of the user based on the data it has gathered on other users’ 
interactions, that is, the issue of group privacy (that it will be discussed in 4.2.5) (Taylor 
et al., 2016). 
   Current and general solutions to these challenges fall into three broad categories 
(Friedman et al., 2015):  
• Privacy-enhancing architectures that aim to mitigate privacy risks by storing user 
data in separate and decentralised databases, to minimise the risk of leaks.  
• Algorithmic solutions focus on using encryption to minimise the risk that user data 
could be exploited by external agents for unwarranted purposes.  
• Policy approaches, including GDPR legislation, introduce explicit guidelines and 
sanctions to regulate data collection, use, and storage. 
In general, the issue of privacy would deserve much more space for reasoning. What is 
needed to know in this context, however, is that most of the platforms are opaque and 
much of the privacy users may benefit is not actually enacted. These issues will be 
variously discussed throughout the thesis. 
 
2.2.3 Information Asymmetry  
Nowadays a bunch of platforms dominate the social media landscape. Basically, these are 
Facebook, Youtube and Twitter. It is well-known in the literature about competition in 
social networks that an equilibrium can sustain only a small number of such 
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intermediaries and a concentrated market structure is thus expected. Economies of scale 
in the production of news lead to monopolies (Lovink and Rasch, 2013; Helberger, 2014). 
The current media landscape indeed reflects these dynamics and brings to a couple of 
social networks an unimaginable power. This is because of network effects which occur 
when the value of a platform to any user increases exponentially with the number of 
already present users. Indeed, the history of alternative media is a history of enormous 
challenges, as the consequence of a political economy that limits the possibilities for civil 
society because hearing alternative voices is a matter of money and political resources 
that afford visibility (Fuchs and Marisol, 2015). 
   Today social media policies, technical design choices and business models actually 
serve as a form of privatized governance directly enacting rights and regulating the flow 
of information online and, in doing so, promote or constrain civil liberties (DeNardis and 
Hackl, 2015). In particular, Facebook, at the time of writing, has 2.6 billion users and is 
the most pervasive and powerful intermediary of the Internet. Its unique relevance 
depends also on the fact that regarding personalization, search engines like Google, are, 
to some extent, less problematic because they tend to deliver more one-size-fits-all 
services, while the diversity in social media communication is significantly lower than 
that of search and also inter-personal communication (Nikolov et al., 2015). 
   The system of news updating in Facebook – the NewsFeed – has a growing central role 
in the global information flow. On average, it selects 200 posts on 2.000, therefore hiding 
90% of social media information – circa 1 hour per day per user (Reviglio and Agosti, 
2020). It is based on EdgeRank, a complex algorithm which constantly changes its 
outputs. By doing so, some values are embedded in the process but these, unfortunately, 
are secret and assessable only indirectly. The understanding of algorithms in the academic 
world is indeed weak due to two major factors: the impermanence of Internet technologies 
and the black-boxed nature of most influential algorithms. The first means that by nature 
the Internet is transient, rapidly changing at a rate that usually outpaces the research 
process. Secondly, the black-boxed nature of algorithms occurs not only to protect trade 
secrets but also prevent malicious hacking and gaming of the system (Pasquale, 2015). 
Of course, these features make not only the research but also the policy focus on 
algorithms very challenging. 
    In sum, mainstream Social Media, notably Facebook, are supranational entities, 
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divorced from the ratification of a social contract (not a mere ‘terms and conditions’ 
contract). Even though they are becoming our being-in-the-world, their interests conflict 
with the opportunities that social networks might entail. Their policy and profit-driven 
model, indeed, negatively affect the externalities of personalization. Facebook, for 
example, offers several ways to personalize one’s own newsfeed. Yet, it does not provide 
clear and effective tools to opt-out, though in theory they could radically empower users 
through education and tools. 
 
2.2.4 Various Biases 
In traditional media, newspaper editors select some of the messages produced by 
journalist to make news. Algorithms used in web services (such as ranking algorithm in 
a search engine, or news feed algorithm in a social network) make similar decisions. The 
design of these algorithms is affected by choices made by designers, i.e., which factors to 
include in the algorithm, and how to weigh them. The most known biases are the 
following: 
• Popularity bias. To serve majority interests, information intermediaries often 
include popularity metric in their ranking algorithm. A search algorithm, for 
instance, can give more weight to information coming from popular websites, to 
support majority interests and values. As a result, users may have troubles finding 
the less popular and smaller sites. 
• Third-party influence/maniplulation. Because the information filtering are 
automated, they might be manipulated by activities from third parties. This could 
occur in several ways, from clickbait and Search Engine Optimization (SEO) 
techniques to ‘bots’ that game social media’s metrics in order to further the spread 
of potentially problematic content. 
• Product/service prioritization. In the last decade, the EU received complaints that 
claimed how their traffic drop after Google began promoting its own services 
above conventional search results. Studies showed that Google and Bing search 
engines both reference their own content in its first results position when no other 
engine does (Bozdag, 2013). Facebook was also criticized for favoring the 
products of its partners. 
• Novelty bias. In Google search engine, the number of years a domain name is 
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registered has an impact on search ranking; domain names that exist for a period 
of time are preferred over newly registered ones. In Facebook, the longer a status 
update has been out there, the less weight it carries. A news item is prioritized 
over an old item. This might, for instance, lead companies to post updates when 
their audience is most likely to be online and using Facebook. 
• Other kind of biases. The algorithm can also prioritize certain types of information 
over others. For instance, the engagement maximization model of mainstream 
SNS tends to prioritize ephemeral content to durable one, short videos (snippets) 
to long ones and snapshots (casual images) to written text as they better lock-in 
users in their “walled-garden” (Derakhshan 2016). 
What are, then, all these ‘biases’? Are they really biases or, instead, they are companies’ 
values and interests inscribed into algorithms and design? Indeed, with algorithmic bias, 
especially in the context of AI, it is often referred to clearly unfair and discriminatory 
outputs. In this context, however, they are more of a series of editorial choices to 
proactively sustain commercial interests rather than unpredictable or even socially 
problematic outcomes.  
 
2.3.5 Diversity 
The effect of personalization on the diversity of information and news diets (or ‘media 
diversity’) has mostly been discussed negatively, assuming that such systems limit the 
breadth of viewpoints and topics. The major risk is the creation of “informational 
bubbles”: filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011) and echo chambers (Sunstein, 2017), two sides of 
the same token. The first is a kind of cultural and ideological bubble in which an 
individual continues to see, listen and read what reinforces its opinions and interests. The 
latter is a group situation where established information, ideas, and beliefs are uncritically 
spread and amplified, while dissenting views are ignored. The crucial difference is that 
the former may not depend on user’s autonomy and awareness (Bodzag, 2011) – therefore 
is mainly caused by technological affordances – while the latter pre-existed digital age 
and thus it is primarily social. There is limited evidence of the existence of these 
phenomena. Also, they are poorly defined and, in fact, are used more as generalizing (thus 
limiting) metaphors (Bruns, 2019). Similarly, the concept of media diversity is not really 
clear. More recently, a systematic literature review of this concept has shed more light 
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(Loecherbach et al., 2020). 
   From an individual perspective, personalization might reduce opportunities to self-
determine and could negatively affect information finding by reducing the exposure to 
alternative points of view in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ (Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2017) 
and, more generally, to serendipitous encounters (Reviglio, 2019a). The consequences 
may be various: from the limitation of personal creativity to a reduction in the ability to 
build productive social capital (in particular weak ties, see Granovetter, 1977). More 
generally, the main consequence to provide a ‘too familiar world’ is that our online life 
would eventually shift from an intersubjective to a subjective one (Keymolen ,2016).  
   From a collective perspective, personalization can weaken media pluralism, making 
people more politically polarized and vulnerable to censorship and propaganda or, better, 
to self-censorship and self-propaganda (Sunstein, 2017a). This, in turn, would help to 
spread misinformation (Vicario et al., 2016) and erode interpersonal trust (Keymolen, 
2016). As such, the audience becomes increasingly fragmented and people – especially 
the less skilled and literate – become more politically polarized and vulnerable to 
censorship and propaganda (see Figure 5).  
   Critics, however, argue that these are moral panics, and that personalization might 
instead foster the cultivation of “expert citizens” with stronger group identities 
(Harambam et al., 2018). Another prominent risk, however, remains growing the ‘digital 
divide’ and ‘cultural divide’ (Fabris, 2018) or ‘epistemic inequality’ (Lynch, 2016). 
Certain privileged group of users, that have higher (digital) literacy, are able to fruitfully 
manage personalization. Instead, a larger group of users would risk to be exposed only to 
a minimum, qualitatively inferior, range of information (see, for example, Figure 6). Also, 
the wealthier the social networks, the more the benefits of personalization, and vice versa. 
   In practice, research on diversity, as well as more generally personalization and its 
challenges, is often contradictory, ambiguous and, thus, unreliable (Zuiderveen Borgesius 
et al., 2016; Bodo et al., 2017; Tucker et al., 2018). The consequent risks of social media 
usage (Verduyn et al., 2017) and filter bubbles (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2016), in 
fact, are very hard to prove and, eventually, to mitigate. Most research is ultimately 
inconclusive because it is generally survey-based, or is correlational or based on a small 
or unsatisfactory sample. In light of the fast-changing media landscape, many studies 
become rapidly outdated. This contributes to the current crisis with regard to the study of 
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algorithms (Bodo et al., 2017). They are “black-boxed” (Pasquale, 2015) which means 
their functioning is opaque and their interpretability4 may not even be clear to engineers 
(Albanie et al., 2017).  
   While insights on the main causes and risks of personalization have been currently 
understood (Tucker et al., 2018), we still lack evidence with regard to the extent of their 
consequences. There is not, in other words, anticipatory knowledge to assess 
personalization systems as a technology. Also, information filtering processes take place 
not only at the technological level (e.g., affordances) but also on the individual (e.g., 
selective exposure) and the social (e.g., sharing practices). And given the vast 
heterogeneity of users, causes and effects of personalization vary widely. Furthermore, 
concerns are growing because of the rise of persuasive technologies and the ability of 
Big-Data to nudge individuals and effectively deceive them (Yeung, 2018, Zarsky, 2019). 
 
                     
Figure 5. Semantic network analysis of the hashtags utilized on Instagram before 2016 UK referendum. 
 




         
Figure 6. Political books relations for Amazon’s recommender system (from The Economist, 2017) 
 
Thus, key issues remain unsolved: to what extent personalization is detrimental, to what 
extent are information intermediaries complicit and responsible, whether they should be 
the target of a policy focus and, eventually, what kind of interventions might be pursued. 
As a reaction to the new media environment, media ethicists and policy-makers began to 
discuss how to maintain an exposure to diverse information. From a theoretical 
perspective, in fact, all the models of democracy consider the consequences of filter 
bubbles problematic for particular different reasons (see Figure 7) (Bozdag and Van den 
Hoven, 2015; Helberger, 2019).  
   More generally, media pluralism is achieved when users autonomously enjoy a diverse 
media diet. The exposure to various sources and content, however, seems insufficient to 
ensure actual experience of media diversity. Even if media diversity online is generally 
more than in traditional media, such exposure does not always end up in an actual 
experience of diversity (Hoffmann et al., 2015). Cognitive and affective factors that drive 
Internet users must also be considered. This requires to employ a user-centric perspective 
and extend beyond the assumption that supply diversity equals experience of diversity, 
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and that diversity of sources equals diversity of content. In fact, in the very first place the 




     Figure 7. Models of Democracy and Design Criteria (from Bozdag and van den Hoven, 2015) 
 
Media diversity is a rich and complex value that can be conceptualized in many different 
ways, and its interpretation differs significantly per discipline (Loecherbach et al., 2020; 
Bernstein et al., 2020). It is not as simple as the maximization of diversity is the most 
optimal solution. In media studies, diversity might be translated as “minority voices 
having equal access in the media” or “the degree which the media relates to the society 
in such a way to reflect the distribution of opinion as it appears in the population”. 
Similarly, in communication studies, diversity is also an important concept. The freedom 
of media, a multiplicity of opinions and the good of society are inextricably intertwined. 
A theory of media diversity states that we establish and preserve conditions that provide 
many alternative voices, regardless of intrinsic merit or truth, with the condition that they 
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emerge from those whom society is supposed to benefit its individual members and 
constituent groups. Whereas in Computer Science literature, diversity is rather fuzzier. It 
can be defined as “variety in the products offered by the system”, “helping user find items 
he cannot easily find himself” or “identifying a list of items that are dissimilar with each 
other, but nonetheless relevant to the user’s interests”. While media studies are analyzing 
this ethical value in detail, almost all scholars of search engine diversity seem to be 
limiting their understanding of “bias” and “diversity” to popularity bias (Bozdag, 2015). 
   While many scholars from different disciplines agree that media diversity is an 
important value that we should include in the design of institutions, policies and online 
services, this value is often reduced to a single definition, such as “source diversity", or 
“hearing the opinion of the other side". There is a need for a more detailed normative 
conceptualization of the value media diversity (Loecherbach et al., 2020; Bernstein et al., 
2020). Only then, perhaps, can we translate this complex value into design requirements 
of information intermediaries and move towards a solution. To do this, all the following 
dimensions of diversity must be taken into account: source diversity and content diversity, 
exposure diversity and diversity experience (namely, what are you exposed to and what 
you actually consume) (Hoffman et al. 2015), individual diversity and aggregate 
diversity, viewpoint diversity (Bozdag, 2015), and the inclusion of minorities and ‘long-
tail’ Information. Standardized measures of these core “sub-dimensions” of diversity are 
highly needed (Loecherbach et al., 2020). Moreover, there are in fact never-ending 
tensions in diverse design proposals, for example ‘diversity’ and ‘trustworthiness’ on the 
one hand, and ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘neutrality’ on the other. While the former 
requires RSs to prioritize certain content, the latter could arguably prohibit the drawing 
of such distinctions. Also, democracy theories have other conflicting values (Helberger, 
2019). Thus, the issue of diversity cannot be ‘solved’ objectively or definitively, rather, 
throughout more interdisciplinary experimentations and collaborations it may be possible 
to approximate a more diverse media consumption. 
 
2.2.5.1 The Case of Facebook 
According to De Vito et al. (2015), NewsFeed’s values in descending order of influence 
seem to be: friend relationships, explicitly expressed user interests, prior user 
engagement, implicitly expressed user preferences, post age, platform priorities, page 
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relationships, negatively expressed preferences, and content quality. Friend relationships, 
in particular, moderate how the other values will be expressed. Friends on social media, 
however, tend to be ideologically clustered and this potentially “places the lens through 
which the News Feed algorithm filters all other values firmly within your personal bubble 
to begin with” (Ibid, p.15). Indeed, homophily is the primary driver of content diffusion, 
especially misinformation and conspiracy theories, and one frequent result is the 
formation of homogeneous, polarized clusters (Del Vicario et al., 2016).  
   Facebook filters in fact combine to decrease exposure to ideologically challenging news 
from a random baseline by more than 25% for conservative users, and close to 50% for 
liberal users (Ibid). Another study by Facebook (Bakhsy et al., 2015), shows that liberals 
tend to be connected to fewer friends who share information from the other side of the 
political spectrum, compared to their conservative counterparts: 35% of the hard content 
shared by conservatives’ friends are cross-cutting, compared to 24% for liberals. As a 
consequence, it seems that social media are not a space apt to belief change. 
   Facebook performed poorly concerning the overall level of deliberative quality and 
performed worse than the other platforms (Esau et al., 2017). Deliberative democracy is 
indeed one of the most influential theoretical concepts in the ongoing debate about the 
relationship between democracy and Internet technology. This was measured through 
certain criteria (rationality, reciprocity, respect, and constructiveness). For example, 
regarding users’ comments platforms differ in moderation, asynchronicity, availability of 
information, and level of focus in topic definition.  
   Facebook is currently designed in such a fashion that promotes our natural homophilic 
tendencies of preferring to be with likeminded people. Indeed, users are usually more 
likely to share articles with which they agree, and the content they share tend to be 
confined only within their echo chamber (Quattrociocchi et al., 2016). In general, the 
more a polarized user is active, the more the user has friends with similar profiles. 
Therefore, users belonging to different communities tend not to interact. Then, if any 
users begin even to filter out uncongenial news, then its attitudes may harden. In fact, the 
filter bubble thesis is supported particularly in the context of online radicalization 
(Sunstein, 2007). 
   Nevertheless, not only algorithms but also design choices can deeply affect users' 
behaviours. Facebook, indeed, provides some personalization options (see Figure 8). 
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Instead, personalization opt-outs are not taken explicitly into consideration. Actually, the 
only evident way to look for a more generalized or de-personalized experience in 
Facebook is to select the option “Most recent” stories in the Newsfeed. However, this is 
still a personalized option, nor to say that the setting spontaneously reset itself to "Top 
Stories" after a certain amount of time. Furthermore, Facebook's relation with content 
suppliers poses other challenges for access of a diverse choice. For instance, Instant 
Articles, the news feature of Facebook in which users are able to open an article directly 
on the app newsfeed. This feature gives Facebook unprecedented power and control over 
the news market, since already 66% of users get news on Facebook (Gottfried and 
Shearer, 2016). However, many have warned that this system is favouring big publishers. 
As a matter of fact, exposure is partly related to how much money the publisher put into 
advertisement, and this gives large media group a comparative advantage, threatening the 
openness and the variety of online news found on Facebook. 
 
             
                    Figure 8. Newsfeed management (screenshot, May 2017) 
 
2.2.5.2 Bursting Filter bubbles and Echo Chambers? 
A related fundamental question to tackle the potential decrease in diversity is whether it 
is possible to ‘dispel’ or ‘weaken’ filter bubbles and echo chambers, and how that would 
be possible. In fact, some political radical groups have claimed that they use exposure to 
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opposition to strengthen their opinions further. Simply exposing radicalized people to 
alternative points of view would not undo these phenomena (O'Hara and Stevens, 2015). 
Quattrociocchi and Sunstein (2016) recently showed that even debunking is ignored by 
99.98% of conspiracy Facebook users. Other studies, however, suggest that exposures to 
opposite views tend to increase political tolerance and awareness of the legitimate 
arguments underlying opposing perspectives. Indeed, individuals would strengthen their 
opinions after better understanding the other political side and, in some cases, formulating 
new opinions on issues that were against their former beliefs (Semaan et al., 2014).  
   There are several inter-connected natural human cognitive proclivities that reduce the 
diversity, relevance and quality of the information consumed, as well as to dismiss 
challenging and unfamiliar information, among these: 
 
• ‘Homophily’ is the principle that a contact between similar people occurs at a 
higher rate than among dissimilar people. The pervasive fact of homophily means 
that cultural, behavioral, genetic, or material information that flows through 
networks will tend to be localized. Homophily implies that distance in terms of 
social characteristics translates into network distance, the number of relationships 
through which a piece of information must travel to connect two individuals. 
Perhaps the most basic source of homophily is space. We are more likely to have 
contact with those who are closer to us in geographic location than those who are 
distant.5 
 
• ‘Selective Exposure’ means that people expose themselves to external stimuli in a 
selective way. When referred to the area of mass communication, this means that 
people choose certain types of media content and avoid other types. It is important 
in understanding the effects of mass communication because it is our common 
understanding that people can only be influenced by media messages to which 
they actually expose themselves. Therefore, the selective exposure concept 
emphasizes the active role of the individual in the selection of media content.6 
 
5 Zipf (1949) stated the principle as a matter of effort: It takes more energy to connect to those who are far away than 
those who are readily available. Yet, this ought not be the case on the web. 
6 Research of this phenomenon is undertaken in the fields of both psychology and communication studies. Basically, 
there are two major trends in this research. Most studies focus on factors that lead to selective exposure or that mediate 
this process, whereas other studies deal with the consequences of selective exposure to information processing. The 
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• ‘Confirmation Bias’ is our tendency to actively seek information which confirms 
our preexisting beliefs and disregard information which might contradict it. This 
tendency originates from our desire to organize our world meaningfully and avoid 
feeling cognitive dissonance.  
 
• ‘Cognitive Dissonance’ refers to a situation involving conflicting attitudes, beliefs 
or behaviors. This produces a feeling of discomfort leading to an alteration in one 
of the attitudes, beliefs or behaviors to reduce the discomfort and restore balance, 
etc. Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory suggests that we have an inner 
drive to hold all our attitudes and beliefs in harmony and avoid disharmony (or 
dissonance). This is known as the principle of cognitive consistency. 
 
Moreover, there are other explanations for group polarization and the development of 
echo chambers that can be summarized in three main explanations as following (Sunstein, 
2009): 
 
1. Informational influences and persuasive arguments. The first explanation 
emphasizes the role of persuasive arguments and information. In any group with 
some initial inclination, the views of most people in the group will inevitably be 
skewed in the direction of that inclination. For example, most people in a group 
believe that immigration should be stopped. As a statistical matter, the arguments 
favoring that initial position will be more numerous than the counter-arguments. 
Individuals will have heard of some, but not all, of the arguments that emerge 
from group deliberation. As a result of hearing the various arguments, deliberation 
will lead people toward a more extreme point in line with what group members 
initially believed.  
2. Social influences, namely conformism. Sometimes people’s publicly stated views 
are, more or less, a function of how they want to present themselves. People 
 
selection processes have also been examined in different contexts, such as in political or online communication. More 
recently, however, has been showed that people in echo chambers often have full access to outside sources of 
information. They may regularly read – but do not accept – mainstream and liberal news sources. They are isolated, 
then, not by selective exposure, but by changes in who they accept as authorities, experts and trusted sources. They 
hear, but dismiss, outside voices. Knowledge, in the end, mainly depends on trusting long chains of experts. 
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usually want to be perceived favorably by other group members, so that some will 
adjust their positions at least slightly in the direction of the dominant position. 
Group polarization is indeed heightened when people have a sense of shared 
identity. People could polarize because they are attempting to conform to the 
position that they see as typical within their own group. If their group’s identity is 
especially salient or important, the ingroup norms “are likely to become more 
extreme so as to be more clearly differentiated from outgroup norms, and the 
within-group polarization will be enhanced.7 
3. The third explanation stresses the close links between confidence, extremism, and 
corroboration by others. If people lack confidence, they will tend toward the 
middle, and hence avoid the extremes. As people gain confidence, they usually 
are willing to become more extreme in their beliefs. People’s opinions have been 
shown to become more extreme simply because their views have been 
corroborated, and because they have become more confident after learning that 
others share their views. A final observation is dedicated to the fundamental role 
of identity. In fact, will significantly increase if people think of themselves as part 
of a group having a shared identity and a degree of solidarity. In short, if identity 
is shared, persuasive arguments are likely to be still more persuasive. 
 
Sunstein (2017) relates political polarization to audience fragmentation and analyses the 
risks to which they might lead. Firstly, these might have the effect of decrease (the quality 
of) deliberation. In fact, such phenomena can sustain so-called “partysm”, which is a kind 
of “visceral, automatic dislike of people of the opposing political party” (p.10). It is not 
as bad as it is racism but, to some extent, similar to it, and nowadays it exceeds it. Sunstein 
provides a paradigmatic example. In 1960, just 5% of Republicans and 4% of Democrats 
said that they would feel “displeased” if their child married outside their political party 
 
7 This also relates to a general theory of public opinion involving a “spiral of silence” in which people with minority 
positions silence themselves, potentially excising those positions from society over time (Noell-Neumann, 1984). It 
happens in authoritarian societies as well as in democracies. Sometimes it is also a good thing; people who believe that 
the sun goes around the earth, or that slavery was a reasonable idea, may end up self-silencing. Interestingly, Internet 
gave opportunities to these groups to express themselves. As Umberto Eco famously argued: “Social media gives 
legions of idiots the right to speak when they once only spoke at a bar after a glass of wine, without harming the 
community. Then they were quickly silenced, but now they have the same right to speak as a Nobel Prize winner. 
(Nicoletti, 2015)” Yet, the spiral of silence is not always benign as group discussions are affected and, as a result, 
become more extreme. Indeed, group polarization occurs merely on the basis of exposure to the views of others, so that 
discussion is not even necessary. 
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(Ibid). By 2010, those numbers had reached 49 and 33%, respectively—far higher than 
the percentage of people who would be “displeased” if their child married someone with 
a different skin colour. Such a political polarization threatens progress. In fact, it is also 
reported that in the U.S. often politicians would like to vote in tune with the other parties 
but they actually risk to lose votes so that they cannot easily reach a political compromise. 
Even if the self-segregation involves only a small part of the electorate, they can be highly 
influential, not least because of the intensity of their beliefs. 
   Another major premise is that the truthfulness of misinformation and disinformation is 
often of secondary importance to polarized groups: people are attracted by disinformation 
not necessarily because they consider it truthful, but rather because it aligns with their 
worldview and it gives them a sense of community and identity.  
   Accordingly, the consequences to draw are the following. On the one hand, fact-
checking corrections will not always be taken seriously by people who ideologically do 
not align with its findings. Also, because fact-checkers are often from opposed ideological 
and societal groups, these organizations may suffer a lack of trust among their target 
audience. Indeed, highlighting false information may even be counterproductive, since 
the excessive attention (and uptake by other media organizations) can also increase its 
reach. It has even been argued that being confronted with corrections could actually 
further strengthen the original beliefs. 
   On the other hand, those in most need of “education” may not be the ones who are 
actually reached and most receptive to it. Therefore, educating citizens may not always 
work in combating disinformation in society at large because the issue is not just cognitive 
– i.e., based on a faulty understanding of social media or personalization – but is also 
driven by deeper and more complex cultural and societal shifts related to the loss of trust 
in mainstream media, science, and other knowledge institutions. 
   To conclude, the capacity to counteract such phenomena is deeply controversial. Echo 
chambers pre-existed digital age: people naturally tend to selective exposure and 
homophily. Nonetheless, RSs, design choices and, more generally, personalization, have 
a large role in potentially worsening the phenomenon, as well as in preventing its 
aggravation (Hoffmann et al., 2015). To some extent, social media are indeed responsible 
(and at times they could even be complicit) in the potential growth of filter bubbles and 
echo chambers. Though there is still no sufficient empirical evidence that warrants any 
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strong worries at present, in case personalization technology would improve, groups 
polarization would increase and personalized news content would become people’s main 
information source, problems for democracy could indeed arise (Zuiderveen Borgesius et 
al., 2016). Yet, indirect effects to democracy there might be already present. 
 
2.2.6 Autonomy  
In order to access social media platforms, users usually have to give up the data they 
generate. The profit-generating business of selling the resultant meta-data to advertisers 
is what supports these “free” platforms. Clearly, Internet users are not simply or even 
primarily hedonistic consumers to persuade or even manipulate in order to maximize data 
extraction and profit generation. Rather users are also often producers, citizens and unpaid 
workers who generate economic value for these platforms through their “digital labour” 
(Scholz, 2012). This is the status quo of the current data-driven society, in which sociality 
is turned into economic value. Users occupy a subordinate position without any 
reasonable possibility to opt out rather than agree or leave their social networks. 
  As we will analyze in detail in Chapter 4, GDPR is likely to be the most advanced 
regulation in the data protection landscape as it recognizes data subjects full control of 
their data. However, it confers limited protection against automated decision-making in 
light of algorithms’ manipulative potentials (Reviglio, 2019b). Of course, GDPR is 
granting novel rights for data subjects and duties for data controller. Along with the e-
Privacy regulation draft, the GDPR actually strengthens ‘data consumer protection’. 
Users can indeed decide whether to enter into a contract, be informed, access the data 
generated, receive information about the logic involved and opt not to be subject to 
automated decision-making based solely on automated processing. However, the right to 
an explanation (Art. 15) and the right to non-discrimination  (Art. 22) – the most relevant 
in this context – are highly disputable. Also, the major problem lies in the apparent belief 
of lawyers (as well as designers) that input control alone is sufficient to alleviate any 
systemic concerns of personalization algorithms (Kohl et al., 2019). Data protection law 
remains indeed crucial – because personalization requires updated target profiles – but 
currently no legal framework addresses explicitly the outputs of personalization 
algorithms.  
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    The approach of user-empowerment often relies on informed consent, but this might 
not be an optimal solution because opt-in approaches lead to uncertainty and context 
dependence. People in fact cannot be counted on to navigate the complex trade-offs 
involving privacy self-management (Acquisti et al., 2015). Most people in fact neither 
read nor understand online privacy policies. These actually have also two inherently 
contradictory goals; to be understandable to consumers – which requires simplicity and 
brevity – and say something meaningful about how data is processed – which is 
complicated and requires a lot of details. Moreover, dark patterns are often employed 
during terms of conditions and privacy updates (Moen et al., 2018). Although user-
centered solutions may better foster the transparency of personalization algorithms, for 
example, they have significant shortcomings: they shift the responsibility and 
accountability for the protection of rights and utility to the users, and this usually result 
in inefficiency such as insufficient privacy protection. 
   The problem is that today’s Internet (Alter, 2017) —especially social media (Deibert, 
2019)— is addictive by design. This threatens individual autonomy (Gal, 2017; Zarsky, 
2019). Human behavior can indeed be manipulated by priming and conditioning, using 
rewards and punishments. Even algorithms can autonomously explore manipulative 
strategies that can be detrimental to users (Albanie et al., 2017). For instance, they can 
use ‘A/B testing’ to experiment with various messages until they find the versions that 
best exploit individuals’ vulnerabilities (Calo, 2013).8 
    Manipulation and deception become easier thanks to affective computing (or 
‘emotional AI’), captology—the study of computers as persuasive technologies (Fogg et 
al., 2002)—and the emergence of psychographic techniques focusing on demographic 
characteristics and ‘affect detection techniques’, along with diverse types of data such as 
location-based tracking, real-time data, or keyboard usage. As already mentioned, dozens 
of Facebook Likes can reveal useful and highly accurate correlations (Youyu et al., 2015). 
Implicated data include what the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
classifies as specially protected data: sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious and political 
 
8 In an A/B test, the experimenter sets up two experiences: ‘A,’ the control, is usually the current system and considered 
the “champion,” and ‘B,’ the treatment, is a modification that attempts to improve something—the ‘challenger.’ Users 
are randomly assigned to the experiences, and key metrics are computed and compared.” From 
https://hbr.org/2017/09/the-surprising-power-of-online-experiments. 
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views, personality traits, intelligence, use of addictive substances, parental separation, 
age, gender and, perhaps most importantly, emotions.9 
   Eventually, persuasive techniques affect individuals’ self-control, self-esteem and even 
self-determination. These can indeed stimulate users in a powerfully subconscious and 
hormonal way. Facebook’s infamous, large-scale emotional contagion experiment 
exemplifies this point (Kramer et al., 2014), showing how mainstream social media can 
affect emotions and exploit vulnerabilities in human psychology. Compulsion loops are 
also found more broadly in a wide range of social media, and especially online games 
(Deibert, 2019). Research suggests that such loops may work via “variable-rate 
reinforcement”10 in which rewards are delivered unpredictably. This unpredictability 
affects the brain’s dopamine pathways in ways that magnify rewards. 
   Also, design facets intentionally trigger dopamine rushes or other emotional highs, 
stimulate popularity contest or implicit social obligations (Kidron et al., 2018)—and use 
a whole host of additional brain hacks, probably many of them not even publicly known. 
Among those known, moral outrage can be exploited to increase engagement. NYU 
psychology researchers found that each word of moral outrage added to a tweet raises the 
retweet rate by 17% (Harris, 2019). At times, users may also be captured in a spiral of 
ever more extreme, conspiratorial content—also known as the “rabbit hole effect.”11 
   Despite apparently increasing transparency along with the resultant efforts to reform, 
the current algorithm-driven advertising system that lies at the core of the surveillance 
economy persists. And it persists in systematically promoting extreme, inaccurate and 
radical content—regardless of what malicious actors may do to seed it. This is the case 
of political microtargeting, also known as “dark ads” (Borgesius et al., 2018). Such 
massive power asymmetry between platforms and potentially malicious actors using them 
on one hand, and individual users on the other, cannot be ignored. One of the actual risks 
 
9 These techniques often rely on a hotly contested scientific paradigm that argues all humans, everywhere, experience 
the same basic emotions, and that all of us express those emotions in the same way. Those emotions include happiness, 
anger, sadness, disgust, surprise, and fear. This paradigm of universal emotions is insufficiently evidence-based and 
poorly regarded in the relevant scientific communities. However, it  could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as a vast 
range of human expressions around the world are “coarsened” into a narrow set of  machine-readable bins. As a result, 
the many and diverse ways of emotional expression, which vary from culture to culture, may be simplified and thus 
impoverished. 
10 A variable ratio reinforcement schedule occurs when, after X number of actions, a certain reward is achieved. Slot 
machines are a real-world example of a variable ratio. 
11 This article made the definition a common reference: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.html. And even if executives from 
YouTube denied https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/03/youtube-exec-denies-the-existence-of-rabbit-hole-
effect.html, it really seems that Youtube drives  such conspirational content (see the project algotransparency.org). 
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is that a more or less certain percentage of “persuadables” – people known to be 
particularly vulnerable to targeted messages – can shift elections. Since the Cambridge 
Analytica scandals implicating manipulative and possibly illegal social media use in 
Brexit and Trump 2016 campaigning, challenges and more effective solutions are being 
discussed (Kohl et al., 2019). 
   Such Big Data-driven nudging is defined by Yeung (2018) as a technique of “hyper-
nudging” which dynamically configures the user’s informational choice context in ways 
intentionally designed to influence her decisions. For example, “dark patterns” define 
instances where designers use their knowledge of human behavior (e.g., psychology) and 
the desires of end-users to implement deceptive functionality that is not in the user’s best 
interest (Gray et al., 2018). As such, hyper-nudging concerns all of the design process, 
not only algorithmic decision-making. This introduces a new form of power—a new 
“invisible hand” of behavioral prediction and modification which is unknown, pervasive 
and effective (Zuboff, 2015). Over time, as smart environments will likely permeate 
societies, users—especially young people—may be automatically plugged in and guided 
through life along algorithm-driven pathways acting in the best interests of whoever owns 
or pays to use people’s data. These kinds of addictive techniques are already concerning 
in the case of negative effects on children’s wellbeing, including increased risk of suicide 
and depression, conflicts with parents and adverse effects on cerebral and social 
development (Kidron et al., 2018). 
  In sum, the advertising business model of social media creates “a race to the bottom of 
the brain stem (…) to extract attention by hacking lower into our lizard brains— into 
dopamine, fear, outrage—to win” (Harris, 2019). And every day the AI system is 
incentivized to get better and, therefore, overall worse for individual free will and social 
cohesion. One resultant, paramount concern is that the Internet, especially social media, 
is downgrading our attention spans, a common base of facts, and capacity for complexity 
and nuanced critical thinking, hindering our ability to construct shared agendas to solve 
our problems and the epochal challenges we face. This degraded and degrading capacity 
for collective action arguably represents “the climate change of culture” (Ibid). Still, 
existing scientific evidence about these consequences remains lacking, along with easy 
technological fixes or political solutions. 
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2.3 A User-centered Perspective 
Information consumption has profoundly changed, and thus research need to catch up 
with these changes and understand novel users’ behaviors and expectations, their main 
causes and effects. On the one hand, news users in fact find and read the news in novel 
ways. They find them via social media and read it on their smartphones throughout the 
day, instead of at specific times, such as in the morning during breakfast or in the evening 
during dinner. 
   Consider that the time currently spent on Facebook by the average user (more than 2 
billion at present) is about 1 h a day, encountering about 350 posts, prioritized out of circa 
1.500 (which means that roughly 80% of the posts are being hidden) (Backstrom 2013). 
In the U.S. – similarly to European countries – two-thirds of users (67%) report that they 
get at least some of their news on social media (Shearer and Gottfried 2017). Yet, only 
about 36% of Facebook users intentionally tried to influence their newsfeed while just 
14% believe they have a lot of control over it (Smith 2018). However, a 2016 survey of 
over 53.000 online news consumer in 26 countries showed that more than half agreed that 
more personalized news may mean they miss out challenging or important information 
(Thurman, 2019). Yet, in some circumstances users consider this preferable to 
journalistically curated choices (Thurman et al., 2018). Expectations and behaviors over 
news personalization are rather nuanced, ambivalent and inconsistent, and this may lead 
to inaction. 
   More generally, attitudes towards personalization need to be better understood. People 
across the world seem to embrace automatically generated personalized 
recommendations (Reuters Institute, 2016) (see Figure 9 and 10). In short, most people 
trust themselves more than they trust journalists. For the majority of users, news RSs are 
not doing anything wrong: they select neutrally and inform or recommend impartially 
(Gillespie, 2014). However, as we have shown, there is no objectivity in the realm of 
filtering and personalization. Any artefact such as algorithmic filtering embodies specific 
forms of power and authority (Winner, 1980). Indeed, they are using supplied criteria to 
determine what is “relevant” to their audiences and worth knowing, though these biases 
are not generally recognized.  
   Most users have no principal reservations against news being distributed through AI-
driven tools (Thurman et al., 2018). Yet, they increasingly tend to be worried that “more 
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personalized news may mean that they miss out on important information and challenging 
viewpoints” (Neuman et al., 2016, p.113). Most users trust algorithms less and less but 
they enjoy every day their fundamental services. Also, there are concerns about being 
wrongly profiled, as well as privacy concerns (Helberger et al., 2019). Though they can 
have some reservations about these algorithms, many have even more reservations about 
journalism and editorial selection. Of course, journalism is in crisis and more often 
survives with click-baiting. As Internet critic and scholar Evgeny Morozov (2017) puts it 
“what it has gained in profitability, it seems to have lost in credibility.” Yet, this sheds the 
light on the complex background nature of this phenomenon and, furthermore, it stresses 
the increasing awareness of the potential consequences of personalization. 
 
 
Figure 9. Proportion Who are Concerned About Each Potential Consequence of Personalization (Selected 
Countries) (from Newman et al., 2016). 
 
 
Figure 10. Proportion Who Think That Each Selection Method is a Good Way to Get the News (from 
Newman et al., 2016). 
 
There are two general explanations for the widespread default trust and lack of 
responsiveness over platforms and the algorithms that filter one’s personal information. 
On the one hand, in the first place, one compelling explanation for why this became 
possible so rapidly is that nothing similar to ICT development ever happened in the past, 
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so there were few institutional defensive barriers (Zuboff, 2015). Information 
intermediaries have indeed been overestimated and treated as “emissaries of the future,” 
producing “an overwhelming sense of inevitability” (Ibid, p.85). As such, societies 
quickly came to depend on these new information and communication tools as necessary 
resources, and at times even as preconditions for social participation.  
   On the other hand, users’ general behavior can be traced back to behavioral economics 
as well as psychology (Acquisti et al., 2015). Drawing from the famous work of 
Kahneman (2011), for example, Sunstein and Thaler (2009) describe two major cognitive 
systems from which individuals take decisions: an “automatic system” and a “reflective 
system”. While the latter is the slow, effortful and controlled way to think, the former is 
efficient, rapid, largely unconscious and prone to systematic errors. This bounded 
rationality affects how people assess the likelihood of future events and how their 
individual biases and vulnerabilities might be exploited.  
   Also, another major issue with personalization and its future development is that they 
can increasingly gratify users to the extent to which they come to accept its deception as 
benevolent. This argument has been discussed in terms of “psychological hedonism” 
(Gal, 2017): if personalized systems become ‘pleasure machines’, able to predict our 
choices and simply grant them to users, are these users willing to give up their 
autonomous choice? And, if so, under which conditions? On the one hand, we may 
contend the “choice paradox” which arises from the fact that the decision to turn over 
one’s choices to an algorithm is, itself, an act of choice: to choose not to choose (Sunstein, 
2014). On the other hand, we need to think seriously about the way in which the choices 
we make affect our values, identities and the meaning and content of our lives. In other 
words, whether we as individuals actually strive for hedonism – that is the view that all 
human action is ultimately motivated by the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain 
– and the extent to which this is beneficial for society at large. For example, liberal 
democratic citizenship requires a certain amount of discomfort (Helberger, 2019).  
   Research elsewhere indicates that users are expecting to play a more active role in the 
interaction with AI-driven tools such as personalization systems (Helberger et al., 2019). 
More generally, the use of AI-driven tools fundamentally alters the agency of users 
regarding the news they consume. AI-driven tools have introduced observable 
measurements of user interaction allowing detailed insights into audience preferences, 
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impossible to obtain in non-digital media. Even if users are at the center of these 
processes, this increase in user agency is unidimensional as it is solely focused on 
observable engagement like clicks or time-spent. And as explained in the previous 
chapter, users do not know what information they are automatically excluded from. The 
challenges outlined above lead to other (open and theoretical) questions: can users be 
sufficiently informed to be fully responsible in such a fast-changing complex 
environment? Should the state override personal autonomy to safeguard personal 
autonomy itself? If yes, to what extent and in which cases? And where positive individual 

























3. The Value of Serendipity 
“A new word is like a fresh seed sown on the ground of the discussion."  
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosopher 
 
In the previous chapter, we acknowledged how the value of media pluralism and diversity 
are indeed necessary for democratic societies, yet under-theorized. It is not clear, in fact, 
how much exposure to how many different contents and sources may be ever considered 
‘sufficient’ or ‘satisfying’. Also, media pluralism as a normative principle remains vague 
and it is not a reliable indicator of a society’s level of freedom, since it may create only 
the illusion of content diversity. In the digital age it is indeed becoming less clear in which 
sense it is meaningful to speak of media pluralism if the consumption is potentially 
characterized by limitless choice. In this context, we now explore an alternative and 
additional design principle to better understand personalization in social media: 
serendipity. 
   Often undervalued because of its unpredictable nature, difficulty to operationalize it 
and wide or sometimes vague definition, serendipity as a design principle is attracting 
ever more interest, especially in the digital environment. Thus, the following questions 
will thus be addressed: is there a trade-off in RSs design between accuracy and 
serendipity? What might be the role of serendipity in the context of information filtering? 
What is (intended with) Serendipity? How to design for serendipity in digital 
environments? Why is serendipity valuable? What are the values that serendipity 
sustains? How to eventually implement serendipity by design? What are the limitations 
and potential unintended consequences of such endeavor? 
   Being influenced by environmental and human factors, the experience of serendipity 
encompasses fundamental phases of production, distribution and consumption of 
information. On the one hand, designing for serendipity increases diversity, quality and 
discoverability. On the other hand, serendipity is a capability that has a strong political 
value. It helps individuals to internalize and adopt strategies that increase the chances of 
experiencing it. As such, the pursuit for serendipity can help to burst filter bubbles and 
weaken echo chambers in social media. The chapter firstly analyzes serendipity and its 
study. Then, it discusses the role and the ethics of artificial serendipity and its design from 
an interdisciplinary perspective. 
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3.1 Serendipity and Its Study  
Serendipity is the art of discovering new things by observing, and learning from 
encountering unexpected information. It has received attention in several fields from 
sociology of science to epistemology, from psychology and innovation studies to 
information and computer science. It is no surprise that there is no wide consensus on its 
meaning. It is indeed widespread to consider serendipity as a romantic ill-defined 
buzzword (Makri 2014). Serendipity is relatively a neologism with no equivalent in 
languages other than English. It originated from Horace Walpole in 1754, that was 
inspired by the Persian fairy tale “The Three Princes of Serendip”, which narrates how 
these traveling princes were “always making discoveries, by accidents and sagacity, of 
things which they were not in quest of”. Largely ignored since then, it gained popularity 
from mid-1900s when it was applied to various breakthroughs in scientific research, until 
voted as “UK’s favorite word” in 2000 (Rubin et al., 2011). 
 
      Figure 11. The Percentage of Use of the Word ‘Serendipity’ in books (Google Books Ngram, 2019). 
 
As serendipity became famous, however, “the vogue word became a vague word” 
(Merton and Barber 2006). Serendipity is indeed often incorrectly referred to as the 
“happy accident”, thus interpreted as mere coincidence, luck and providence. This 
dilution of meaning challenges its application in research (McCay-Peet and Toms 2017). 
In fact, serendipitous discoveries can be perceived as accidentals but they are usually the 
result of groundwork, observation, and previous knowledge. As Louis Pasteur famously 
claimed: “in the field of observation, chance favours only the prepared mind.” (Merton 
and Barber 2006). Thus, serendipity has to be considered also as a capability (de Rond 
2014), intended as being capable of making use of the opportunities that the environment 
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provides (Sen 2005). As various definitions assign different weights to personal and 
environmental factors, between individual sagacity and lucky chance, this tension, 
eventually results in a combination of them, differing case by case. Serendipity is today 
often defined as “an unexpected experience prompted by an individual’s valuable 
interaction with ideas, information, objects, or phenomena” (McCay-Peet and Toms 
2013). 
   In the context of digital environments, serendipity can be studied under different 
perspectives. For information behavior research it has been approached as a quality of 
someone or, in research relating to recommender systems and search engines, as a quality 
of an event or something. While being approached as either a personal proclivity or a 
phenomenon or event, the most holistic approach to serendipity occurs in information 
science and human–computer interaction (HCI) research where serendipity is often 
approached as an experience or a process. As such, it has various components, dimensions 
and environmental factors (Kotkov et al., 2016) as well as affordances (see Figure 13) 
(Bjorneborn 2017).12  
   As it is a subjective experience—any individual has different strategies to experience 
different kinds of serendipity— in this thesis we broadly intend serendipity as the 
experience depending on both environmental conditions and individual capability to 
encounter— opportunistically (Type A, see note 11) or purposefully (Type B and C)— 
unexpected meaningful information that may help to solve a problem, make you discover 
a novel idea, interest, or even change a belief.  This experience can be cultivated by design 
– so-called artificial serendipity – taking into consideration both the extent of profile-
based information filtering (how truly personalized an item is supposed to be) and the 
individual and social level of serendipitous items (how an item attempts to burst your 
filter bubble or to challenge your echo chambers). 
   The ability to extract knowledge serendipitously covers all areas of human activity, 
including ‘science, technology, art, and daily life’ (van Andel 1994). According to Merton 
 
12    It is possible to generalize serendipitous encounters into three-main types (McCay-Peet and Toms 2017):  
• Type A: from observations to a solution. It befalls when people are not looking for any information in 
particular. For instance, while scrolling a social media’s feed. Thus, it is the epitome of nowadays 
Internet usage.  
• Type B: from problem I to a solution to problem II. It occurs when people are looking for information 
on a certain problem and find a different but previously unsolved problem. To some extent, also this 
type often befalls in online information seeking. 
• Type C: unexpected solutions, also called pseudo-serendipity. It usually befalls when an individual is 
seeking information purposefully but accidentally finds an unrelated, unexpected one.  
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and Barber (2006) who wrote the most extensive research about its meaning and 
diffusion, serendipity is one of the main forces that has steered the progress of science. It 
is full of renowned examples: from penicillin to DNA, from string theory to mirror 
neurons. The role of serendipity on epistemology of science is thus well-established. 
There is, however, a lack of advancement in this field. Interestingly, Campanario (1996) 
suggests that the reason for this lies in the mythization of scientific research and the 
difference between the ‘context of discovery’ and the ‘context of justification’. Science 
is indeed supposed to be something that is totally under control, so that scientists may be 
reluctant to admit that the discoveries for which they are honoured were accidental.  
    Similarly, in everyday life the role of chance and serendipity is often underestimated. 
Though relatively less momentous, serendipitous insights occur on a daily basis, 
particularly on the Internet. Accidental encountering is indeed an integral part of everyday 
information behavior (Erdelez 2004), also called micro-serendipity (Bogers and 
Björneborn 2013). Even though serendipity studies have suggested that serendipity is a 
rare, elusive phenomenon, in today’s information societies for many serendipity seems 
so common that they do not always reflect upon it and therefore not even recognize it. 
   Most of the studies on serendipity focus particularly on scientific discovery rather than 
on everyday serendipity. Extensive accounts on how to research serendipity (McCay- 
Peet and Toms 2017) and cultivate it in digital environments (Race and Makri 2016; 
Bjorneborn 2017; de Melo 2018) provided ground for novel studies. These literature 
reviews suggest how the tension between the need to manage both the quantity and quality 
of information has been a key driver of these research. They show how serendipity in 
digital environments can be reduced and cultivated through design, affordances and 
recommender systems.  
   Furthermore, it is researched the increasing role of serendipitous news consumption 
online (or Incidental Exposure to Online News, IEON) for the formation of individual 
and public opinion (Yadamsuren and Erdelez 2016). Indeed media researchers have 
largely ignored such phenomenon for a long time, probably due to the difficulty in 
capturing it. In recent years, however, more studies started to explore how individuals 




3.2 A Brief History of Artificial Serendipity  
Serendipitous discovery has been a research topic for more than one hundred years. 
Fathers of cybernetics recognized the value of a necessary (but not sufficient) element of 
serendipity: surprise, which operates as a cognitive/emotional reaction to serendipitous 
encounters (Rubin et al., 2011). In mathematical terms, Shannon (1948) argued that 
information is proportional to its deviation from expectation. In other words, the amount 
of information is a measure of surprise. The question of whether computers are able to 
‘take us by surprise’ was instead famously raised by Alan Turing (1950). Despite 
theoretical discussions, the potential of computers to trigger serendipitous encounters was 
already clear-cut. A famous example is the 1968’s Cybernetic Serendipity art exhibition 
at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London in which the relationship between 
technology and creativity was explored.  
 
                                . 
                        Figure 12. Cybernetic Serendipity Art Exhibition (1968) 
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The focus on serendipity then shifted in the realm of library and information science, with 
the first article by Bernier (1960). Early work on serendipity were done in relation to 
browsing Online Public Access Catalogs (O’Connor, 1988). Functionality for supporting 
serendipitous discovery included browsable search indexes and similar article citation 
retrieval (Rice, 1988). In more general terms, however, Van Andel (1994) argued a 
common argument: “computer program cannot foresee or operationalize the unforeseen 
and can thus not improvise ('imprevu' = 'unforeseen'). It cannot be surprised or 
astonished, and has no sense for humor, curiosity or oddity” (…) The very moment I can 
plan or programme ‘serendipity’ cannot be called serendipity anymore.” Skepticism 
about programming ‘true’ serendipity is in fact widespread (Krotoski 2011; Carr 2016). 
Once you create an engine to produce serendipity, one may claim, you destroy its essence. 
If serendipity could be controlled, then an event is no longer serendipitous, but predictable 
or reproducible. Yet, it remains possible to cultivate serendipity (Race and Makri, 2016) 
and it is exactly its unpredictability in which lies its valuable capacity of increasing 
information diversity, discoverability and quality (Reviglio, 2019). Moreover, the 
concept of serendipity in digital environments – also defined as artificial serendipity, that 
is, not only more generally computer-generated serendipity, but also whenever an agent 
is able to create the necessary conditions for serendipity to occur13 (de Melo, 2018) – has 
been reframed with another valence, focusing on both its preconditions and its individual 
experience (Erdelez, 1999). As such, there are various degrees of serendipitous 
encounters – it is a continuum to cover the entire spectrum of different degrees of surprise 
and meaningfulness. 
    With the advent of the Internet and the consequent change in the production and 
consumption of information, the concept of serendipity became more debated. It was 
indeed acknowledged that computer search tended to provide answers to questions 
facilitating purpose-driven information seeking instead of opportunistic and accidental 
ones – typical of browsing printed information. Still, without search engines the journey 
on the web was initially intended as discovering what was out there—accidentally—not 
on finding specific content (Hendler and Hugill, 2013). This led Gup (1997) to wonder 
about “The End of Serendipity”, in particular the most ‘random’ and proactively yet 
 
13 Instead, natural serendipity—meaning the serendipity that occurs naturally in the world—is absolutely unpredictable, 
as the number of factors and variables that create it are impossible (at least as of now), to calculate (de Melo, 2018). 
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accidentally sought one. Moreover, any procedure to select and prioritize information for 
users – especially in newspapers, and more generally in traditional media – to some extent 
recognizes and seeks to solve in a beneficial manner the tension between a generalized 
relevance—what individuals are expected to want—and serendipity—what individuals 
may like—due to personalization in digital environments this balance shifted from 
serendipity to relevance (Thurman, 2011). In the passage from an ink economy to a link 
economy and from a “professional filter” to a “social filter” (Tewksbury, 2003), this ideal 
tension became more significant: the potential for relevant and personalized content 
increased as well as for serendipitous ones. 
    As personalization improved its accuracy there has been an increasing recognition of 
the value of serendipity. Media theorist Steven Johnsons (2006) described the Internet as 
‘the greatest serendipity engine in the history of culture’. Yet, with the development of 
the web 2.0 few platforms took over the market and began to steer worldwide information 
consumption. Thus, concerns took over on hopes. Meckel (2011) made an appeal to ‘save 
serendipity’ as a fundamental experience for individual progress. Identities can indeed be 
undermined by profiling algorithms that are stuck in the past, impeding the ‘aspirational 
self’. Profiling technologies that enable personalization in fact cannot produce or detect 
a sense of self but they influence a person’s sense of self (Hildebrandt, 2009). Hildebrandt 
(2017) argues that such ‘incomputable nature of the self’ should be somehow protected. 
In fact, not only no personal profile can ever entirely identify an individual, but there are 
always many—and sometimes radically different—ways of computing the same person. 
In this respect, the value of serendipity is of paramount importance as there is a trade-off 
between algorithmic accuracy and serendipity (Kotkov et al., 2016). In sum, its design 
acknowledges the natural identity reductionism of profiling techniques, the potential 
hedonistic redundancy users might spiral in and, more generally, the exploitation of 
individuals’ vulnerabilities that personalization practices and design choices can unfold 
to maximize engagement and, therefore, it also represents the endeavor to overcome them 
(Reviglio, 2019). 
   Despite several challenges that the design of serendipity faces, there is a recognition 
that it has the potential to prevent the threats of filter bubbles and echo chambers 
(Yadamsuren and Erdelez 2016; McCay-Peet and Toms, 2017). Even if evidences on the 
negative consequences of these phenomena are rare and the concepts are ill-defined and 
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serve more as metaphors, all the models of democracy consider these intertwined 
phenomena problematic for particular different reasons (Bozdag and Van den Hoven, 
2015). As such, the design for serendipity attempts to preserve the likelihood of 
encountering information one may (not) like—in opposition to individuals’ hedonism and 
platforms’ pursuit of profit— to avoid that past behaviours pre-determine and excessively 
strengthen future ones, and to balance the information diet. Ultimately, designing for 
serendipity helps the discovery process.  
   Zuckerman (2008; 2013) is a prominent advocator of serendipity, especially concerning 
the phenomenon of cyber-balkanization. For example, how the development of a 
cosmopolitan culture may be limited due to georeferenced algorithms. He expected that 
serendipity tools would become as important as search engines and social media are 
nowadays. Indeed, there have been over time more and more attempts to pursue 
serendipity as a design goal, among them, for information retrieval (e.g. Campos and 
Figuereido, 2003), for social media (e.g. Burkell et al., 2012), for music discovery (e.g. 
Zhang et al., 2012), for idea generation to contribute to interdisciplinary research 
(Darbella et al., 2014) business and ICT development (e.g. Saini and Khurana, 2013), for 
information behavior strategies to enhance online discovery, in everyday searches (e.g. 
Buchem, 2011) or in online academic scholarly research (e.g. Maloney and Conrad, 
2016). 
       Nowadays Internet mainstream services such as Netflix, Amazon, Google Now and 
Spotify certainly provide serendipitous recommendations. Yet, they tend to exploit 
convergent systems—as the capacity to discover the right thing at the right time, to cater 
to the user’s perceived intentions, interests, tastes—rather than divergent systems—as the 
increasing of information diversity in order to expand user’s horizons and to help uncover 
surprising discovery (de Melo, 2018). An example of the former narrative is Google CEO 
Eric Schmidt (2006) which envisioned a future where people and technology come 
together to create a serendipity engine “where you don’t even have to type” (2006). 
Internet, however, can be ever more serendipitous, especially in social networking sites 
and to the extent in which information explorability is wisely sustained. Under the current 
business model, personalized relevance and quantity outstrip serendipity and quality, 
providing only an ‘illusion of serendipity’ (Erdelez and Jahnke, 2018). The capacity to 
control curation and to navigate information filters is indeed rather limited (Harambam 
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et al., 2018). As such, there are two major competing conceptions of designing (for) 
serendipity: one is based on convergent systems and the other on divergent systems. 
These actually represent two diverse routes to trigger serendipitous encounters. How do 
we draw the line between the two, if any? Before answering this significant question, 
arguments on the value of artificial and digital serendipity as a design principle are now 
briefly discussed. 
 
3.4 A Discussion on the Ethics of Serendipity and Its Design 
Despite inevitable limitations in operationalizing complex notions, in this Section we 
argue how serendipity can inform designers, society and users to create more ethical 
platforms and algorithms. In the last decade, in fact, applied ethics has developed into an 
even more practical discipline. Such “design turn in applied ethics” (Van den Hoven et 
al., 2017) acknowledges that the needs and values of users are considered in their own 
right and not simply as a side constraint on successful implementation. This perspective 
helps to develop pragmatic methodologies and frameworks (like Value Sensitive Design 
and pro-ethical design) that help to make moral and ethical values integral parts of 
research and development (Friedman et al., 2002).  
   Fundamental questions to open the debate are thus addressed; in this context, how and 
why can serendipity inform designers, ethicists, users and, eventually, policy-makers? 
What are the values that it sustains in relation to the risks discussed in Chapter 2? And, 
also, how to translate serendipity into general norms and design requirements? There can 
be a “good measurement” or “desirable degree” of serendipity? We now discuss these 
questions from three main perspectives: societal and philosophical (serendipity as a 
metaphor), designers (serendipity as a design principle and technical challenge) and 
educators and users (serendipity as an educational goal). 
 
3.4.1 Serendipity as a Metaphor 
Serendipity is a fascinating and powerful concept strictly related to other philosophical 
ones such as Aristotle’s poiesis, Jung’s synchronicity, and Nietzsche’s amor fati (Lupo 
2012; Olma 2016). It is indeed a rather complex value that can be conceptualized in 
different ways. From an epistemological perspective, serendipity is an observation of a 
surprising fact followed by a correct abduction (Merton and Barber 2006). In short, 
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abduction—also called retroduction or inference to the best explanation—as a premise 
has a known phenomenon while as a conclusion a probable explanation. According to 
Peirce (1992), abduction is considered the first step of scientific reasoning, arguing that 
“all the ideas of science come to it by way of abduction” (Ibid). Of course, it may also 
lead to fallible inferences such as affirming the consequent. Yet these are amendable 
hypothesis. Abductive reasoning is indeed considered as a more powerful mode for 
navigating the uncertainties of the information age because it would better support 
genuine doubt and skepticism (Cunningham 2001), which is indeed associated with 
greater intention to seek information, more news media use and more frequent online 
opinion expression (Yamamoto et al., 2018).  
   In the current Internet landscape, anything is supposedly designed to be efficient and 
most of the choices are delegated to algorithms. The pursuit for serendipity can thus 
become a technical challenge to preserve and support a sense of freedom and mystery 
that is available in less networked information environments. It might indeed become 
fundamental to maintain in the infosphere the pleasing feelings that elevate accidental 
discoveries to sensations of serendipity. In future algorithms, it will be indeed necessary 
to leave some things open to chance (Domingos 2015).  
   As serendipity cannot be programmed but only cultivated, its design is more 
probabilistic and, therefore, it is supposed to imply a wider degree of (pseudo)random 
encounters compared to an efficiency-driven information architecture. Seeking 
serendipity would also account for what in statistical jargon are called outliers—deviant 
cases that do not follow the statistical model and that might compromise its predictive 
power—that represent the personal “long tail”. Similarly, Abbott (2008) provided a 
theoretical basis for concerns about algorithmic filtering, arguing indeed the necessity to 
defend randomness from processes for search and discovery. Because of evolution and 
the ability to adapt to environmental changes, human beings are “antifragile” (Taleb 
2012), in the sense that they actually benefit and get better from shocks, randomness and 
uncertainties. In other words, extremely accurate algorithms may reduce human 
resilience. Personalization algorithms might indeed overly reduce pain and uncertainty 
(Gal 2017) so as to create only an illusion of knowledge, eventually pushing people to 
radicalize their beliefs due to the easiness to receptively confirm them in online settings 
(Lynch 2016). Adding to the ‘Socrates paradox’ (I know that I know nothing), serendipity 
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helps to internalize the significance of the ‘unknown unknown’, what we don’t know that 
we don’t know. Thus, it preserves necessary feelings of uncertainty and mystery. 
Philosopher of information Floridi (2015a) argues that a low and stable degree of 
uncertainty leads to increased degrees of liberalism and toleration, as well as more 
efficient flows of information. Similarly, Marcus (2010) acknowledges that the emotional 
anxiety provoked by perceptions of conflict, even if unpleasant (e.g. zemblanity, see note 
19), is the only means of forcing a rational re-evaluation of one’s currents beliefs.  
   The value of serendipity can also be considered on the light of future technological 
developments. Advances in so-called artificial intelligence, machine learning and the 
semantic web have the potential to enable algorithms to make ever more sophisticated 
recommendations. Whereas virtual reality, augmented reality and the Internet of Things 
will definitely blur the anachronistic distinction between online and offline, giving rise to 
the vision of Ambient Intelligence, or even leading to a ‘social physics’ (Pentland 2015). 
It is a real challenge to design serendipity in physical places and other emerging contexts. 
 
3.4.3 Serendipity as a Design Principle 
Programming for serendipity sounds like an oxymoron, and to some extent it is. It is, in 
fact, a subjective experience that is only discernible in hindsight and for which the 
unexpected plays a fundamental role. Serendipity, in effect, cannot be created ‘on 
demand’. While natural, ‘pure serendipity’ is not amenable to generation by a computer 
(van Andel 1994), artificial serendipity can actually be cultivated by creating 
opportunities for it through the design of physical, digital, and learning environments 
(Race and Makri 2016; de Melo 2018). So far, however, relatively little research has been 
undertaken to assess how well existing approaches to information interaction support and 
assess serendipity.  
   Even though there is no set of systematic requirements for a system that facilitates 
serendipity in digital environments yet, many scholars agree that the main functional 
requirements are to enable the “anomaly” or the chance encounter to trigger an event, 
support the user in “connecting the dots” so as to make him/her reach a significant 
surprise outcome (McCay-Peet and Toms 2017). As said, serendipity is also an 
affordance, an opportunity that the environment offers to the user that is able to grasp it, 
as an intuitive invitation (Gibson 2014). At the same time, there are affordances for 
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serendipity itself (Bjorneborn 2017). Clearly, the challenge is how to operationalize them, 
especially considering the fuzziness of the concept of serendipity. 
   Given the interdisciplinary and elusive nature of serendipity, different yet related 
disciplines have interpreted and employed the concept of artificial serendipity in different 
ways. For this reason, it will be now attempted an initial deconstruction of such concept 
in the context of personalization based on an interdisciplinary literature review.  
 
Figure 13. Key affordances and sub-affordances for serendipity with coupled personal factors and sub-
factors (from Björneborn, 2017). 
 
At a theoretical level, the pursuit for artificial serendipity underpins several intertwined 
assumptions and values (Reviglio, 2019); acknowledging the positive value of designing 
for serendipity in fact means that despite advancements in computing, the outcomes of 
algorithms will always be actually unpredictable. There is no perfect personalization 
indeed (call it ‘hyper-personalization’) as algorithms will be more likely never able to 
“fully” understand the complexity of a human being. Even individuals may not always be 
sure of what they actually want and prefer. As such, personalization of news feeds ought 
not to approach any accuracy optimization and try to preserve a degree of ‘random 
encounters’ and items less profiling-based. Eventually, on the one hand, the design for 
serendipity helps to appraise the natural limitations of personalization – even at the cost 
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of users’ engagement and hedonism – while, on the other hand, it invites us to accept the 
multiplicity of our identities and the need for a balanced and diverse diet. In any case 
users ought to be responsibly empowered with an effective information discovery agency 
and not to fully delegate information seeking to an often privatized and naturally biased 
algorithmic information filtering. 
   As it will be further outlined in this chapter, there are two main interpretations in the 
design of digital serendipity, particularly in RSs, namely pseudo-personalized serendipity 
and hyper-personalized serendipity: this is a theoretical spectrum which posit how 
serendipity is designed based on a user profiling, thus the extent to which designers rely 
on (supposedly) more accurate predictions. Even if hyper-personalized serendipity is 
found on the serendipity spectrum, it is less likely to be as serendipitous as pseudo-
personalized serendipity. In fact, the actual difference between the two is the expected 
accuracy of the recommendation. More “pure” – thus more unexpected – serendipity is 
more likely to occur through (semi or even non) personalized recommendations. In the 
case of hyper-personalized recommendations, to be truly serendipitous they should be not 
only useful or surprising but also meaningful, memorable, insightful, information which 
encapsulates quality and epistemic relevance (Floridi, 2006). These should, for example, 
‘fairly’ attempt to stimulate individual progress and societies cohesion. 
   Ideally, as users and citizens we need and want both hyper-personalization and pseudo-
personalization. Hence, from a theoretical level it is needed to find a balance. Still, from 
a practical level it is hard to argue any optimal degree of pseudo- and hyper- 
personalization. Also, a right level of trade-off between the provider’s and users’ interests 
is debatable. Eventually, being able to identify personalization’s accuracy in particular 
items as well as in the general consumed media content may be the basis for autonomous 
choice, if a proper agency is afforded by design. In order to increase serendipitous 
encounters, similarly to the dynamic relation between randomization, personalization and 
generalization suggested by Carr (2015), designers and engineers should strive to balance 
pseudo-personalization, hyper-personalization and non-serendipity, that is, all that 
information that ex-post did not unfold in any serendipitous experience. The latest 
represents the value of diversity; the assurance that news feeds are not all or excessively 
hyper-personalized, so that individual and political serendipity are cultivated so that a 
user actually expands his/her horizons and it is encountered information one may (not) 
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like, thus leaving space for generalization and diversification. Yet, it is exactly this 
inevitable consequence of designing for serendipity that sustains serendipity as an ethical 
principle in democratic societies, by diversifying information, preventing hyper-
personalization and sustaining a stronger common base of facts and ideas, outside one’s 
filter bubble and echo chambers. This framework resonates with a core function of 
traditional media, that is, to provide ‘reliable surprises’ in order to balance familiarity and 
chaos (Schönbach 2007) and, similarly, a balance between convergent and divergent 
systems (de Melo, 2018).  
 
3.4.4 Serendipity as an Educational Goal 
Serendipity embraces certain values that can represent future educational goals and 
political struggles of the digital era. Not only its design generally sustains creativity and 
innovation but its teaching helps to stimulate proactive information seeking, inter-
disciplinary skills and enrich the algorithmic imaginary. As a consequence, it might help 
to solve the main challenges to experience diversity online (see Hoffmann et al., 2015) 
and, at the same time, sustain the four modalities of expressing voice (see Harambam et 
al., 2018).  
   Firstly, serendipity is a capability and, as such, can be considered in terms of virtue 
ethics. As sagacity and curiosity are often acknowledged as fundamental virtues, there 
are two other primary ones: humility and courage (Lupo 2012). On the one hand, 
humiliation is necessary in the face of the imponderable occurrence of chance so as to 
radically question one’s own beliefs. On the other hand, courage is needed to follow such 
chance, and to turn it into an opportunity against its potential risks. It is also necessary 
for any individual engaged in the task of getting rid of beliefs and prejudices that curb the 
cognitive path. As scientists strive to embrace such attitude, individuals can also benefit 
from being nudged to be sagacious and critical active-seekers alike in online settings. 
Critically, to experience serendipity it is needed to take the risks of failure, frustration and 
“wasted time”. Serendipity is also strictly related with randomness, chance and, therefore, 
uncertainty and mystery. Tolerance towards uncertainty is thus a desirable educational 
outcome. 
   Secondly, since serendipity is intimately related to research and discovery, to occur it 
requires an environment that stimulates platform’s transparency and user control, it 
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implies, therefore, an empowerment of individuals. Contrary to many legal formulations 
in data protection which are framed in terms of harms, and thus freedom from algorithms, 
serendipity can be considered a positive freedom, as an individual, unexpected and 
valuable information. When users are treated as active-seekers, then, they can perceive 
their findings as triumphs of personal agency, intuition, and inspiration, and as a self-
reinforcing expectation, increase their freedom from algorithms. Maturity of information 
societies is indeed a matter of people’s expectations, not just technological or economic 
development (Floridi 2016a). If one analyzes the phenomenon of personalization through 
the lens of serendipity, it is possible to rebalance the asymmetric power between human 
agency and computer delegation, and between users and corporations’ rights.  
   Thirdly, serendipity has a semantic value, in the sense that it can expand users’ 
algorithmic imaginary (Bucher 2017). Our current conceptual toolbox indeed is no longer 
fitted to address new ICT-related challenges and, as Floridi (2015b) argues, this is a risk 
because ‘the lack of a clear conceptual grasp of our present time may easily lead to 
negative projections about the future: we fear and reject what we fail to semanticise (p.3)’. 
Serendipity can actually represent a narrative for emerging information societies and 
enrich the ‘ecology of the self’, as the ethics of self-poiesis (Floridi 2011). For instance, 
it can strengthen individual’s reactance to bias-driven algorithms. Either, it might help to 
recognize one’s own responsibility in the "spreadability" of serendipitous information, 
given that users are actually one another’s curators (Race and Makri 2016, p. 5.2) (Table 
1).  
   Finally, managing serendipity can generally help users to navigate our hyper-complex 
world more resiliently. Scholars have remarked that the researcher of the future has to be 
able to work in several fields temporarily and to find similarities between apparently 
heterogeneous concepts (Lupo, 2012). Serendipity, in fact, more often comes out among 
interdisciplinary scholars (Edward Foster and Ellis, 2014) and it boosts interdisciplinary 
research (Darbellay et al., 2014). In the informal learning that derives from HCI, a 
serendipitous proclivity represents a powerful soft-skill to tackle the challenges of the 
information era and a new fundamental idea that contribute to rethink the current context 
of education (Cobo and Moravec, 2011). Indeed, it can help to develop abilities of self-
learning through accidental learning (Kop, 2012; Yadamsuren and Erdelez, 2016).   
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Figure 14. Summary of the main opposing phenomena and antithetical values that the design of serendipity 
tends to favour and disfavour (from Reviglio, 2019a). 
 
3.3 A Taxonomy for Designing Digital Serendipity  
In the last article written on serendipity (Reviglio, 2019b), it was finally attempted to 
extrapolate implicit meanings of serendipity as a design principle, especially in the 
context of social media. To begin with, two general approaches that can be taken by 
designers are default rules and active choosing (Sunstein, 2017b). As previously 
mentioned, a user might take both a non-purposive or passive information behaviour 
(which generally supports Type A serendipity) and a purposive or active (mostly Type B 
and C) (Kotkov et al., 2016). On the one hand, active serendipity occurs both when 
designers provide serendipitous tools by design and when users proactively seek 
information and eventually experience serendipity with these. On the other hand, passive 
serendipity occurs when engineers inscribe serendipity into algorithms and when user is 
passively exposed (and nudged) to potentially serendipitous information. These 
intertwined conceptualizations share another paramount distinction: hyper-personalized 
serendipity and pseudo-personalized serendipity which ideally differ for the extent to 
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which they rely on individual profiling and, therefore, on their (presumed) accuracy. 
Furthermore, we identify individual and political serendipity, which respectively aim to 
increase the exposure to new ideas and potentially new interests, outside one’s filter 
bubble, and facts, views and arguments, outside one’s echo chambers. These can be both 
hyper- and pseudo-personalized. 
   All these different interpretations of serendipity need a more detailed analysis. In fact, 
they emerged in literature but they may be difficult to grasp as they are often implicitly 
intended and their meanings often overlap. Therefore, we now propose a preliminary 
taxonomy of the main interpretations of serendipity in digital environments – especially 
in personalized social media – according to different design processes and disciplines’ 
perspectives. 
 
3.3.1 Passive Serendipity – Serendipitous Recommender Systems 
Passive serendipity is mostly attained in personalized information flows. Personalized 
recommender systems (RSs) have presented since long the problem of excessive 
homogeneity. RSs research in fact began to move beyond accuracy and experimenting 
with serendipity (Ge et al., 2010). Indeed, user satisfaction does not always correlate with 
very accurate RSs. This, however, does not guarantee that mainstream platforms will take 
it into consideration. RSs have already been criticized to not sufficiently account for 
serendipity (Matt et al., 2014). Optimizing current RSs for more serendipitous 
recommendations is not a trivial task of course. Promising attempts have been already 
done long ago. Campos and Figuereido (2002) famously pioneered an information 
retrieval software that resulted in 52.7% of (pseudo)serendipitous suggestions. Despite 
the subjective character of the results, they showed that explicitly programming for 
serendipity is possible. Yet there is still no consensus on the definition of serendipity in 
RSs (Kotkov et al., 2016). It is, however, a compound of other concepts like novelty, 
utility, diversity, unfamiliarity and unexpectedness.  
   Even though design a RS is a multi-criteria decision making problem, there is a major 
theoretical design trade-off between two main criteria: accuracy and serendipity (Ibid). 
Accuracy-driven RSs can lead to more engagement and satisfaction for users (thus 
revenues for information intermediaries) than serendipity-driven RSs. More often, in fact, 
serendipitous content may not be liked. Designing for serendipity, however, might 
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increase user satisfaction in the long-term. Furthermore, seeking and experiencing 
serendipity is time-consuming. Potentially-serendipitous content (e.g. a long article or a 
documentary) may bring the user to another website, pulling off profitable scrolling. More 
generally, it implies a slower consumption of information as it may require an ‘incubation 
period’ (McCay-Peet and Toms 2017). Thus, such time may be given away to scrolling, 
and so to engagement within the platform. The profit-driven model of mainstream SNS, 
for example, tend to prioritize ephemeral content to durable one, short videos (snippets) 
to long ones and snapshots (casual images) to written text as they better lock-in users in 
their “walled-garden” (Derakhshan 2016). Eventually, other relevant criteria need to be 
considered to create serendipity-driven RSs, in particular challenging ethical and political 
information.  
 
3.3.2 “Active Serendipity” – Serendipity by Design 
There are actually countless ways to empower users, extract value from their profiles 
meaningfully, to illustrate blind spots, increasing diversity, and to stimulate creative 
associations. First of all, visualization and discovery tools such as the use of real-time 
transparency dashboards help to increase users’ awareness, autonomy and, as a 
consequence, the potential to access and encounter more diverse and, eventually, 
serendipitous information (for example, see Nagulendra and Vassileva 2016). There are 
indeed several visualization tools that can increase control and awareness about a user’s 
information diet. In this context, a significant design choice might be to afford more 
profiles per user. The management of multiple filtering can in fact nudge users to subtract 
from the determined path offered by algorithms (Bozdag and Timmermans 2011; 
Hildebrandt, 2017). Similarly, to afford users to “empathize” with—namely browsing—
the information flow of other’s users, friends, and even groups may be serendipitous. 
Either, to exploit others’ profile to filter your own feed (what is called algorithmic 
recommender personae, see Harambam et al., 2018). Yet, it must always be 
acknowledged the paradox of choice, that is, the more to choose from, the less that is 
chosen. These design choices and visualization tools provide a general idea of 
serendipitous design choices and tools that could supplement user experience. Its aim 
would be to provide users with ‘institutionalized serendipity’ (Merton and Barber, 2006). 
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     Figure 15. A dashboard that displays users their filter bubbles (from Nagulendra and Vassileva, 2016) 
 
3.3.3. Hyper-personalized Serendipity 
Hyper-personalization is generally intended as the use of data to provide more 
personalized and targeted products, services and content. Hyper-personalized serendipity 
can thus be intended as the attempt to recommend serendipitous items based on an 
individual data profile. In recent years there has been growing interest in this philosophy, 
and in how it can be applied to a variety of disciplines and issues. This endeavor could 
follow the principle of kairos14 (one of the principles of captology) that refers to the ability 
to provide the right content, at the right person in the right moment (Fogg et al., 2002). 
Hyper-personalized recommendations could in fact be timely, useful, surprising and 
persuasive, yet not necessarily serendipitous. When this is the case, hyper-personalized 
serendipity could represent what has been termed as ‘serendipity on a plate’ (Makri et al., 
2014), namely highly personalized and passive serendipity. It is the conception of 
serendipity more akin to research on RSs, marketing and nudging practices (Kotkov et 
al., 2016).  Thus, it is primarily driven by the principles of delegation and efficiency. To 
some extent, it is indeed a necessary feature of RSs and other information systems. In 
theory, however, encounter only (or clearly mostly) hyper-personalized information, 
particularly in personalized news feeds, may only create an illusion of serendipity 
(Erdelez and Jahnke, 2018) and become detrimental both to individuals and societies at 
large (Reviglio, 2019). Yet, hyper-personalization is also an ideal tool for news 
 
14 Traditionally kairos is a Greek divinity, personification of the “opportune moment”. 
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organizations to regain control of the news distribution process and reconnect with 
audiences. 
   Hyper-personalization is the paradigm of convergent systems. To give an example, one 
watches a movie at the cinema and then stumbles upon a review of that particular movie 
online. One may experience this as serendipitous, and the content related to the review 
may well be indeed. Its "serendipitousness" may, however, be limited. These 
recommendations may be less unexpected by users – they can realize they depend on data 
surveillance – and, therefore, it becomes naturally less serendipitous while, relatedly, it is 
problematic from a privacy perspective. Moreover, the conflicting interests of platforms 
that provide such services are questionable; in fact, the natural feeling of privacy loss can 
undermine trust over the system. For this reason, it is clear how the deployment of hyper-
personalized serendipity may be even limited in order to preserve profitable surveillance 
practices. Also, it might be employed in a crafty and deceitful way. For example, by 
creating compulsion loops that are actually found in a wide range of social media. Thus, 
hyper-personalized content could be purposefully offered among uninteresting content in 
a way that increases engagement (intended as the more scrolled posts, the more ads sold 
and thus revenues). In this case it is fake serendipity (as further explained). Moreover, 
user’s privacy preferences can constitute informative metadata which the system could 
use to make sensitive inferences about the user and ultimately influence such exposure to 
hyper-personalized content. Despite speculations, the business model of mainstream 
social media is nevertheless based on surveillance practices yet individuals are even 
risking of not getting a deserved pay-off, that is, high quality (personalized) information. 
 
3.3.3.1 Illusory Serendipity  
Illusory serendipity is a sub-group of hyper-personalized serendipity. Yet, while hyper-
personalization may also imply serendipitous encounters, illusory serendipity is 
surprising but does not lead to any valuable insight. It is merely fake, ephemeral and/or 
even addictive. It usually exploits users’ inferred vulnerabilities regardless of the quality 
of information. Illusory serendipity is indeed inherently persuasive and, at times, 
manipulative. It drives click-bait, misinformation and disinformation. Further research on 
the techniques to design it and the individual reactions to it is certainly needed to better 
understand its expression. 
 88 
 
3.3.4 Pseudo-personalized serendipity 
Pseudo-personalization refers to all those recommendations that are either statistically 
unlikely, either less likely – that may lead to more unexpected serendipitous encounters. 
To some extent, it is already an implicit by-product of personalization practices as they 
are indeed inherently probabilistic. This, however, depends on the extent of the likelihood 
of a recommendation to be liked (recommendation’s accuracy). As such, it refers to the 
spectrum in which recommendations are less profile-driven. On the one hand, pseudo-
personalization might be highly unlikely to be liked (low accuracy of recommendation) 
– or at times even be random or – from a design perspective – random in an ‘exploratory 
way’. On the other hand, it might be more accurate, that intersects a user’s profile but, 
still, less accurately than hyper-personalization.  
   This design attempt is significant to trigger serendipitous encounters because in order 
to make sense of chance information exposure “information must resonate with some 
prior knowledge, interest, or experience for the user” (Helberger, 2011). Still, contrary to 
hyper-personalization, engineered pseudo-personalization attempts to provide the most 
unexpected serendipity – as being less probable and less predictable – it thus represents 
a more hazardous attempt to design for serendipity, particularly from an economic 
perspective (i.e. engagement and thus profit may be threatened). Also, it is time-
consuming, risk-taking, sometimes distracting and frustrating. In order to properly sustain 
pseudo-personalized serendipity, information discoverability –the possibility to find and 
access content with a specific quality– is also fundamental, along with the semi-
randomizability of information filtering. In the case of active serendipity, its role becomes 
even more significant; it could in fact provide the possibility to subtract from any 
potentially (biased or excessively pre-determined) algorithmic curation and be able to be 
exposed to more casual, diverse and, eventually, serendipitous content. The main aim of 
pseudo-personalization is to actually overcome the potential determinism implicit in 
profiling – which can result in redundancy and limited pool of information – as well as 
platforms’ information selection power. Since long this limitation of recommender 
systems was acknowledged and it originates from the analogous “over-specialization 
problem”, that is, when the system can only recommend items scoring highly against a 
user’s profile, the user is restricted to seeing items similar to those already rated. 
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3.3.5 Individual Serendipity 
‘Individual serendipity’ is related to the ‘filter bubble problem’ and, thus, particularly 
related to personal identity, particularly affected by ICTs that are indeed technology of 
construction of the self (Floridi 2011). It is individual exactly because it focuses on the 
individual information consumption. It is thus intended as the design attempt to expose 
users to information that intersects a user digital profile, so that an individual can discover 
new ideas and interests, indeed outside one’s filter bubble. As such, this conception is the 
most akin to the concept of ‘content diversity’ by design (Helberger, 2011) and it implies 
a degree of generalization and diversification of information selection. It can be sustained 
through active serendipity that means, generally speaking, to provide serendipitous 
affordances (Gibson 2014). Similarly, discoverability is fundamental to sustain cultural 
diversity (Burri, 2019). In this context, a significant design choice might be to afford more 
profiles per user. The management and access to multiple filtering can in fact nudge users 
to subtract from the determined path offered by algorithms (Bozdag and Timmermans 
2011). This conception of serendipity also sustains what Hildebrandt (2017) defines as 
‘agonistic machine learning’, that is, demanding companies or governments that base 
decisions on machine learning to explore and enable alternative ways of datafying and 
modelling the same event, person or action.  
    Pseudo-personalization may actually be not particularly problematic as long as the 
system adapts to the individual serendipitous disposition – the more diversity you 
consume the more diverse the information selected. There are, however, two main issues 
to consider. On the one hand, growing ‘epistemic inequality’ (Lynch 2016). Certain 
privileged group of users, that have higher (digital) literacy, are effectively able to reach 
a good balance between relevance and serendipity, and the recommender systems would 
indeed adapt to their serendipitous proclivity. Instead, a larger group of users risk to be 
exposed only to a minimum, qualitatively inferior range of information. On the other 
hand, there is an asymmetry between first and second order preferences. What if a user 
would ideally prefer to be more open and curious while in practice actually prefers her or 
his comfort zone if this is (more often subtly) offered? In other words, individual 
serendipity also attempts to fill the mismatch between the necessity for the aspirational 
self to uncover and the intrinsic identity reductionism of profiling. Finally, one may feel 
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to enjoy a diverse media diet while it is ignoring the actual potential diversity and 
serendipity the Internet may offer. Therefore, it is essential to provide ‘serendipity 
agency’, namely the capability to use tools to control and be aware of the production and 
one’s own consumption of information. Such endeavor embraces ‘pro-ethical design’ or 
so-called “tolerant paternalism” (Floridi, 2016) that aims to modify the level of 
abstraction of the choice architecture by educating users to make their own critical 
choices. 
 
3.3.6 Political Serendipity 
Political serendipity concerns the risks of echo-chambers and, thus, it is particularly 
related to certain democratic principles, especially media pluralism. It is intended not only 
as a metaphor but also as the proactive attempt to expose users to content that is politically 
challenging in order to balance user’s political news diet. It is typically intended as such 
in discussions related to media ethics and media pluralism (Helberger, 2011; Hoffmann 
et al., 2015; Burri, 2019). Theoretically, it is sustained by a vast literature and all 
democratic models (Bozdag and Van den Hoven, 2015), in the liberal one particularly for 
the concept of ‘marketplace of ideas’ while in the deliberative one to promote open-
mindedness and mental flexibility (Helberger, 2019). More generally, it sustains the 
fundamental right to autonomously seek and be exposed and eventually assess alternative 
fact, viewpoints, worldviews, with the chance to raise that emotional anxiety that may 
trigger belief change (Marcus, 2010) or simply to preserve a common base of facts to 
discuss. 
   Basically, political serendipity it might be achieved either through the attempt to 
balance the political news offer by design, either to proactively attempt to expose to 
challenging and alternative views in a highly personalized manner. On the one hand, 
however, being actively exposed to challenging information—eventually serendipitous—
may not necessarily result in experience of diversity, de-polarization and/or more 
tolerance. In some cases, the opposite may be true. Polarized individuals radicalize further 
while exposed to challenging information (Quattrociocchi et al., 2016). Experiencing 
serendipity especially requires attitudes of open-mindedness and sagacity that are, above 
all, an educational issue. Yet, political serendipity by design could, in theory, help to 
prevent people to begin to radicalize (Reviglio, 2017). On the other hand, there may be 
 91 
problems related to political hyper-personalization and illusory serendipity. In other 
words, persuasive or even manipulative political micro-targeting. Therefore, it may be 
better to provide users affordances. In practice, Sunstein (2017b) proposed that social 
media could create a “serendipity button” for news and opinions, allowing people to opt 
in, especially during elections. Related stories at the bottom of a “post” also seem to help 
in counteracting misinformation or simply enriching a user perspective in a serendipitous 
way (Bode and Vraga, 2015). Another example to sustain political serendipity as an 
agonistic approach to political news may be Flipfeed, a MIT Lab-made Twitter plug-in 
that provides to the users the possibility to scroll the feed of a random individual which 
resides in a far ideological spectrum from one’s own. 
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3.5 Limitations and Unintended Consequences  
There are several arguments that problematize serendipity as a design principle. As many 
other principles, indeed, serendipity works well in theory while in practice shows many 
limitations. Several challenging issues indeed lie on its definition, its normative 
translation and, eventually, in its measurement.  
   First of all, one of the main challenge is indeed the measurement of serendipity, which 
mainly depends on the subjectivity of the phenomenon. Individuals have very different 
thresholds for considering something serendipitous. Serendipity is not a purely discrete 
concept (Makri and Blandford 2012). In its assessment, serendipity is a continuum to 
cover the entire spectrum of different degrees of surprise. Therefore, serendipity cannot 
be considered as a ‘good measurement’ that is valid, reproducible and accurate, thus it 
can become object of dispute (see Kroes and van de Poel 2015). It can be established, 
nonetheless, a reasonable or justified consensus on how to operationalize it and measure 
it. On the base of which evaluation criteria, then, information architectures and RSs 
should be designed remains open-ended. Measurements of serendipity can be both 
quantitative and qualitative scales (McCay-Peet and Toms 2017). It is indeed possible to 
observe serendipity in controlled research environments, throughout surveys or by 
directly observing information encountering behaviour (Kotkov et al., 2016). 
Quantitative measurements may then be based on mixed method approach and other 
evaluation criteria. Eventually, these might complement each other to potentially come 
up with an additional key performance indicator. Nevertheless, a “desirable degree” of 
serendipity remains subjective; in the case of passive serendipity, how much potentially-
serendipitous information should be provided both in the quantity of un/expected 
information recommended and the degree of such un/expectedness? Perhaps, somewhat 
counter-intuitively, an optimal balance may be found personalizing serendipity, albeit 
there might be significant privacy implications (McCay-Peet and Toms 2017).  
   A related-risk lies in potential manipulations of serendipity (particularly passive 
serendipity), due to its relatively conceptual fuzziness and, again, its subjective character. 
Paradigmatically, as already mentioned, Google CEO Eric Schmidt (2006) envisioned a 
future where people and technology come together to create ‘a serendipity engine’ “where 
you don’t even have to type” (2006). Instead of create serendipity and offer it ‘on a plate’, 
however, it is more sustainable to create opportunities for it by supporting strategies that 
 93 
may increase its likelihood, thus empowering users to create their own personal ‘recipes’ 
(Makri et al., 2014). Mere simulations of serendipity, in fact, may produce vague, washy 
attempts to make the world a better place (Olma, 2016). One risk may be to legitimize 
whatever recommended content with serendipity and to muddle it with sensationalism, 
propaganda or even disinformation and misinformation (so-called fake news).  
   From a regulatory perspective, optimize social media for serendipity does not appear 
promising. Above all, it might be considered as a form of stealthy paternalism naturally 
suitable to handling. Yet epistemic inequality might persist, if not increase. Challenge-
averse individuals who would ideally benefit more from an architecture for serendipity, 
are naturally those less willing to play with it. On the contrary, those already prone to it 
are those more willing to benefit from it. Given the heterogeneity of users, to avoid further 
inequality a regulation may be required. As said, the actual loss for platforms might be 
users’ engagement and, consequently, it would threaten companies’ revenues. Therefore, 
it also represents a political and legal challenge.  
   Still, the beneficial effects of an architecture for serendipity are uncertain. Looking for 
serendipity is often time-consuming, risk-taking, sometimes distracting. As explained 
above, being actively exposed to challenging information—eventually serendipitous— 
may not necessarily result in experience of diversity, de-polarization and/or more 
tolerance. In some cases, the opposite is true. Polarized individuals radicalize further 
while exposed to challenging information (so-called backfire effect) (Quattrociocchi et 
al., 2016). Any intervention should eventually be measured accordingly. Experiencing 
serendipity especially requires an attitude of open-mindedness that is, above all, an 
educational issue. Therefore, while from a theoretical perspective serendipity can be 
advocated as a beneficial design principle, from a pragmatic perspective it is a highly 
problematic endeavor. Not only there are still potential improvements in the 
understanding of serendipity from a theoretical perspective but there is also significant 
design, psychological and educational research gap. Yet, we argued that serendipity has 
to be conceived both passive and active. In other words, an architecture for serendipity 
should balance personalization, generalization and randomization, and may be beneficial 





Serendipity is a polysemantic notion and polymorphic phenomenon. As such, different 
yet related disciplines have interpreted and employed the concept in different ways. The 
chapter outlined the research history of serendipity in digital environments to seeks to 
map the conceptual space of ‘artificial serendipity’. This was done carrying out an 
interdisciplinary literature review and defining and discussing relevant terms in the area, 
in particular the distinction between hyper-personalized and pseudo-personalized 
serendipity. These have been made to further develop the study of serendipity in digital 
environments. In fact, artificial serendipity proved to be a technically volatile and a 
conceptually nuanced ethical principle. Though, it is also a beneficial design principle for 
both individuals and democratic societies. In fact it could help to burst filter bubbles and 
echo chambers, particularly in personalized news feeds. Cultivating serendipity is 
individually desirable and socially beneficial. Its design can sustain media pluralism and 
strengthen human rights, such as freedom of expression and the right to receive 
information.  
   As of now, many research gap remain in the study of serendipity in digital 
environments. Discussions and, eventually, consensus on the definitions, the design and 
the assessment of serendipity need to be further reasoned. Also, the practical effectiveness 
in bursting filter bubbles and soften echo chambers is questionable. Digital literacy, 
critical thinking and high quality media remain fundamental preconditions for a beneficial 
expression of serendipity in digital environments. There is certainly room for research on 
serendipity in learning environments, conceived as a soft-skill to master. Nonetheless, 
under the current business model of mainstream social media, for example, serendipity 
may be limited, and often mingled with what we termed ‘illusory serendipity’. In fact, 
when designed for profit-making alone, or when they are mainly profit-driven, 
“algorithms necessarily diverge from the public interest” (Benkler, 2019). In order to 
increase serendipity, designers and engineers should recognize the nuances of designing 
for serendipity – especially the trade-off with accuracy – and, from an ethical standpoint, 
attempt to balance hyper-personalized and pseudo-personalized recommendations, even 
throughout design affordances and information discovery tools. Our current conceptual 
toolbox is in fact no longer fitted to address new ICT-related challenges and “the lack of 
a clear conceptual grasp of our present time may easily lead to negative projections about 
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the future: we fear and reject what we fail to semanticise” (Floridi, 2015, p.3). These 
concepts can eventually better inform and inspire educators, designers and engineers to 
help individuals find the information they need, not just the information they think they 






























4. Personalization and Its Regulation 
In this Chapter it is analyzed the phenomenon of personalization from a regulatory (4.1), 
ethical (4.2) and governance (4.3) perspective. The analysis takes into account the 
interdisciplinary nature of personalization and it is focused on the European legal context. 
To begin with, modes of regulation and an overview of social media regulation are 
broadly discussed. Then, an analysis of the European Legislation is provided. After 
having introduced a human rights perspective, there are briefly discussed the E-
Commerce Directive, E-privacy Directive, the General Data Protection Regulation and, 
more generally, media law. In the second part, an ethical approach to personalization is 
discussed, introducing the role of ethics in European legislation and Artificial Intelligence 
and discussing certain issues such as group privacy and nudging. In the third part, it is 
discussed the governance of personalization as a synthesis of regulation and ethics. Also, 




4. An Introduction to the Normativity of Personalization 
The regulation of the digital, the governance of the digital and the ethics of the digital 
(whether computer, AI, information or data ethics) are different normative approaches, 
complementary, but not to be confused with each other (Floridi, 2016) (see Figure 18). In 
this chapter, the normativity of personalization will be discussed from these different but 
intertwined perspectives. Prior to this, necessary clarifications are briefly given.  
   To begin with, ‘digital regulation’ has to be basically intended as “a system of rules 
elaborated and enforced through social or governmental institutions to regulate the 
behaviour of the relevant agents in the infosphere (p.3)”. Instead, ‘digital governance’ is 
“the practice of establishing and implementing policies, procedures, and standards for the 
proper development, use and management of the infosphere (Ibid)”. For example, through 
digital governance, a government agency or a company may (a) determine and control 
processes and methods used by data controllers and (b) devise effective procedures for 
decision-making and for the identification of accountabilities with respect to data-related 
processes. As such, digital governance may comprise guidelines and recommendations 
that overlap with, but are not identical to, digital regulation. Similarly, not every aspect 
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of digital regulation is a matter of digital governance and not every aspect of digital 
governance is a matter of digital regulation.  
   Then, there is digital ethics, understood as “the branch of ethics that studies and 
evaluates moral problems relating to data and information (including generation, 
recording, curation, processing, dissemination, sharing and use), algorithms (including 
AI, artificial agents, machine learning and robots) and corresponding practices and 
infrastructures (including responsible innovation, programming, hacking, professional 
codes and standards), in order to formulate and support morally good solutions (e.g. good 
conduct or good values) (Ibid, p.4)”. Digital ethics shapes digital regulation and digital 
governance through the relation of moral evaluation. 
                       
Figure 18. The relationship between digital ethics, digital regulation and digital governance (from Floridi, 
2018).  
 
Furthermore, digital ethics may be understood now in two ways, as hard and soft ethics 
(Floridi, 2018). Hard ethics is what we usually have in mind when discussing values, 
rights, duties and responsibilities—or, more broadly, what is morally right or wrong, and 
what ought or ought not to be done—in the course of formulating new regulations or 
challenging existing ones. In short, hard ethics is what makes or shapes the law. Thus, in 
the best scenario, lobbying in favour of some good legislation or to improve that which 
already exists can be a case of hard ethics. Instead, soft ethics covers the same normative 
ground as hard ethics, but it does so by considering what ought and ought not to be done 
over and above the existing regulation, not against it, or despite its scope, or to change it, 
or to by-pass it (e.g. in terms of self-regulation). We will further discuss this distinction 
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in Section 4.2. 
  Now, in the following section we firstly analyze personalization regulation (Section 
4.1). This will be done in the context of European legislation, with a special focus to 
Human Rights, the E-Commerce Directive and the GDPR. Then, we explore relevant 
issues for both personalization ethics (Section 4.2) and personalization governance 
(Section 4.3) to provide a more comprehensive approach to the government of the subject 
of research. In the former case, we advocate, again, the importance of serendipity as a 
design principle for personalization algorithms and design, thus discussing it in the 
broader ethical debate. Moreover, an analysis of the relevance of inter-cultural ethics and, 
eventually, a critical approach to nudging are also introduced. In the latter case, we 
analyze specifically the role that public service media had in Europe, and what role it may 
have in the present day, especially regarding personalization practices and, more 
generally, in sustaining the traditional principles historically sustained by public service 
broadcasting. 
 
4.1 Personalization Regulation 
In this section, an overview over the debate on regulating platforms is introduced. For 
many reasons, in fact, the Internet – and more specifically the information intermediaries 
that enable personalization – is not an easy area to regulate. Since its inception, it has 
often been conceived as the epitome of decentralization. Internet, in fact, is more 
decentralized than any other communications systems that has occurred previously. Some 
of its features undermined the benchmarks that a century of international cooperation 
helped to build; the principles of territoriality, universality of values and effectiveness 
collide with the fluidity of information and data flows. This denaturalising effect suggests 
fundamental differences between the Internet as an object of regulation and any other 
domains that have been regulated internationally. Also, it is an area of constant fast-pacing 
changes not only for its infrastructure and architecture but, above all, for its capacity to 
trigger social, economic, and (geo)political changes. 
   As we have seen throughout the thesis, many Internet intermediaries have dominant 
positions in their particular markets – above all, Facebook for social networking sites and 
Youtube for video sharing – and utilize design to satisfy (or even nudge) users, and RSs 
to disseminate and determine personalized content, thus giving them immense power and 
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influence. This should come with certain responsibilities and, potentially, with certain 
liabilities. Yet, these platforms argued that they are technology companies rather than 
media companies, thereby avoiding media regulation and editorial responsibilities 
(Napoli and Caplan, 2017). How they design their platforms, how they allow content to 
flow, and how they agree to exchange information with competing platforms have also 
direct implications for both communication rights and innovation. The intermediation of 
content driven by personalization is related to several conditions of democracy; how 
people receive news, the articulation of relationships and associations; access to 
knowledge, and spaces for deliberation about issues of public concern. And as the Internet 
transcends national borders, the norms and laws in various jurisdictions are often in 
conflict and these private intermediaries must determine which government requests to 
comply with and which to ignore.  
   In this context of complex and global socio-technical systems like social media 
platforms it is therefore discussed what are the best regulatory approaches. Regulators are 
thus faced with two interrelated questions in this context: who should regulate platforms 
and how they should be regulated. In general, there are three main approaches that are 
usually discussed; traditional regulation, self-regulation and co-regulation who set and 
enforce different regulatory goals, standards and justifications (Hirsch, 2010: Finck, 
2018): 
 
• Regulation. Basically, proponents of government regulation argue that the 
desire for profits, coupled with the economic value of personal information, will 
inevitably lead private firms to collect a great deal of personal information 
online. 
 
• Self-regulation. Self-regulation is a regulatory system in which “business 
representatives define and enforce standards for their sector with little or no 
government involvement” (Ibid, p.458). In general, critics of government 
regulation often argue that the market, either alone or in combination with self-
regulation, will do a better job of protecting privacy as well as human rights, 
owing to; a) Industry members know better than anyone else and therefore are 
uniquely positioned to identify the most effective and efficient means of 
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protecting public values. b) If users ask for more privacy, for example, 
individual Internet businesses will enhance their competitive positions by 
responding to customer preferences for greater privacy, thereby leading to a 
more privacy friendly Web. Those who object to such a market solution focus 
on information asymmetries. Users are indeed often unaware of the collection 
of their personal information online or about complex technological dynamics 
and their social consequences. 
 
• Co-regulation. “Co-regulation” is intended as a system that combines state- and 
non-state regulation. It is therefore a hybrid approach that has the potential to 
combine the strengths of the former two approaches. Co-regulation 
encompasses initiatives in which government and industry share responsibility 
for drafting and enforcing regulatory standards. Co-regulation is not a new 
phenomenon and can be found at various places in the regulatory landscape. 
American legal and policy scholars often use the term interchangeably with 
“collaborative governance.” Proponents of co-regulation claim that it provides 
the flexibility of self-regulation while adding the supervision and rigor of 
government rules. Its critics, however, assert that co-regulation a) lacks 
transparency and accountability as compared to traditional notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, b) industry will not reveal insider knowledge to regulators but will 
instead use its informational upper hand to obtain weaker standards, so that c) 
enforcement responsibilities will often result in deals that favor industry and 
disfavor the public interest. In any case, there remain also serious questions 
about whether detailed government regulation – and any other approach – is 
appropriate for a fast-paced, complex part of the economy or even feasible in 
light of major political obstacles. 
  
For further clarification the above denominations point towards various approaches to 
regulation, yet they operate on a spectrum. Also, all of them are already set in place to 
some extent. On the one hand, platforms are already self-regulating entities. They 
determine the terms and conditions of their intermediary function and define online and 
offline standards of behaviour. On the other hand, there is an information asymmetry 
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between platforms and policy-makers that naturally requires some forms of co-regulation.  
So, what is the best approach to regulate platform and its personalization systems, if any? 
This question will be further addressed after having analyzed the current European legal 
framework in Section 4.3. 
   Another significant issue is which jurisdiction and law are more suited for regulation 
and also whether there is a need for modification of existing legal frameworks or to create 
new legislation. Significantly, in the past years policymakers have undertaken several 
different initiatives to regulate social media RSs. This has included horizontal 
instruments, such as competition law and data protection law, which are not tailored to 
social media’s personalization in particular but may still have some spillover benefits for 
its purposes (Leersen, 2020). Antitrust and consumer protection law already place some 
limits on platforms, and for the sake of this thesis, on the risks of personalization. Antitrust 
law could place limits on the ability of platforms to prioritize their own services and 
therefore discriminate other actors. Consumer protection law in most jurisdictions forbids 
covert advertising, which means that platforms have a duty to disclose whether content is 
being sponsored – i.e., whether it constitutes an advertisement rather than organic content.  
   Yet, more recently, some innovative sectoral proposals have been discussed and drafted. 
For example, the Medienstaatsvertrag, proposed in 2018 by the German broadcast 
authority, requires social media platforms to disclose the selection criteria that determine 
the sorting and presentation of content. The Dutch State Commission on the 
Parliamentary System has proposed an “independent entity” to monitor social media RSs 
to maintain diversity and avoid bias and, finally, the EU Code of Practice on 
Disinformation which requires signatories to “[d]ilute the visibility of disinformation by 
improving the findability of trustworthy content” and to “invest in technological means 
to prioritize relevant, authentic, and authoritative information where appropriate in 
search, feeds, or other automatically ranked distribution channels”. Most of these 
instruments are rooted in media pluralism policy, but they also target other public interest 
considerations such as the combating of online disinformation.  
   Nevertheless, considering the special position of media and the preference for self-
regulation following from media freedom, for some time it has been considered unlikely 
that the normative principles in the media context would directly translate into legal 
obligations. Such context has enabled social media mainstream platforms to actually 
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privatize internet governance (DeNardis and Hackl, 2015). So far, governments have been 
reluctant to take a strong lead. As of now, (supra)national governments have tried some 
forms of co-regulation, such as the above mentioned EU Code of Practice on 
Disinformation, in which the major tech companies – Facebook, Google and Twitter – 
pledged to work more actively to lessen the spread of disinformation and hate speech 
online. As previously discussed, all of this is non-binding and the rules can be interpreted 
rather loosely by these companies. More and more critics in academia and civil society 
are arguing that such forms of regulation do not provide sufficient incentives. Others 
argue that in designing and implementing interventions, one way to mitigate concerns 
regarding social media regulation is to incorporate multistakeholder, polycentric and co-
regulatory elements. This perspective will be discussed in Section 4.3.1. 
   To better understand social media regulation and governance, in the next sections we 
attempt to answers the following questions; what is the role of human rights and 
secondary law on personalization and its practices at the European level? How is it 
ensured that profiling, processing and decisions made on their basis are legal, fair and 
non-discriminatory? Is the “terms and condition/terms of service” a sufficient and fair 
contractual paradigm? How the European legal approach tackles the challenges of 
personalization and the risks coming from the employment of increasingly sophisticated 
techniques of manipulation? 
 
4.1.1 European Legislation 
In this Section, we will elaborate on the European legal system’s attempt to – or should 
try to – regulate personalization and its related technologies and practices, in particular 
referring to legal debates on (news) RSs, behavioural advertising and political micro-
targeting, throughout a comprehensive legal lens. 
 
4.1.2 A Human Rights Perspective 
In order to start with the analysis of the existing legal framework for the regulation of 
online personalization, a number of provisions and legal acts in the areas of fundamental 
human rights as well as within primary and secondary law of the EU need consideration. 
As Leenes et al. (2017) argue, the common heritage of European fundamental rights and 
values can serve as an anchor point for regulatory discussions. Fundamental rights as the 
highest legal assets within democratic states -both in their (subjective) expression as 
 103 
defensive rights of natural and legal persons and partly as (objective) guarantees- must 
be safeguarded as the basis of every legal framework and in every legislative and 
regulatory activity. In some cases, they can oblige the states bound to them to (certain) 
actions in order to counteract existing circumstances that cannot be reconciled with 
fundamental and human rights and to eliminate existing impairments. Fundamental 
human rights involved in personalization and its practices are, above all; dignity, the right 
to privacy, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, right to information, freedom of 
media and others.   
   In this context, the European Convention of Human Rights (EHCR) has an important 
role and impact on the EU in two respects; on the one hand, the Member States as 
Convention States are bound to the ECHR as a source of international law, also in the 
implementation of Union law, which at the same time means that the Member States are 
guarantors of measures taken by the Union. On the other hand, even after the adoption of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), the ECHR is still one 
of the most relevant legal references within Union law. Indeed, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) recognizes in its decisions that “the principles on which the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is 
based must be taken into consideration in community law”15, and it states that 
“fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of the law, the 
observance of which is ensured by the Court. In safeguarding those rights, the Court has 
to look to the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, so that measures 
which are incompatible with the fundamental rights recognized by the constitutions of 
those States may not find acceptance in the Community”16. This means that the CJEU 
therefore incorporates both the norms of the ECHR and the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) into its decisions, in particular within the framework of 
the justification of infringements of fundamental rights guaranteed in the CFR. In 
principle, the ECHR, the CFR and national constitutional law complement each other 
cumulatively. 
   An overriding principle and foundation of all other fundamental rights is human dignity 
- Article 1 of CFR – which is inviolable and must be respected and protected. Although 
 
15 CJEU, judgement of 15.5.1986, C-222/84, Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 
para. 18. 
16 CJEU, judgement of 13.7.1989, C-5/88, Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, para. 17. 
 104 
the ECHR does not explicitly mention human dignity, the ECtHR assumes that the 
principle of respect for human dignity underlies all Convention guarantees and that “[t]he 
very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom”17. 
Human dignity is both a fundamental right with subjective guarantee content and a 
principle under objective law. However, it has always been difficult to solidify the content 
of human dignity or define it. It can be stated here that at least the minimum core of 
human dignity consists in the fact that every human being possesses an intrinsic worth, 
merely by being human, which should be recognized and respected by others. In the area 
of online content, there are many conceivable possibilities for violating human dignity. 
This applies, for example, to algorithmic manipulation or content that contains 
pornography or depictions of violence. 
   The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is protected by Article 9 of 
the EHCR and Article 10 of the CFR. Various philosophies and belief systems fall within 
the ambit of the right. Freedom of thought strengthens other fundamental rights. Without 
freedom of thought, freedom of expression is meaningless. One cannot speak freely if 
one cannot think freely. At the same time, freedom of thought is reinforced by other 
fundamental rights. Freedom of thought is possible only with effective freedom to receive 
information. Freedom of thought also overlaps with freedom of opinion; if a belief is not 
sufficiently serious and coherent to attract protection of freedom of thought, at least it is 
protected by freedom of opinion. For beliefs to attract the protection of freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion, they should attain a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion, and importance – and conspiracism? The Strasbourg Court held 
that freedom of thought, conscience, and religion protects against “indoctrination of 
religion by the State” (Angeleni v. Sweden, 1986, p. 48). So, what about potential 
indoctrination by algorithms? This issue will be discussed further.    
   The freedom to hold opinions as a component of freedom of expression, Article 10 of 
the ECHR and Article 11 of the CFR. In general, news personalization systems have a 
significantly lesser effect on opinion formation than, for example, ideology conversion 
systems because personalization systems apparently do not punish users for not changing 
their opinion. Furthermore, it is part of the public task of the news media to inform people, 
and it is insurmountable that they influence public opinion. The question is indeed at what 
 
17 ECtHR, judgement of 29.4.2002, no. 2346/02, para. 65. 
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point news RSs interfere with free opinion formation and ultimately become coercive. 
The information and technologies that news media use for personalization give them the 
power to influence our opinions. For example, if you are presented with a personalized 
news feed, you might think that “what you see is all there is” and jump to conclusions 
(Kahneman, 2011, p. 85). One factor to distinguish legitimate influence on public opinion 
from coercion of opinions is transparency. Users often ignore that their social media news 
feeds are tailored to their interests and preferences (Eslami et al., 2015). The lack of 
transparency reinforces the risks of selective exposure. Overall, we can claim that most 
people are not in a “filter bubble” or “echo chamber”. Still, some groups might be more 
vulnerable to end up in a filter bubble, and others are more susceptible to receive less 
diverse online news on certain issues (Bodó et al., 2019). In any case, Article 10 ECHR 
may nevertheless prove an important point of departure to realize democratic values in 
the personalized media landscape (as we will discuss in Section 4.1.5.1) (Eskens et al., 
2017). 
   Last but not least, privacy is protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The 
Convention and Charter use the term “private life” instead of “privacy,” but these terms 
are commonly assumed to be the same. Instead of providing a static definition, the Court 
has brought different interests and rights under the notion of privacy. Overall, the right to 
privacy has a wide scope of application and “goes beyond concealed personal 
information” (Purtova, 2010, p. 186).   
   Together, these rights protect what Eskens (2020) calls the personal information 
sphere. The personal information sphere is the domain where people can determine for 
themselves how they interact with information about the world and how other people may 
interact with information about themselves. This is a form of control that is different from 
the kind of control enabled by data protection law, which focuses on consent, 
transparency, and data access rights. The notion of a personal information sphere 
resembles the concept of “intellectual privacy” (Richards, 2015). Intellectual privacy is 
“a zone of protection that guards our ability to make up our minds freely” so that we can 
prepare ourselves to exercise our freedom of expression rights (Ibid, p. 95). The 
difference between the two concepts is that the personal information sphere arises from 
European fundamental rights, whereas intellectual privacy is built on the U.S. First 
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Amendment. Furthermore, due to the elaborate European fundamental rights framework, 
the personal information sphere encompasses more rights and freedoms and is more 
inward-looking than intellectual privacy, which is more outward-looking. 
  Following Eskens (2020), we agree that the notion of a personal information sphere 
shows how privacy interferences affect other fundamental rights that enable people to 
develop their sense of self and relate to the world. The notion is reminiscent of personality 
rights. Yet, the difference between personality rights and the personal information sphere 
is that the latter encompass all kinds and directions of communication about all kinds of 
private and public matters, whereas personality rights are mainly about the 
communication of one's image from the rights holder to the outer world. 
 
4.1.3 E-Commerce Directive 
The diversity of content, dissemination channels and problems on the Internet is matched 
by the diversity of issues covered by legislative acts. The E-Commerce Directive (ECD) 
is the main secondary legislation to be dealt with in the context of this study because of 
the horizontal approach it follows. Adopted in 2000, the ECD was intended to create, for 
the first time, a coherent framework for Internet commerce. As key areas of regulation, 
the proposal identifies the responsibility of intermediaries, electronic contracts, 
commercial communications, transparency and enforcement, and the country-of-origin 
principle. The primary objective of the liability rules is to prevent distortion of 
competition between cross-border services through different civil and criminal 
responsibilities. 
   In the EU, the E-Commerce Directive provides for certain liability protections in 
relation to user-generated content. Specifically for providers of information society 
services who are acting as intermediary service providers (as defined in the Regulations 
Directive as “any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic 
means and at the individual request of a recipient of services”) (Cobbe and Singh, 2019). 
To be acting as an intermediary service provider, it must be neutrally providing a service 
by automatic, technical, and passive means. The E-Commerce Directive, in recital 42, 
states that the Directive’s liability protections are limited to situations where the service 
provider has engaged in an activity of a “mere technical, automatic and passive nature, 
which implies … neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is 
transmitted or stored.” As such, in relation to content recommending of user-generated 
 107 
content, service providers are unlikely, in most cases, to have knowledge of the content 
itself. Rather, they will have knowledge of metadata about the content (e.g. ‘likes’ or 
‘shares’). Yet, service providers do exercise control over content, and this is the very 
point of recommending; service providers exercise such control in order to show people 
what they want them to see in order to drive engagement, profit, and market position. The 
normative nature of recommender systems – the fact that they enable platforms to 
exercise control over content distribution in pursuit of their own goals – is the reason for 
their use. 
   Consequently, in relation to recommending, platforms cannot be intermediary service 
providers and are operating beyond the limits of the liability protections provided by the 
E-Commerce Directive. The effect of this analysis would be that recommending is not an 
activity that is covered by any of the E-Commerce Directive’s liability protections. 
Recommending is an activity engaged in by service which developed in the years after 
the E-Commerce Directive was passed. However, this distinct activity of recommending 
is also not otherwise covered under any particular regulation beyond the general law. This 
means that recommending falls into a significant and consequential gap in the current 
legal regime. Following this analysis, service providers would have, under the E-
Commerce Directive or any other current law, no special protection against liability for 
recommended illegal content or activity on their platforms. 
   The straightforward response would be to provide for a substantively similar regime to 
that already established for hosting, whereby service providers are shielded from liability 
provided they expeditiously remove illegal recommended content once they become 
aware of it. However, recommending is a much less neutral, more involved, and a more 
active form of service provider activity than simply hosting. While liability protection for 
recommending is perhaps desirable, this should come with some responsibilities beyond 
simply removing illegal content expeditiously upon knowledge of it’s illegal nature. 
These responsibilities would sit alongside and complement other applicable legal 
frameworks, such as around data protection or non-discrimination. Regulating the usage 
of recommender systems in social media therefore provides an opportunity to establish a 
more inclusive framework of principles, requirements, and limitations within which the 
discrete activity of recommending can responsibly be undertaken. 
 108 
   A new relevant horizontal instrument in this context is the Regulation on Promoting 
Fairness and Transparency for Business Users of Online Intermediation Services 
(Platform-to-Business Regulation) (Leersen, 2020). This Regulation does not affect 
consumers of social media content but rather producers, who are granted certain notice 
rights in relation to recommender systems under Article 5. This provision requires 
platforms to disclose, inter alia, “the characteristics of the goods and services offered to 
consumers through the online intermediation services or the online search engine”. For 
sophisticated content providers who rely on social media, such as newspapers and other 
media outlets, this could be an additional way to adapt to changes in recommendation 
algorithms, and potentially to detect unlawful or abusive forms of discrimination. 
  
4.1.4 E-privacy Directive 
In previous years, the EU has adopted some provisions that give consumers the power to 
manage their personal data and not to be subject to automated decision-making such as 
in personalization practices. The right to data portability18 envisaged in the new General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), as well as the e-Privacy regulation19, and also the 
“retrieve them all” provision of the proposed Digital Content Directive, are all tools 
whereby digital consumers will supposedly have the chance to decide who should use 
their data to offer them the goods and services that they want. These regulatory 
interventions bring to the fore a reshaping of the traditional landscape of the consumer 
protection rules, thereby providing a more comprehensive vision of “data consumer law”. 
In actuality, they grant consumers several rights, such as the right to transfer data from 
one controller to another and the right to retrieve any data produced or generated through 
their use of a platform. They are expected to re-balance the relationship between data 
subjects and data controllers and to encourage competition between companies. They 
represent a new paradigm that abandons a purely protective and paternalistic regulation 
 
18 Data portability refers to the ability to move, copy or transfer data easily from one database, storage or IT environment 
to another. To make an example, move one’s Facebook profile to another social network. 
19 Notice that the E-Privacy Regulation should be treated as lex specialis in relation to the GDPR. However, the 
enforcement mechanisms of GDPR and E-privacy Regulation remain the same. In a further step the question about the 
relationship between the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive is to be raised – in the ordered brevity. Art. 95 GDPR 
answers this question expressly in such a way that the GDPR “shallnot impose additional obligations on natural or legal 
persons in relation toprocessing in connection with the provision of publicly available electroniccommunications 
services in public communication networks in theUnion in relation to matters for which they are subject to specific 
obligationswith the same objective set out in Directive 2002/58/EC”. This meansthat there is a lex generalis-lex 
specialis relationship where the special provisionsof ePrivacy Directive prevail over the general rules of the GDPR 
inareas which they specifically seek to regulate. 
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focused only on consumers’ weaknesses, with the aim of experimenting with a more 
proactive approach (Colangelo et al., 2019).  
   Without delving into detail on the scope of the ePrivacy Directive, it should be noted 
that – in the light of the objective of this Directive, to ensure the protection of fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the public when they make use of electronic communication 
networks – at least some of its provisions also apply on providers of information 
technology networks (in particular Art. 5(3), 9 and 13). Regarding the dissemination of 
content in the online environment this means that Art. 5 para. 3 and 13 of the ePrivacy 
Directive apply to website operators (e.g. for cookies20) or other businesses (e.g. for direct 
marketing). For example, website operators have to obtain the (active) consent of the user 
if they want to store (and subsequently use for e.g. personalized advertising) certain 
cookies on the end devices of website users, which in particular enables web tracking and 
is therefore essential for many advertising-based business models on the Internet.  
    Discussions about the legal requirements for behavioural targeting, for example, often 
focus on the e-Privacy Directive’s consent requirement for tracking cookies and similar 
technologies. But in many cases, the Data Protection Directive and the right to protection 
of personal data also applies, namely when behavioural targeting entails the processing 
of personal data. The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights only allows 
personal data processing if the data controller has a legal basis for the processing, such as 
consent. However, Borgesius (2015) argues that Article 5(3) of the e-Privacy Directive 
does not provide a legal basis for the processing of personal data. Sometimes called the 
‘cookie provision’, it requires consent for storing or accessing information on a device of 
a user or subscriber. Some companies suggest that they can use an opt-out system to 
comply with Article 5(3) of the e-Privacy Directive. However, even if companies could 
obtain consent for cookies, companies would generally be required to obtain the data 
subject’s unambiguous consent if they process personal data for behavioural targeting. 
The e-Privacy Directive’s preamble says that a user’s device and its contents are part of 
the user’s private sphere. ‘Terminal equipment of users of electronic communications 
networks and any information stored on such equipment are part of the private sphere of 
 
20 Ads publishers often use tracking cookies, small text files that are stored on a user’s computer to recognize that 
computer. With a tracking cookie, it is possible to follow an Internet user across all websites on which it serves ads. 
Through almost every popular website, tracking cookies are stored; through some websites dozens of them. Behavioural 
targeting companies use many other tracking technologies as well, such as flash cookies and device fingerprinting. 
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the users requiring protection under the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.’ 
   In actuality, the ePrivacy Directive contains no provisions on law enforcement, 
sanctions and the establishment of supervisory authorities. Rather, it is up to the Member 
States (who must ensure that the requirements are implemented) to decide how they are 
to be implemented. In addition, there is no forum under the ePrivacy Directive, such as 
the ERGA or EDPB, where an exchange could take place on the implementation and 
enforcement of the requirements of the Directive. Yet, the ePrivacy Directive is also 
currently undergoing a reform process. Outside the regulatory framework of the ePrivacy 
Directive, the GDPR applies. Due to its character as a regulation, it is directly applicable 
in all Member States and has thus strongly harmonized the data protection laws 
throughout Europe. 
 
4.1.5 General Data Protection Regulation 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) grants platform users a bundle of 
individual rights. Article 5 lists ‘transparency’ as one of the Regulation’s key principles, 
and users are granted information and notice rights about personal data processing under 
Article 12-14. More specifically, under Article 22, data subjects may under certain 
circumstances have the right to opt out of such automated decisions, and also enjoy a 
bundle of information rights collectively known as the “right to an explanation”. Van 
Drunen, Helberger and Bastian (2019) argue that these provisions should be interpreted 
contextually as a means to empower data subjects in their capacity as news consumers. 
In fact, users of RSs are entitled to a range of information, for example, the parties able 
to influence editorial decisions, the profiles that the algorithms construct about them, and 
the algorithm’s metrics and factors. In such a reading, the GDPR could in theory be a 
source of insights about platform gatekeeping decisions. It remains debatable whether 
such access rights would find much usage with the average end user. 
   Furthermore, critics suggest that the GDPR – one of the most lobbied pieces of EU 
legislation to date21 (Edwards and Veale, 2017) – delivers personalization to social media 
platforms with the utmost ease (Kohl et al., 2019). Firstly, by shifting the prerequisite for 
 
21 For example, Facebook lobbying of GDPR has been analyzed. It seems that even if in most areas not, on some very 
specific issues, the GDPR was shifted towards Facebook's ideals (Johansen, 2019). 
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more expansive (re)uses of personal data from anonymization to ‘pseudonymization’ 
which still allows for some form of re-identification.22 In fact, although anonymized data 
is effective in protecting privacy, much analytical value of the data is lost through 
anonymization (which is relevant for personalization purposes). Secondly, the GDPR 
facilitates personalization by making the collection and processing/use of personal data 
essentially a matter of informational self-determination. This emphasis suggests to users 
that all that is at stake in data protection is their own personal interest, whereas also 
fundamental collective public goods are actually at stake, such as deliberative democracy. 
Moreover, the GDPR lacks a precise language, in addition to explicit and well-defined 
rights and safeguards (Wachter et al., 2017). A number of provisions may lead to 
confusion, enforcement gaps or asymmetrical interpretations. This is understandable 
given that the reform of EU data protection is ongoing and needs further guidelines.  
   Furthermore, clarification is required, as the word personalization contains the adjective 
personal, this implies that personalization should, at least in part, be based on personal 
data. Yet, researchers in personalization have largely overlooked the crucial connection 
between personalization and legal definitions of personal data (Greene and Shmueli, 
2019). Clearly, a source of complexity is that different legal regimes define personal data 
differently. In this case, the GDPR defines personal data as "any information relating to 
an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’)" (Article 4). Such a broad 
definition means personal data could constitute anything from browser cookies, to 
location data, to even a combination of non-sensitive measurements, if there are 
sufficiently few or unique observations to single out individuals. Ultimately, it is context 
that determines whether data are personal data (Greene et al., 2019). 
      The focus of the following section is specifically on the most relevant GDPR’s articles 
affecting fundamental principles to guarantee a fair personalization dependent, above all, 
by ‘profiling’ which is a relatively novel concept in European data protection regulation 
(Art 4(4)). It refers to both the creation and the use of profiles. By virtue of deriving, 
inferring or predicting information, practices of profiling generate personal and sensitive 
data. The rights to erasure (Art 17) and restriction of processing (Art 1823) are then useful 
 
22 Pseudonymization is a technique that is used to reduce the chance that personal data records and identifiers lead to 
the identification of the data subject whom they belong 
23 As many other articles, more guidance is needed in practice. For instance, the UK’s Information Commisoner Office 
recently released a code that provides more guidance to appropriately safeguard children’s personal data. In the case 
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forms of redress in the context of unlawful profiling techniques. Further guidance, 
however, is needed to clearly set out the articles’ scopes of application. This is also true 
for highly debated articles that we are going now to briefly analyze, namely Articles 13-
15 and Article 22.  
 
4.1.5.1 Transparency 
In the context of RSs, concerns over transparency often refer to the specific algorithm 
used to produce recommendations, the outputs (i.e. recommendations) and the inputs (e.g. 
user content, behavioral data, etc.). In addition, transparency can also refer to individuals 
and organizational structures involved in designing and operating this system. As Ananny 
and Crawford (2018) argue transparency in algorithmic systems should take into account 
“not just code and data but an assemblage of human and non-human actors (p.983).” 
Given that research on mainstream social media’s human agents involved in 
personalization are rather scarce, in this section we focus only on the formers, specifically 
from a data protection perspective. 
   In the present day, personalization RSs – and, more generally, algorithmic systems – 
have the potential to be significantly more complicated than traditional formalized 
decision-making systems. This led the requests for greater transparency from lawyers, 
social and computer scientists, and this has been reflected in both legislative 
developments and proposals across the world. Transparency is indeed often assumed to 
be an ideal for democratic oversight and political discourse in democracies and it is 
generally defined with respect to “the availability of information, the conditions of 
accessibility and how the information…may pragmatically or epistemically support the 
user’s decision-making process” (Turilli and Floridi, 2009, p.106). This is significant 
when regarding decisions that are extremely complex, black-boxed and cause several 
individual and social concerns. Interestingly, there has also been considerable debate as 
to whether more complex algorithmic systems are actually needed or useful. Some 
research has indeed focused on creating simpler systems with comparable utility to more 
complex ones. 
 
of profiling, it calls for a differentiation between different types of profiling for different purposes so as to offer separate 
privacy settings for each different type of profiling. 
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   Burrell (2016) distinguishes three barriers to transparency: 1) Intentional concealment 
on the part of corporations or other institutions, where decision making procedures are 
kept from public scrutiny. 2) Gaps in technical literacy which mean that, for most people, 
simply having access to underlying code is insufficient and 3) a mismatch between the 
mathematical optimization in the high-dimensionality characteristic of machine learning 
and the demands of human-scale reasoning and styles of interpretation. In addition, it has 
to be considered whether individuals can tell that a decision or personalization measure 
is taken algorithmically at all, especially in a world of ‘ambient intelligence’ it can be 
difficult for an individual to know when data relating to them is being processed, or when 
their environment is being altered. Yet, transparency can be reached in many ways. Above 
all, throughout the explicability of the system and the process, and this can take many 
forms as we will highlight in the next sections. 
 
4.1.5.2 Explicability 
Strictly related to transparency is the right to an explanation of the decision made by 
personalization algorithms. Harsh debates have been conducted not only as to whether 
this right is contained in the GDPR but, also, whether this right can even exist. In other 
words, the decisions of algorithms are not always clear-cut, explicable or even meaningful 
to users. While a right to an explanation appears attractive, and has significant public 
support, the utility of it is spurious. Some authors have expressed concern that it may 
provide a meaningless, non-actionable form of explanation that does little more to help 
deal with algorithmic harms than the privacy policies individuals often ignore (Edwards 
and Veale, 2017). 
   Especially relevant to profiling, there is the right to be informed (Art 13) and the right 
of access (Art 14). In particular, Articles 13(2)(f) and 14(2)(g) require data controllers to 
provide specific information about automated decision-making, based solely on 
automated processing, including profiling, that produces legal or similarly significant 
effects, namely: 1) the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling; 2) 
meaningful information about the logic involved; and 3) the significance and envisaged 
consequences of such processing for the data subject.  
      Article 15(1)(h) uses identical language as of the above articles and entitles data 
subjects the right of access to information about solely automated decision-making, 
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including profiling. However, some key expressions in Articles 13-14, specifically 
“meaningful information about the logic involved” as well as “the significance and the 
envisaged consequences” (Art 13(2)(f)), needs to be interpreted to provide data subjects 
with the information necessary to understand and challenge profiling and automated 
individual decision-making. As a result, the right to explanation has been interpreted in 
two drastically different ways: as an ex-ante general explanation about system 
functionality or as an ex-post explanation of a specific decision (Art 15). Yet, in the 
interest of strong consumer protection, meaningful information must be sufficient to 
answer questions that the data subject might have before they consent to the processing 
(notification) and after a decision has been made (right of access).  
   A right to explanation is thus not explicitly mentioned in the GDPR. Legal basis has 
been detected (Wachter et al., 2017). In particular, Recital 71 states that data subjects 
have the right ‘to obtain an explanation’. Yet, the legal status of recitals is debated but, in 
general, they only provide guidance to interpret the articles so they are not considered 
legally binding. This is a critical gap in transparency and accountability (Edwards and 
Veale, 2017).  
 
4.1.5.3 Non-discrimination  
In the Article 22(1) of the GDPR there is additional safeguards against one specific 
application of profiling, namely the case of automated individual decision-making that 
fulfils is “based solely on automated processing” and produces “legal effects concerning 
him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her”. Profiling can indeed form the 
basis of decision-making that is both automated and produces significant effects, in 
particular discrimination. A right to non-discrimination is, in fact, deeply embedded in 
the normative framework that underlies the EU and the use of algorithmic profiling for 
the allocation of resources is, to some extent, inherently discriminatory (Goodman and 
Flaxman, 2016). In this sense, Article 22 is set. There are, however, several ambiguities 
that must be discussed. 
   Firstly, the wording of the “right not to be subject to automated decision-making” can 
be interpreted as either a prohibition or a right to object. This ambiguity has existed since 
the Data Protection Directive 1995 (Wachter et al., 2017), but resolving it is nowadays 
critical. Since profiling and automated decision-making often occur without the 
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awareness of those affected, data subjects may not be able to effectively exercise their 
right to object. Moreover, Article 22 only applies to decisions that are “based solely” on 
automated processing, including profiling. Since “based solely” is not further defined in 
the regulation, the regulation allows for an interpretation that excludes any human 
involvement whatsoever. This would render the article inapplicable to many current 
practices of automated decision-making and there is the risk that the controller may 
fabricate human involvement. Ultimately, the complexity and multifaceted nature of 
algorithmic discrimination suggests that appropriate solutions will require an 
understanding of how it arises in practice, and this highlights the need for human-
intelligible explanations of algorithmic decision making.  
   Furthermore, paragraph 71 and Article 22(4) specifically address discrimination from 
profiling that makes use of sensitive data. Goodman and Flaxman (2016) broadly 
questioned the interpretation of the wording ‘sensitive data’ and that clarification is 
significant. 
   Finally, the wording of both “based solely on automated processing” and “legal and 
“similarly significant effects” leaves room for interpretation and should be clarified to 
offer the strongest possible protection for data subjects. So far, the Working Party has 
opted for a nuanced subjective interpretation of “significant effects” that runs the risk of 
placing the burden of proof on the data subject (Kaltheuner and Bietti, 2018). This 
guidance raises several important questions on who defines whether a targeted data 
subject is vulnerable. 
 
4.1.5.4 Auditing 
Auditing is one promising mechanism for achieving transparency (Mittelstadt, 2016). For 
all types of algorithms, auditing is a necessary precondition to verify correct functioning. 
For platforms that mediate political discourse, auditing can create a procedural record to 
demonstrate bias against a particular group. Auditing can also help to explain how citizens 
are profiled and the values prioritized in content displayed to them. It allows for 
prediction of results from new inputs and explanation of the rationale behind decisions. 
Yet, many epistemic, technical, and practical challenges must be overcome (Burrell, 
2016). Firstly, a political right to transparency may undermine the privacy of data subjects 
and autonomy and competitive advantage of service providers, or even national security. 
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Secondly, the rationale of an algorithm can be epistemically inaccessible, rendering the 
legitimacy of decisions difficult to challenge. Nonetheless, algorithm auditing may be 
approaching at pace and the belief that highly complex algorithms are incomprehensible 
to human observers should not be an excuse to surrender robust political discourse.  
   Furthermore, developing practical methods for algorithmic auditing is highly needed. 
For example, Tutt (2016) suggests that a regulatory agency for algorithms may be 
required, and this agency can “classify algorithms into types based on their predictability, 
explainability, and general intelligence” (p.15) to determine what must be regulated. 
Some researchers even see promise in the collective use of individual rights to achieve 
greater societal transparency (e.g. group privacy). In any case, GDPR requires data 
processors to maintain a relationship with data subjects and explain the logic of automated 
decision making when questioned (Art 13, 14 and 15). The regulation might prove a 
much-needed impetus for algorithmic auditing. However, with opacity, implementing 
transparency and the right to an explanation in a practically useful form for data subjects 
is extremely difficult, necessary yet likely insufficient. 
 
4.1.5.5 Public Disclosures  
Another source of transparency could be represented through ‘public disclosures’ that 
could include the documentation of recommendation outputs and their audiences; 
content-specific ranking decisions and other interventions by the operator’s in RSs 
performance and the organizational structures that control RSs (Leersen, 2020). These 
might be fundamental sources for external accountability.  
   The main drawback of public records, compared to confidential disclosures such as data 
sharing partnerships and government auditing, is their limitations in sharing sensitive 
data: public disclosures would indeed require a trustless design that pre-empts abuse by 
malicious actors, to contend with threats to user privacy, and, according to platforms, the 
integrity of the service (i.e. by enabling third parties to ‘game’ the algorithm). Privacy-
by-design techniques such as anonymization and differential privacy can aid in mitigating 
these concerns. Ultimately, publicity places hard limits on what can be disclosed and thus 
on the ultimate research utility of public disclosures. However, public disclosures also 
have an important advantage over data partnerships: by simply making information 
publicly accessible, public disclosures would be available to every researcher with the 
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time and interest, even to those without institutional means of accreditation. In terms of 
format, public disclosures about recommender systems should include real-time, high-
level, anonymized data access through public APIs and browser interfaces. Therefore, 
public records could be instrumental for purposes of real-time, high-level monitoring by 
media watchdogs such as journalists, activists, and NGOs. As Leersen argues (2020), 
these may not suffice to conclusively demonstrate bias or discrimination in RSs, but at a 
minimum they could offer a starting point for such investigations and serve as a first-
warning system for more targeted efforts. An example of a similar endeavor is the project 
Algotransparency.org (see Figure 19), which covers YouTube recommendations made by 
1000 selected channels and on a limited set of keywords. It has already led to important 
insights about social media RSs. 
 




Given the complexity of designing privacy-compliant disclosure standards, rules for 
public disclosure will be difficult to capture exhaustively in one-size-fits-all legislation. 
Not only are social media RSs technically complex, but they are also heterogeneous; each 
has unique features (types of posts and formats, engagement metrics, et cetera) which 
may require unique forms of documentation and privacy safeguards. Therefore, a more 
feasible model may be to set broad disclosure standards in legislation, enforced by an 
independent public authority with the power to offer case-by-case guidance for particular 
platforms on what types of disclosures are necessary. 
  
4.1.5.6 A Short Discussion on the GDPR 
To conclude, GDPR defines novel rights for data subjects and duties for data controllers. 
Along with e-Privacy regulation it strengthens ‘data consumer protection’. Users can 
decide whether to enter into a contract, be informed, access the data that is generated, 
receive information about the logic involved and not to be a subject to automated 
decision-making based solely on automated processing. When a data subject enters into 
a contract, however, gives up to some of these rights. As a member of the European 
Parliament claimed: “The GDPR is not only a legislative piece, it’s like a textbook, which 
is teaching us how to understand ourselves in this data world and how to understand what 
are the responsibilities of others and what are the rules which is governing in this world” 
(in Hasselbalch, p.9, 2019). Although, users seem to be insufficiently empowered by the 
GDPR with regards to the logics involved in the personalized (news) services. At first 
glance data-driven personalization may appear to be only a matter of data protection law, 
however, the analysis of automated inferences, predictions or decisions more often lies 
outside of it (Kohl et al., 2019). In essence, data protection law focuses on ‘inputs’ rather 
than ‘outputs’, that are mostly out of its scope.  
   As such, data protection law shows some limitations when it comes to the actual 
consumption of information. Yet, the application of consumer protection law to data-
related commercial practices can certainly add to the protection offered by data protection 
law (Helberger et al., 2017). The complex interplay between data protection and 
consumer law needs to be further analyzed in order to understand whether and how they 
might complement each other so as to be able to prevent the risks of media 
personalization. There is indeed a fundamental need for interdisciplinary work, not only 
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across academics and practitioners, but also between different legal jurisdictions and 
across different disciplines. GDPR, for example, does not provide any duty for the data 
controller towards the information a data subject might consume. In this respect, it is 
media law that is directly responsible.  
 
4.1.5 Media Pluralism 
Throughout the twentieth century, state institutions in Western Europe were primarily 
responsible for the organization of public space and for safeguarding public values. This 
societal arrangement has since come under increasing pressure due to economic 
liberalization and the privatization of public institutions and services. The rise of digital 
intermediaries in the form of online platforms is accelerating and further complicating 
this trend. In many cases they intensify the pressure of the market on important public 
values, such as the diversity of media content.     
   The concepts of media pluralism and diversity are indeed well-established ideas in 
Western Europe’s media research and policy since the 1960s (Hoffmann et al., 2015). 
According to McQuail (2007), diversity is “the most potent concept in communication 
policy in modern times” (p. 41). Media pluralism and diversity are considered a crucial 
foundation for both democratic societies and an enlightened public. The European 
Commission (2007) explicitly recognized diversity as a policy goal that “embraces a 
number of aspects, such as diversity of ownership, variety in the sources of information 
and in the range of contents available” (p. 5). Art. 3 para. 3 subpara. 4 TEU plays a role 
in the context of media policy as a whole and therefore in the context of this study. 
According to this, the EU shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity and shall 
ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced. This provision 
therefore addresses the role of media as economic and cultural heritage in safeguarding 
diversity. Thereby the EU’s objective is not to create a uniform European culture but 
rather to preserve existing cultural diversity, which draws its strengths precisely from its 
historically grown diversity. 
   Pursuant to Art. 85 para. 1 GDPR, EU Member States are obliged to balance the right 
to the protection of personal data with the right to freedom of expression and information, 
including processing for journalistic purposes, by means of legal provisions. This 
balancing act i.e. the assessment of the extent to which the balancing of data subjects’ 
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interests and media/information interests requires modifications with regard to data 
protection provisions, is the responsibility of the Member States, which, however, have a 
wide margin to act. More generally, a number of Council of Europe recommendations 
emphasize the importance of informing and empowering users. For instance, 
Recommendation 2018-1 on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership calls 
on states to encourage platforms to “provide clear information to users on how to find, 
access and derive maximum benefit from the wide range of content that is available”. The 
Council of Europe has also developed standards on the need for government oversight of 
content recommenders, emphasizing diversity or pluralism as a guiding principle. Their 
Committee of Ministers has recommended that “[s]tates should encourage social media, 
media, search and recommendation engines and other intermediaries which use 
algorithms … to engage in open, independent, transparent and participatory initiatives 
that seek to improve these distribution processes in order to enhance users’ effective 
exposure to the broadest possible diversity of media content.” 
   While the terms pluralism and diversity are frequently used interchangeably, the 
difficulty of distinguishing one from the other also hints at the complexity of the 
underlying phenomena: media diversity and pluralism can both describe objects as varied 
as media outlets or platforms, ownership, sources, content, ideas, or forms. The term 
pluralism is commonly used when describing various media outlets or diverse ownership 
structures. Diversity, in turn, more frequently describes the variety of content available 
to or consumed by citizens. The latter is assumed to be an outcome of the former, although 
this relationship can still be considered contentious in empirical research. From the first 
perspective, diversity is generated by a plurality of available media or content, and the 
latter conceptualizes media diversity as a result of user behavior (as we already analyzed 
in Section 2.2.5). 
   Recent debate on the public responsibility of social media platforms pivots on the 
question of whether or not platforms can be held accountable for the content shared 
through them, legally and morally (Helberger et al., 2018). From the legal point of view, 
this discussion is grounded in the host-editor, namely either social media qualify as hosts, 
with the consequence that they fall under the European e-Commerce regime, or they are 
categorized as editors, having full legal responsibility for what is shared through their 
platforms (Council of Europe 2011, para. 29–36). Yet, the actual role and capacities of 
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social media’s platforms to prevent certain undesirable outcomes or to contribute to their 
realization. Of course, platforms fundamentally shape user activity, yet they do not 
determine this activity. Many of the problems with media pluralism and diversity are, to 
some extent, user-driven. For similar reasons, at least part of the solution to potential 
public policy challenges lies with the users. The current focus in law on allocating 
responsibility to one central party – editor, data controller, or the supplier of a service – 
is primarily due to the fact that this central actor is the source of potential risk or harm, 
or the controller of a resource that can give rise to legal responsibilities. Yet, multiple 
actors are effectively responsible. 
 
4.1.5.1 The ‘Right to Receive Information’ 
Taking into account the unique role of the media in democratic societies as a source of 
information, a platform for deliberation, and a critical watchdog, it becomes evident that 
freedom of expression is a central human right to consider in the deployment of 
personalized recommender systems, next to the right to privacy and the prohibition of 
discrimination (CoE, 2020). The news consumers’ fundamental right to receive 
information guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR24 may prove an important point of departure 
to realize democratic values in the personalized media landscape (Eskens et al., 2017). 
Information consumption has changed dramatically and needs to be reconceived. Given 
the vast amount of information produced and consumed, to some extent users are 
necessarily passive actors which have to delegate information filtering to algorithms and, 
therefore, to platforms. Thus, the right to information is, in effect, a right to receive 
information. How this would eventually translate is difficult to argue. It is indeed an 
under-theorized right, lacking a framework to fully understand the rights of news 
consumers or the obligations of states regarding news recipients.  
   Article 10 entails positive and negative obligations for states (CoE, 2020); a negative 
obligation to abstain from interference with the freedom of expression rights of 
 
24 ARTICLE 10 of the EHCR, Freedom of expression: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall 
not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.  
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests 
of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary 
 122 
journalists, editors and users, including the use of AI in, for example, forms of automated 
censorship. And positive obligations for member States to create the conditions for a 
favorable environment for the exercise of freedom of expression, also in the relationship 
between private parties. In effect, the exercise of this freedom carries with it ‘duties and 
responsibilities’ (Article 10 ECHR, para. 2). The scope of someone’s duties and 
responsibilities depends on the situation and the technologies used for communication. 
      Media (and in particular news) personalization invites us to reconsider subjective 
rights to receive information. In traditional one-to-many media, people have a subjective 
right to receive information that others are willing to impart, but they don’t have a right 
to receive information that the media is not willing to impart. In fact, the media would 
lose its editorial freedom if people could demand specific news stories and distribute these 
to them and, at the same time, if these were conflicting, it would be difficult to decide 
whose right to receive information should prevail. By enabling one-to-one 
communication, personalization technologies could, in theory, resolve conflicts between 
subjective rights to receive information and the media’s or other parties’ freedom of 
expression. Such a type of subjective right to receive information could help to establish 
what news consumers legitimately may expect from the news media with respect to the 
diversity or relevance of personalized recommendations.  
   The right to receive information is also intrinsically connected with the rights to privacy 
and data protection. Users who are aware of the use of algorithmic tools by news media, 
and know that they involve personal data collection, may fear the consequences of such 
personal data processing. The risk can be chilling effects, namely they may hesitate to 
consult online news and recommended content and affect the exercise of their expression 
and information rights (Büchi et al., 2019). This connection between freedom of 
expression and privacy rights has been called ‘intellectual privacy’ (Richards, 2015). The 
possibility of state access to data on individual reading patterns, collected by newsrooms 
and internet intermediaries to create or improve AI-driven tools, also poses a broader, 
latent threat to democracy. 
      Actually, media personalization may enable or hinder the exercise of this largely 
institutionally protected right. There are many different values and interests at stake 
especially with news personalization, which can lead to conflicts (prominently truth 
finding versus social cohesion) that are not likely to end up in court but must be discussed 
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in public. There is a need to further discuss what the right to receive information should 
mean nowadays, how it relates to data protection, and to empirically study how people’s 
information seeking strategies and privacy attitudes influence the exercise of this right. 
    Considering the special position of media and the preference for self-regulation 
following from media freedom, it is unlikely that the normative principles in the media 
context should directly translate into legal obligations (Harambam et al., 2018). Negative 
and positive obligations of member States following from Article 10 ECHR, in fact, do 
not hold against these ‘technology companies’. At the very least, from Article 10 ECHR 
can follow some obligation, for example that media actors have a responsibility to 
develop professional rules regarding the risks of personalization algorithms for bias and 
media diversity. Nevertheless, this raises the following question: how the state could 
dispose of its obligations? Eskens et al. (2017) unveil five perspectives from which to 
understand the right to receive information and answer this question: 
 
1. Political debate. receiving information is essential for people to participate in 
political life. Eskens et al. broadly intend political participation as encompassing 
participation in the electoral process, but also ‘discovering and forming an opinion 
of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders’, forming opinion about the public 
and private activities of political representatives, and discussing governmental 
actions with others. Such perspective leads to a concrete obligation for states. In 
particular, as Eskens et al. (2017) stress, the ECtHR held that states have a duty 
to ensure that the public has access to accurate information and varied opinions 
through audiovisual media. 
 
2.  Truth finding. This perspective means that the quest for truth may legitimize a 
claim to receive information. It is a broader perspective than political 
participation, since people may aim to find out the truth about non-political issues. 
This also carries the implication that the public is entitled to receive a diversity of 
information, because truth will only emerge out of the marketplace of ideas. 
Diversity has for a long time been a central tenet of European media law and 
policy, implementing the value of pluralism. The ECtHR has indeed established 
that democracy demands pluralism, and that the state is the ultimate guarantor of 
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pluralism. Subsequently, the Court imposes on states the positive obligation to put 
in place a legislative framework to guarantee pluralism in the media system. 
 
3. Social cohesion. According to Eskens et al. (2017), the Council of Europe, as well 
as the ECtHR, recognize the importance of receiving information for the creation 
and maintenance of social cohesion. In this sense, social cohesion refers to high 
quality and strong social relations, including people a sense of belonging to a 
social group, and group orientation towards the common good. This necessitates 
a certain degree of trust, while social cohesion also enables mutual trust amongst 
people. ECtHR case law supports the connection between social cohesion and 
exposure diversity. The Court recognizes that public debate about complex issues 
furthers social cohesion by ensuring that representatives of all views are heard, 
particularly minority voices. 
 
4. Avoidance of censorship. Censorship clearly has implications for exercising the 
right to receive information as it prevents people from receiving information. In 
this case, the Court has established that the right to receive information prohibits 
the government from restricting a person from receiving information that others 
wish or may be willing to impart to him or her. 
 
5. Self-development. Various legal judgements or policy instruments are based on 
the idea that receiving information is necessary for people’s self-development. 
This perspective covers two types of information: personal information in the 
sense of personal data, and information that is not personal but relevant to 
someone’s private life for another personal reason. The Court established that 
access to information is also important for private and cultural issues, in addition 
to public interest issues. Besides, this case also relates to the perspective of social 
cohesion. 
 
Users share a ‘cooperative responsibility’ with social media platforms as content editor 
(Helberger et al., 2018). Concerning current individual control over information, 
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Harambam et al. (2018) identifies four ways in which people can influence the 
algorithmically curated information they encounter, and these are:  
 
1) Alternation, that is, switching between different news outlets and media 
forms, and also by using multiple or different recommenders. Yet, it 
requires effort, skills and, also, it is limited in working around hidden 
biases in algorithmic curation.  
 
2) Awareness, that is, being aware of algorithms functioning. In this respect, 
the GDPR, which raises the bar on transparency and user control over 
personal data processing, and may have a positive impact.25  
 
3) Adjustment, that is, adjust algorithms according to personal interests and 
wishes. Most news outlets, however, have not developed formal ways to 
influence their curating algorithms. 
 
4) Obfuscation, that is, mobilizing against the data-driven processes through 
the deliberate addition of ambiguous, confusing, or misleading 
information to interfere with data collection. Yet, this may run against 
some of the goals and benefits of personalization. 
  
The above techniques, however, are not particularly effective and are difficult to pursue 
for the average user.26 Yet, more generally, the ability to intervene in data-driven 
processes can be challenging and costly to implement, in particular at scale, considering 
the nature of the required possibility to intervene. Then, what forms of intervention at the 
level of data inputs and processing can be achieved in the context of algorithmic news 
recommenders to further the value of voice must be discussed further. This leads to a 
related issue which might help to better define strategies to tackle the current limitations 
of data protection law previously outlined.  
 
25 This is the case with Facebook which is implementing a feature “why I am seeing this” to provide users a better 
understanding of the reasons why a post has been recommended. 
26 Recently, it is even questioned whether the actual ‘horizontal approach’ based on the notion of ‘average consumers’ 





The European Commission (EC) has recognized the exposure of citizens to large scale 
online disinformation (2018a) and micro-targeting of voters based on the unlawful 
processing of personal data (2018b) as major challenges for European democracies.  
   Bradshaw and Howard (2018) have found that governments and political parties in an 
increasing number of countries of different political regimes are investing significant 
resources in using social media to manipulate public opinion. Political bots, as they note, 
are used to promote or attack particular politicians, promote certain topics, fake follower 
bases, or to get opponents’ accounts and content removed by reporting it on a large scale. 
Micro-targeting, as another tactic, is commonly defined as a political advertising strategy 
that makes use of data analytics to build individual or small group voter models and to 
address them with tailored political messages (Bodó et al., 2017). These messages can be 
drafted with the intention to deceive certain groups and to influence their behaviour, 
which is particularly problematic in the period that leads up to voting in elections when 
decisions of paramount importance for democracy are made. During elections the 
tensions are high and the time for correction or reaction is scarce. 
   In a response to these challenges, and to ensure citizens’ access to a variety of credible 
information and sources, the EC has put in place several measures which aim to create an 
overarching “European approach” (Nenadić, 2019). The key instruments contained in the 
approach and drew out the key principles upon which it builds: data protection; 
transparency; cooperation; mobilizing the private sector; promoting diversity and 
credibility of information; raising awareness; empowering the research community. The 
principles of traditional media regulation in the electoral period are impartiality and 
equality of opportunity for contenders. 
   The European approach certainly requires further elaboration, primarily to include 
additional layers of transparency. This entails transparency of political parties and of 
other actors on their actions during election campaigns, as well as further transparency 
about internal processes and decision-making by platforms, especially on actions relevant 
to pluralism, elections and democracy. This approach faces two constraints. Namely that 
the power of global platforms is shaped in the US tradition, which to a significant extent 
differs from the European approach in balancing freedom of expression and data 
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protection. Conversely, the EU approach confronts the resilience of national political 
traditions in member states, in particular if the measures are based on recommendations 
and other soft instruments.  
   In the online environment, the principles applied to traditional media require further 
elaboration as the problem of electoral disinformation cuts across a number of different 
policy areas, involving a range of public and private actors. Political disinformation is not 
a problem that can easily be compartmentalized into existing legal and policy categories. 
It is a complex and multi-layered issue that requires a more comprehensive and 
collaborative approach when designing potential solutions. Lastly, the ability to 
manipulate is becoming as effective as widespread. Thus, new forms of regulation and 
control are discussed. 
 
4.1.6.1 Towards a “Right Not to Be Deceived”?  
Human behavior can be manipulated by priming and conditioning, using rewards and 
punishments. Algorithms can autonomously explore manipulative strategies that can be 
detrimental to users (Albanie et al., 2017; Lanzing, 2018). Basically, they exploit human 
biases and vulnerabilities to affect self-control, self-esteem and personal beliefs. As a 
consequence, autonomy is threatened (Kohl et al., 2019; Zarsky, 2019; Deibert, 2019). 
This is even more concerning in the case of negative effects on children’s wellbeing, 
including increased risk of suicide and depression, conflict with parents and adverse 
effects on cerebral and social development (Kidron et al, 2018). Recital 38 of the GDPR 
in fact states that: “Children merit specific protection with regard to their personal data, 
as they may be less aware of the risks, consequences and safeguards concerned and their 
rights in relation to the processing of personal data…”. 
      Social media already act as addictive machines (Deibert, 2013). As such, users are 
tempted to give up their rights to benefit from such ‘hyper-personalization’. In theory, 
using such techniques goes against the ‘fairness’ and ‘transparency’ provisions of the 
GDPR (Zarsky, 2019). In this sense, GDPR proves to be a necessary yet insufficient step. 
In fact, as smart environments will permeate societies, users (especially young people) 
will be automatically plugged in and guided through life along algorithmically 
determined pathways, and the boundary between legitimate persuasion and deception will 
become increasingly blurred. This is why more reflection is needed. 
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   The right most clearly implicated in big data-driven hyper-nudging is the right to 
informational privacy. As such, data controllers are obliged to follow the principle of data 
protection by design and by default. This might go beyond the individual to focus a priori 
on the creation of better algorithms (Edwards and Veale, 2017). For example, privacy 
might be fundamental to enable what Hildebrandt (Hildebrandt, 2019) defines as 
‘agonistic machine learning’, that is, demanding companies or governments that base 
decisions on machine learning to ‘explore and enable alternative ways of datafying and 
modelling the same event, person or action’. In the case of personalization, the value of 
serendipity is thus implied. 
    Of course, also consumer law could actually help to protect consumers against unfair 
profiling and persuasion practices (Helberger et al., 2017). However, the extensive 
uncertainty and context dependence implies that people cannot be counted on to navigate 
the complex trade-offs involving terms of services and privacy self-management 
(Acquisti et al., 2015). There is overwhelming evidence that most people neither read nor 
understand online privacy policies. According to behavioral sciences as well, existing 
notice and consent model cannot be relied upon to protect the right to informational 
privacy (Yeung, 2017).27 
   In addition to privacy, online digital users should have a separate and distinct right not 
to be deceived, rooted in a moral agent’s basic right to be treated with dignity and respect 
given that deception violates the autonomy of the person deceived, involving the control 
of another without that person’s consent. Basically, this might unfold throughout several 
practices: 
1. First of all, an ideal aim to achieve is ‘content neutrality’ by design, meaning 
platforms is agnostic towards content. Content neutrality might be also achieved 
with a ‘right to profile transparency’, through an infrastructure that supports what 
the philosopher Mireille Hildebrandt defines as ‘counter-profiling’ (2015), 
meaning “to conduct data mining operations on the behaviours of those that are 
in the business of profiling whether ‘those’ are humans, computing systems or 
hybrid configurations” (p.223). This is a general strategy to figure out how one is 
actually targeted. 
 
27 Also the European Commission recognizes that individual decision-making occurs subconsciously, passively and 
unreflectively rather than through active deliberation (2016). 
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2. Platforms should routinely disclose to their users and the public any experiment 
that the users were subjected to.28 Appropriate information and specific consent 
to the use of techniques of deception ought to be given. Yet, given the complexity 
and subtleness of online deception the choice may not even be sufficiently 
informed and conscious even with consent.  
3. There could also be established independent boards to review and approve 
experiments in advance. A specific agency responsible to detect manipulative 
techniques, prevent them and protect fundamental human rights may be required. 
The current vast power asymmetry between global digital service providers and 
individual service users cannot be ignored. In the Big Data era any kind of 
personalization is a form of nudging with unintended (and unsettling) 
consequences. As it currently stands, the EU legal framework seems to be 
insufficient in facing this challenge. In fact, this would be  particularly in line with 
two intertwined newly discussed human rights: the ‘right to not be measured, 
analysed or coached’29 (van Est et al., 2017) and a ‘right to cognitive sovereignty’ 
that ought to protect individuals’ right to mental self-determination (Yeung, 
2018b). 
4. As for political microtargeting, platforms should clearly identify political 
advertisements and who paid for them and offer a transparent repository of all the 
material used in the campaign provided by candidates and political parties. 
Furthermore, a stronger requirement for political parties to report on the amounts 
spent on different types of communication channels is desirable, as well as the 
requirement for platforms to provide more comprehensive and workable data on 
sponsors and spending in political advertising. 
 
4.2 Personalization Ethics 
Personalization ethics is by no mean an abstract exercise. It can (and should) guide the 
development of personalization technologies, practices and usage. Numerous data ethics 
public policy initiatives, for example, have been recently created, moving beyond issues 
 
28 In U.S. a bill about this issue (called “Deceptive Experiments To Online User Reduction”) has been recently proposed 
and discussed. 
29 The right is intended as “the right to decide whether or not they want to participate in experiments carried out by 
other actors (which usually goes hand in hand with surveillance) or other activities that involve registering or otherwise 
observing people’s lives and influencing their behaviour with technological means.” (van Est et al., 2017, p.43). 
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of mere compliance with data protection law to increasingly focus on the ethics of big 
data, especially concerning private companies’ and public institutions’ handling of 
personal data in digital forms (Hasselbalch, 2019). These should not be viewed as 
solutions in their own right. Indeed, they do not replace legal frameworks. Rather, they 
“complement existing law and may inspire, guide and even set in motion political, 
economic and educational processes that could foster an ethical “design” of the big data 
age, covering everything from the introduction of new laws, the implementation of 
policies and practices in organizations and companies and the development of new 
engineering standards, to awareness campaigns among citizens and educational initiatives 
(p.2, Ibid).” In other words, data ethics (but also, more broadly, digital and information 
ethics) become means to make sense of emerging problems and challenges of a rapidly 
evolving information and data infrastructure, and to evaluate various policies and 
solutions. 
   To better understand such processes, there will be now introduced several fundamental 
concepts and notions that will be used throughout the Section. By doing this, a critical 
overview of the ethical debate is presented, and the relation between personalization 
regulation and personalization ethics is understood. 
 
4.2.1 Soft and Hard Ethics 
To begin with, it is important to acknowledge a meaningful distinction (already 
introduced in Section 4); the one between hard and soft ethics (Floridi, 2018): 
 
• Hard ethics occurs when we discuss values, rights, duties and responsibilities—
or, more broadly, what is morally right or wrong and what ought or ought not to 
be done—in the course of making choices or taking decisions in general and of 
formulating new legal norms or challenging existing ones in particular. 
Therefore, hard ethics is what may contribute to making or shaping the law.  
 
• Soft ethics covers the same normative ground as hard ethics, but it does so by 
considering what ought and ought not to be done over and above the existing 
norms, not against them, or despite their scope, or to change them, or to by-pass 
them, e.g. in terms of self-regulation. In other words, soft ethics is post-
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compliance ethics. This last approach has a dual advantage (Floridi, 2018); on 
the one hand, an ‘opportunity strategy’, thus it enables actors to take advantage 
of the social value of digital technologies, seizing new opportunities that are 
socially acceptable or preferable and balancing any precautionary principle with 
the duty not to omit what could and ought to be done. On the other hand, the 
advantage of a ‘risk management solution’, thus it enables organizations to 
anticipate and avoid costly mistakes.  
 
It is really within the EU that post-compliance soft ethics can currently be exercised, to 
help individuals, companies, governments and other organizations to take more and better 
advantage, morally speaking, of the opportunities offered by digital innovation. Because 
even in the EU, legislation is necessary but insufficient. It does not cover everything (nor 
should it), and agents should leverage digital ethics in order to assess and decide what 
role they wish to play in the infosphere, when regulations provide no simple or 
straightforward answer, when competing values and interests need to be balanced (or 
indeed when regulations provide no guidance) and when there is more that can be done 
over and above what the law strictly requires.  
   To better understand these two different approaches, let me make a paradigmatic 
example: recitals in the GDPR. As it is often the case with complex legislation, the 
Articles leave grey areas of normative uncertainty uncovered, are subject to 
interpretations and may require updating when applied to new circumstances, especially 
in a technological context where innovation develops so quickly and radically. Therefore, 
to help understand their meaning, scope and applicability, the Articles are accompanied 
by 173 Recitals. In EU law, Recitals are texts that explain the reasons for the provisions 
of an act, but are not legally binding. Yet, they are used by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in order to interpret a directive or a regulation and reach a 
decision in the context of a particular case. In addition, they can also be used by the 
European Data Protection Board (the EDPB, which replaces the Article 29 Working 
Party), when ensuring that the GDPR is applied consistently across Europe. The Recitals 
themselves will require an interpretation, namely the ethical framework that can 
contribute to interpret the Recitals. Thus, while hard ethics is what contributed to the 
process leading to the elaboration of the GDPR, soft ethics is the framework that 
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contributes to enable the best interpretations of the Recitals. The space of soft ethics is 
bounded by human rights and compliance. Yet, its potential is an ever expanding one over 
time. 
 
4.2.2 AI Ethical Principles 
To fill the gap between the prescriptions derived from general theories and the results of 
the prescriptions in the world of policy making and professional practice it is fundamental 
to acknowledge that technology is not neutral with respect to values (Winner 1980). 
Artefacts can influence and alter our moral behavior through a reciprocal process, 
especially personalization that is an egopoietic technologies or technology of construction 
of the self (Floridi 2011). This is particularly true in the case of recommender systems 
that are indeed AI-driven.  
   As of now, EU can become a global leader in developing and using AI for good and 
promoting a human-centric approach and ethics-by-design principles (Commission, 
2018). The increasing demand for reflection and clear policies on the impact of AI on 
society has produced several initiatives that state principles, values, or tenets to guide the 
development and adoption of AI. The risk is unnecessary repetition and overlap, if the 
various sets of principles are similar, or confusion and ambiguity, if they differ. In either 
eventuality, the development of ethical AI may be delayed.  
   Floridi and Cowls (2019) analyzed six sets of ethical principles from initiatives with 
global scope, or from within western liberal democracies, to summarize the effort and 
provide an overview of the debate. To begin with, by comparing the sets of principles 
there is a convergence (at least in Europe) with the four core principles commonly used 
in bioethics: beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and justice. Yet, they are not 
exhaustive. In fact, a new principle is needed in addition: explicability, understood as 
incorporating both intelligibility and accountability.  
   Let me now briefly introduce these five principles and contextualize them into the issue 
of personalization: 
 
1. Beneficence. It means promoting well-being, preserving “human dignity” and 
“sustainability.” Its principle of “sustainability” articulates perhaps the widest of 
all interpretations of beneficence, arguing that “AI technology must be in line 
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with … ensur[ing] the basic preconditions for life on our planet, continued 
prospering for mankind and the preservation of a good environment for future 
generations.” 
2. Non-maleficence. It means privacy, security and ‘capability caution’. Though ‘do 
only good’ (beneficence) and ‘do no harm’ (non-maleficence) may seem logically 
equivalent, they are not, and represent distinct principles. Non-maleficience 
assumes the responsibility by proactively working against the risks arising from 
technological innovations.  
3. Autonomy. It is the power to decide (to decide). When we adopt AI and its smart 
agency, we willingly cede some of our decision-making power to technological 
artefacts. Thus, affirming the principle of autonomy in the context of AI means 
striking a balance between our decision-making power and the delegation to 
artificial agents. This introduces a notion we might call ‘meta-autonomy,’ or a  
‘decide-to-delegate’ model: humans should retain the power to decide which 
decisions to take: exercising the freedom to choose where necessary, and ceding 
it in cases where overriding reasons, such as efficacy, may outweigh the loss of 
control over decision-making. 
4. Justice. It means promoting prosperity, preserving solidarity, avoiding unfairness. 
The consequences of pre-existing disparity in autonomy are addressed in the 
principle of justice. Elsewhere ‘justice’ has still other meanings (especially in the 
sense of fairness), namely to eliminate unfair discrimination, promoting diversity, 
and preventing the rise of new threats to justice.  
5. Explicability. It means enabling the other principles through intelligibility and 
accountability. The situation is indeed inherently unequal: a small fraction of 
humanity is currently engaged in the development of a set of technologies that are 
already transforming the everyday lives of almost everyone else. Different terms 
express this principle: “transparency”, “accountability”, “intelligibility”, 
“understandable and interpretable”.  
 
   Significantly, explicability complements the other four principles. As Floridi and Cowls 
(2019) put it “for AI to be beneficent and non-maleficent, we must be able to understand 
the good or harm it is actually doing to society, and in which ways; for AI to promote and 
not constrain human autonomy, our ‘decision about who should decide’ must be informed 
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by knowledge of how AI would act instead of us; and for AI to be just, we must know 
whom to hold accountable in the event of a serious, negative outcome, which would 
require in turn adequate understanding of why this outcome arose.” 
         
 
Figure 20. An ethical framework of the five overarching principles for AI (from Floridi and Cowls, 2019). 
 
Concerning RSs, in the past 20 years they have been developed focusing mostly on 
business applications, and the emphasis has tended to be on commercial objectives 
(Milano et al., 2019). Thus, research into the ethical issues posed by RSs is still in its 
infancy. However, as we have seen in Chapter 2, RSs have several moral implications, as 
well as individual and social undesirable consequences. They need to be ethical 
(Paraschakis, 2017; Tang and Winoto, 2015). To make RSs ethical and operational one 
needs foremost to specify three parameters (Milano et al., 2019): a) what the space of 
options is; b) what counts as a good recommendation; and, importantly c) how the RS’s 
performance can be evaluated. In news RSs, a good recommendation may be defined as 
a news item that is relevant to the user (Floridi, 2008). This is clearly not sufficient as the 
consequences of RSs go often beyond mere news relevance. Generally, the main concerns 
for ethical RSs are privacy, autonomy, inappropriate content, opacity, fairness and social 
effects (Milano et al., 2019) and these are all embraced by the five AI principles explained 
above. These need, however, to be complemented with ethical personalization in its 
broadest (and concrete) applications (as we will do in Chapter 5). 
 
4.2.3 From Theory to Practice 
In any case, enabling the dual advantage of ‘ethical personalization’— so that the 
opportunities are seized, while the harms are foreseen and minimized or prevented — 
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requires asking difficult questions about design, development, deployment, practices, 
uses and users, as well as the data that fuel the whole process. The hope is that the 
principles outlined above can act as normative constraints. Here it lies the distinction 
between the ‘what’ (ethical principles) and the ‘how’ (technical requirements). Truly, in 
the last decade applied ethics has developed into an even more practical discipline. Such 
“design turn in applied ethics” (Van den Hoven et al., 2017) acknowledges that the needs 
and values of users are considered in their own right and not simply as a side constraint 
on successful implementation. This perspective helps to develop pragmatic 
methodologies and frameworks (like Value Sensitive Design and pro-ethical design) that 
help to make moral and ethical values integral parts of research and development 
(Friedman et al., 2002). However, the mere existence of these principles does little to 
bring about actual change in the design of algorithmic systems, leading to accusations of 
‘ethics washing’ and feelings of ‘ethics fatigue’ (Floridi, 2019b). 
   In this sense, Bozdag and Timmermans (2011) have initially highlighted how to unfold 
the principles stressed to make personalization ethical:  
1) To make sure different identities are allowed per user, which might differ per 
context.  
2) To design for autonomy, so that the user can customize the filter, and change the 
identity that is formed on basis of his previous interactions, and  
3) to design for transparency, so that the user is aware that a filter is taking place. 
The user must be able to see which criteria is used for filtering, and which identity 
the system has of the user.  
Similarly, Hakala et al. (2014) wrote a foresighted article titled “Ethical Personalization 
Act 2025” in which they stressed the importance of education and, therefore, of the 
awareness of the educators over personalization practices. These solution, however, are 
still too broad. As such, this debate will be widened in the last final chapter in order to 
provide a more detailed analysis of personalization ethics. 
   Still, the gap between principles and practice is as dangerous as too large (Morley et al., 
2019). Especially in a digital context, ethical principles are not simply either applied or 
not, but they are regularly re-applied or applied differently, or better, or ignored as 
algorithmic systems are developed, deployed, configured, tested, revised and re-tuned. 
Complexity, variability, subjectivity, and lack of standardization, including variable 
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interpretation of the ‘components’ of each of the ethical principles make this endeavor 
challenging. This is also risky as the lack of guidance may (a) result in the costs of ethical 
mistakes outweighing the benefits of ethical successes; (b) undermine public acceptance 
of algorithmic systems; (c) reduce adoption of algorithmic systems; and (d) ultimately 
create a scenario in which society incurs significant opportunity costs (Cookson, 2018). 
   Another significant risk is that the tech industry, especially in Silicon Valley, ‘owns 
ethics’, in the sense that it does not bear sole responsibility for it, but rather oversees 
integration of ethical projects across organizations. For example, using corporate 
resources hiring staff for ‘ethical’ roles. This recent widespread commitment to ethics “in 
tension with—and at risk of being absorbed within— broader and longer-standing 
industry commitments to meritocracy, technological solutionism, and market 
fundamentalism (Metcalf and Moss, 2019, p.11).” In this context, ethical words like 
“fairness,” “accountability” and “transparency” can be used as “weasel words” whereas, 
more pragmatically, words like “justice, liberation, and rights” actually remain 
frameworks for material improvement of human lives.  
   Furthermore, during the application of ethical principles there are still significant 
concerns or malpractices that might limit the potential to implement good ethics. Floridi 
(2019) identifies five major ones that deserve to be introduced: 
 
(1) ethics shopping as “the malpractice of choosing, adapting, or revising (mixing and 
matching) ethical principles, guidelines, codes, frameworks, or other similar 
standards (especially but not only in the ethics of AI), from a variety of available 
offers, in order to retrofit some pre-existing behaviours (choices, processes, 
strategies, etc.), and hence justify them a posteriori, instead of implementing or 
improving new behaviours by benchmarking them against public, ethical 
standards (p.2)”. 
 
(2) ethics bluewashing as “the malpractice of making unsubstantiated or misleading 
claims about, or implementing superficial measures in favour of, the ethical values 
and benefits of digital processes, products, services, or other solutions in order to 
appear more digitally ethical than one is (p.3)”. 
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(3) ethics lobbying as “the malpractice of exploiting digital ethics to delay, revise, 
replace, or avoid good and necessary legislation (or its enforcement) about the 
design, development, and deployment of digital processes, products, services, or 
other solutions (p.4).” 
 
(4) ethics dumping as “the malpractice of (a) exporting research activities about 
digital processes, products, services, or other solutions, in other contexts or places 
(e.g. by European organizations outside the EU) in ways that would be ethically 
unacceptable in the context or place of origin and (b) importing the outcomes of 
such unethical research activities (p.6)”. 
 
(5) ethics shirking as “the malpractice of doing increasingly less ethical work (such 
as fulfilling duties, respecting rights, and honouring commitments) in a given 
context the lower the return of such ethical work in that context is mistakenly 
perceived to be (p.7).” 
 
The above one are the most obvious and significant ethical risks one might encounter 
when navigating from principles to practices in digital ethics, thus they need to be kept 
in mind. These will indeed be highlighted when necessary during the following analysis. 
      There are, then, also concerning research gaps. Currently, most attention for all the 
ethical principles is focused on interventions at the early input stages but very few tools 
or methods during the middle building and testing phases (Morley et al., 2019). Few of 
the available tools surveyed provide meaningful ways to assess, and respond to, the 
impact that the data-processing has on an individual, and even less on the impact on 
society as a whole. Also, while ethics and values have been studied extensively, these 
conversations are frequently bound to the academic community and related discourses, 
making practitioner access to these conversations difficult. Comprehensive ethics 
education is critical to ensure that future generations of practitioners, designers and 
engineers take their role as creators of futures seriously.  
   Furthermore, legislations may even prove to have unintended consequences in terms of 
incentivizing some types of research over others and promoting minimum adherence over 
best practice, given that being legally compliant may be seen to be good enough. For 
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example, GDPR has encouraged a focus on privacy and explicability over the promotion 
of autonomy in design choices and done very little to encourage competition to be the 
most ethical system (Floridi, 2018). As such, societies need to come together in 
communities comprised of multi-disciplinary researchers, innovators, policymakers, 
citizens, developers and designers to foster the development of common knowledge and 
understanding and a common goal to be achieved with innovative tools and 
methodologies for applied AI ethics. 
   Finally, there are opportunities and (ethical) challenges of ethics by design. It is possible 
indeed to nudge users to rely on empowerment nudges, which promote decision-making 
in the interests of citizens, as judged by themselves, without introducing further regulation 
or incentives’ or manipulative measures (Helberger et al., 2016). A similar approach is 
embraced by Floridi (2016), which suggests what he calls “tolerant paternalism” that, in 
short, aims to modify the level of abstraction of the choice architecture by educating users 
to make their own critical choices and to assume explicit responsibilities. Certainly, there 
are also ethical concerns about ethics by design and nudging (Helberger et al., 2016). This 
issue will be analyzed in Section 4.2.6. Then, two other related issues are now introduced, 
namely the significance of intercultural information ethics (Section 4.2.4) and the role of 
group privacy (Section 4.2.5). 
 
4.2.4 The Relevance of Inter-cultural Ethics 
Where does morality begin and end in a socio-technical infrastructure that extends across 
jurisdictions and continents, cultural value systems and societal sectors? Evidence from 
different parts of the world shows that the relationship between users and RSs, societies 
and privacy, and journalists and automation can differ greatly, and that the socio-cultural 
context as well as contextual factors such as the media and political system should be 
taken into account in the development of personalization, its governance and its  
regulation. This is particularly true regarding a fundamental and paradigmatic value of 
information societies: privacy. 
   Importantly, intercultural information ethics study shows how the concept of privacy is 
associated with the Western perspective of individual autonomy (Capurro 2005), even 
though forms of privacy are found in every culture throughout the world. More generally, 
many experts highlight the dangers of the dominance of “Western” ethics, even in other 
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strictly related debates such as the one on Artificial Intelligence (AI). For example, not 
even one African country has drafted an AI ethical guidelines independently from 
international or supranational organizations (Jobin et al., 2019). This reveals a power 
imbalance in the international discourse. As pointed out by a number of scholars 
(Capurro, 2005, 2008; Ess, 2006; Olinger et al., 2005; Makulilo, 2016), privacy 
discussions have been dominated for a long time by Western cultures, to the exclusion of 
non-Western ethical and socio-cultural perspectives. Some have even erroneously argued 
that the concept of privacy is completely absent in many Eastern cultures (Ess, 2006). 
This limited approach carries risks not only because the ethical norms and values can 
collide with those of the communities in which they are deployed, but also because it 
might represent a missed opportunity to enrich and further develop the current paradigm 
of privacy protection so as to effectively face new emerging technological challenges. 
   Yet, in intercultural information ethics there is a danger not only to group together all 
Western traditions under a single banner but also to negatively designate such 
influence. Only because there exists a monopoly of influence by one system over another 
does not mean that said monopoly is not valuable. Instead, it can be stressed that those 
same liberal democratic values arose out of conflicts of cultural and subcultural difference 
and are specifically designed to be accommodating enough to include a rather wide range 
of differences. Therefore, as Ess (2006, 211) pointed out, a global information ethics that 
seeks to avoid any homogenization must “conjoin shared norms while simultaneously 
preserving the irreducible differences between cultures and peoples.” 
   An initial response to the encounter with apparently irreducible difference is conceived 
as a modus vivendi pluralism, one that ‘simply lets these differences stand and accepts 
that there is no further common ground to be found between diverse views, approaches, 
norms, etc’ (Ess, 2006, 216). Such an approach seems insufficient. As Luciano Floridi 
pointed out (in Ess 2006), such modus vivendi pluralism is pragmatically not to be found, 
in the sense that in the absence of some larger form of shared community life and values, 
and as the basic tensions are not resolved, differences seem rather to sustain constant 
conflicts that might bring to violent confrontation. 
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   Charles Ess (2006) argues that a global information ethics could overcome such 
conditions by taking up an ethical pluralism, specifically Aristotles pros hen.30 Away 
from ethical relativism and ethical dogmatism, this model highlights connection in the 
face of irreducible difference, a complementarity in which an active engagement across 
these differences works to enrich both participants. This is a promising endeavor; 
according to Ess (2006, 218), conceptions of privacy and data privacy protection laws 
emerging in countries such as China, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Japan “cohere and 
resonate with Western notions of privacy and data privacy protections – and in ways that 
compose a robust, pros hen pluralism.” Yet, intercultural dialogue is difficult, so that 
excessive optimism is not reasonable (Hiruta 2006). Discussions of privacy in non-
Western cultures are indeed scattered and sometimes conflicting. Whereas some even 
contend that the concept of privacy is completely absent in many Eastern cultures (Ess 
2006). 
   Following Ma (2019), considering other ethical perspectives jointly could spark 
research contributing to the relational understanding of privacy in three ways: i) to 
understand how cultural factors influence people’s understanding of privacy, ii) to assess 
whether there are some underlying shared social norms that might be more salient in one 
context/culture than another and iii) to find empirical evidence of how prevalent control-
based belief of privacy is among individual, corporate and/or government documents in 
other cultures other than Western ones. 
   To conclude, current working conceptualizations of privacy – as well as other related 
values – are rooted in the Western concept of individual autonomy as having control over 
personal information. This is increasingly unsuited in helping answer many questions 
people could face in everyday life, even in the ethics of personalization. For example, 
algorithmic systems which measure, count and profile groups of individuals create 
knowledge that is not (only) private to an individual, but which reveals something about 
a group of individuals. Being targeted as part of a group could indeed affect one’s online 
personalized experience. This is, in a nutshell, the problem of protecting ‘group privacy’ 
(Taylor et al., 2016). As such, researchers have moved on and proposed a contextual 
understanding of privacy (Nissenbaum, 2011) as well as relational privacy (Stoljar, 2015; 
 
30 ‘Pros hen pluralism’ is a three-layered doctrine, consisting of one requirement for diversity at a cultural level, 
another for diversity at an ethical theoretic level, and the other for unity at the ethical theoretic level (Ess, 2006). 
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Bannerman, 2018; Ma, 2019). Cultures that embrace a conception of privacy as (more) 
relational have already been analyzed in this context, notably Indian (Basu, 2012) and 
Japanese cultures (Capurro, 2005), Buddhism (Hongladarom, 2016), Confucianism (Ma, 
2019) and, finally, also the sub-Saharian etno-philosophy of Ubuntu (Reviglio and 
Alunge, 2020). 
 
4.2.5 The Importance of Group Privacy 
Another particularly significant theoretical and practical issue to protect privacy and 
guarantee fair personalization practices is represented by ‘group privacy’. As a matter of 
fact, nowadays most people are not profiled as individuals but, instead, as a member of a 
specific group.  Data are not gathered about a specific person or group, rather, to borrow 
van der Sloot’s terms (2016), they are gathered about an ‘undefined number of people 
during an undefined period of time without a pre-established reason’. These data are then 
processed on a group or aggregated level through the use of statistical correlations to 
provide personalized services or make targeted decisions. Thus, the ‘individual’ element 
is mostly lost, yielding biased or discriminatory results. Despite the focus on personal 
identifying information is still useful for more traditional data processing activities, a 
number of scholars (Taylor et al., 2016) indeed argue that in the big data era these should 
be supplemented by a focus on identifying information about categories or groups.  
   Yet, harm to specific individuals is very difficult to demonstrate. These data do not 
directly identify a person, and consequently fall outside the scope of the data protection 
regulations, although they may affect him or her as being part of a specific group.31 To 
argue what a notion of group privacy might imply both theoretically and practically, it is 
necessary to firstly understand what is intended as ‘group’, and how profiling threatens 
such ‘group privacy’. And being targeted as part of a group could affect algorithmic 
decisions made about us and for us, for example credit scoring or online personalization. 
   Kammourieh et al. (2016) note that a ‘group’ refers to a ‘class or unit made up of more 
than one person or thing’ and the term also leads us to imagine ‘people who have formed 
 
31 Interestingly, Van der Sloot (2016) notes that “one could focus on the initial moment when personal data are gathered 
and not yet aggregated, but this may only concern the split second which it takes to aggregate data. The same counts 
for the moment at which group profiles are applied and used to affect a specific person. This only concerns the very 
end of the data process. By focusing on the individual, his interests and rights, one loses sight of the larger part of the 
data processing scheme and the general issues concerned with that.” 
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explicit ties, whether legal or otherwise, that bind them together’ like a social, religious 
or ethnic group, or a structured organization like a company or political party. 
Traditionally, groups can be active (members proclaim the existence and willingly 
identify themselves as members of the group) or passive (members are attributed 
membership by society and may not willingly wish to be identified as such e.g. categories 
of vulnerable persons in a country or society). This conventional definition changes with 
new technological practices. Through machine learning, it is now possible to infer 
information and draw knowledge from vast amounts of unstructured data - usually 
without anyone’s knowledge - while pattern recognition tools facilitate the discovery of 
previously imperceptible interrelations within datasets and, as such, creates new means 
for identifying and grouping individuals (Kammourieh et al., 2016).  
  These new abilities to group individuals poses significant ethical and legal problems. 
Taylor (2016) raises the problems of misuse and misinterpretation or inaccuracy of such 
information collected in a Big Data context: inability of privacy legislations and ethical 
frameworks to keep up with the pace of, and therefore regulate the use of such data 
(misuse), and the eventuality of such data being interpreted by data scientists rather than 
social scientists (misinterpretation). There is equally the fundamental problem of consent: 
how can informed consent be collected from each member of such groupings (Taylor 
2016; Bernal 2012).  
   These developments triggered discussions on whether a legal notion of collective 
privacy is necessary and whether this collective dimension requires the granting of 
specific collective rights. In privacy literature, the idea of group privacy is not absent (e.g. 
Bloustein, 1978). The philosopher of information Luciano Floridi (2014, 1) defines it as 
a “right that is held by a group as a group rather than by its members severally. It is the 
group, not its members, that is correctly identified as the right-holder.” Since long, the 
group has not been conceptualized in terms of privacy beyond a collection of individuals 
with individual interests in privacy (Bloustein 1978). In other words, the rights holder has 
always been the data subject and the rights regarding informational privacy have been 
mainly exercised by single individuals. Even in the new often-lauded GDPR, specific 
reference to group privacy is absent32.  
 
32 European data protection law however appears to provide legal grouns for the consideration of networked and group 
privacy with the EU Data Protection Directive Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion 4/2007, which considers data to be 
personal data if it impacts the rights of an individual. 
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   Historically, the legal position of the ‘group’ has been a complex one and disputed one. 
Groups are usually dynamic entities as they come in an endless number of sizes, 
compositions, nature, and they are fluid (Taylor et al., 2016). So, one may argue, with 
groups acting as moving targets and no clear or fixed ontology for them, it may be difficult 
to develop a theory of group privacy. The only fixed entity is therefore the individual, so 
group privacy is nothing more than the sum of ‘individual privacies’. Groups, however, 
are not “given” but are determined by algorithms through clustering. In other words, the 
activity of grouping comes before its outcome, the group. This different approach helps 
to explain why profiling a standard kind of grouping may already infringe on the privacy 
of the resulting group, if such profiling is oriented by a goal that in itself is not meant to 
respect the privacy of the group. This is true even in cases in which the members of the 
group are not aware of this: a group that has been silently profiled, in fact, need not be 
aware of this to have its privacy protected. 
   In big data contexts, the common attributes of the group often become evident only to 
the data gatherer. A telling example is what Nathaniel Raymond (2016, 48) calls 
“demographically identifiable information,” or DII, which he defines as: “either 
individual and/or aggregated data points that allow inferences to be drawn, enabling the 
classification, identification, and/or tracking of both named and/or unnamed individuals, 
groups of individuals, and/or multiple groups of individuals according to ethnicity, 
economic class, religion, gender, age, health condition, location, occupation, and/or  other 
demographically defining factors.” From a traditional perspective, such information, 
provided it relates to no specific individual but to a given population, is not subject to 
privacy law. However, there are reports of such information being (hacked and) used to 
study, locate and launch attacks on targeted populations in warzones, or combined with 
other data points to (sometimes erroneously) infer the Muslim faith of taxi drivers in New 
York city (Kammourieh et al., 2016). In a nutshell, individuals could still get affected by 
the processing of such information. 
   The implication of the technical issues related to group privacy is that our legal, 
philosophical and analytic attention to the individual may need to be adjusted, and 
possibly extended (Taylor et al., 2016). The fact that the individual is no longer central, 
but incidental to these types of processes, challenges the very foundations of most 
currently existing legal, ethical and social practices and theories related to privacy.  
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4.2.6 To Nudge or Not to Nudge? 
One of the hottest ideas in current policy debates is “libertarian paternalism,” the design 
of policies that push individuals toward better choices without limiting their liberty 
(Sunstein and Thaler 2008; Hausman and Welch, 2010; Floridi, 2016). This debate is not 
only occurring in policy debates but it is also reflected in personalization systems. Thus, 
to better understand the ethics of personalization in social media, we now discuss the 
ethics of nudging and, given that nudging is a form of persuasion, we begin with an 
introduction to the ethics of persuasion to understand both the difference between 
persuasion and manipulation, and between persuasion and nudging. 
   Persuasion is a very broad and diffuse phenomenon and, therefore, the concept is 
notoriously difficult to characterize. To some extent, it is an umbrella term for ‘influence’. 
It can be defined as “the action or process of persuading someone or of being persuaded 
to do or believe something (Oxford Dictionary).” From the serpent in the Garden of Eden 
to modern mass-media society, persuasion is a natural part of human interaction. There 
have always been human persuaders in society capable of changing people’s minds and 
behaviors. Aristotle considered persuasion an art of rhetoric. Examples of persuaders 
abound—cult and political leaders, mothers, car salesmen, journalists. Also teachers can 
be considered as institutionalized persuaders. Nowadays persuasive efforts evidently 
manifests in media, especially through propaganda, advertisement, and opinion leaders. 
Since long, media technology has played a significant role in facilitating the delivery of 
persuasive messages to buy, donate, vote or act – from megaphones to podcasts. Media 
have always been a vector for persuasion and, at times, manipulation. Critical Theory – 
in particular the Frankfurt school – since long denounced the role of media in shaping 
contemporary societies (FONTE). This also is caused by the intertwined relationship 
between media and advertisement. Marketing has in fact always attempted to understand 
individuals’ desires, emotions and thoughts. Eventually, it is important to recognize that 
persuasion is a pharmakological phenomenon, that is, it can be used either for the good 
(e.g. persuasive learning or health behavior change) or for malicious ends. 
   The standard definition identifies two possible objects of change, that is, attitudes (such 
as opinions and beliefs) and behaviors (such as decisions). In this sense, change can be 
intended in three main ways: formation, alteration, and reinforcing (Oinas-Kukkonen, 
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2010) and it has traditionally been associated with two routes (Pettty and Cacioppo, 
1986): 1. central route, whereby an individual evaluates information presented to them 
based on the pros and cons of it and how well it supports their values and 2. peripheral 
route, in which change is mediated by how attractive the source of communication is and 
by bypassing the deliberation process. Of course, when the latest rules it is ethically 
disputable. Persuaders have indeed always stood on uneasy ethical ground. To provide 
the most paradigmatic example: if a serpent persuades you to eat a fruit, to what extent 
the culpability fall upon you or upon the serpent? Ethicists have struggled with such 
questions for thousands of years. 
   Persuasion apparently distributes responsibility between the persuader and the 
persuaded. It is therefore fundamental to distinguish (whether and when possible) 
whenever persuasion falls into manipulation. In order to bypass human resistance in being 
deceived, the manipulator has to hide the fact that he or she is manipulating the person in 
some way. In other words, there must be misinformation, disinformation and/or 
information asymmetry. Stated more generally, manipulation can proceed in three distinct 
ways, all of which violate the principle of persuasion: 1) providing false or too incomplete 
information (deception) 2) providing no comprehensible information at all, but only some 
ambiguous cues that likely lead to the target change of the manipulator 3) providing 
information, but manipulating the context in such way that the central route is blocked 
and the peripheral route will likely lead to the target change of the manipulator. The 
principle underlying manipulating and deception is thus controlling individuals in such 
way that their awareness of the very fact that they are manipulated is prevented. 
Manipulation and deception are ruled out by the principle of persuasion.  
   So, what is the difference between persuasion and nudging? This distinction is essential 
as it helps to recognize how nudging and persuasion are different, with the former merely 
targeting a particular behaviour in a particular setting, and the latter targeting a person’s 
underlying beliefs and preferences, with a view to secure more lasting identity, attitude 
and behaviour change. To appreciate the difference between nudging and persuasion, 
imagine a shop in which customers are nudged onto a particular path to encourage them 
to buy particular products. This strategy may work as long as the customer does not 
realize they are being nudged. However, the moment that choice architecture is no longer 
present, old habits will reappear instantly. 
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   In sum, persuasive technologies (PTs) can be used in policies which apply nudging 
techniques. These belongs to the more general class of ‘behavior-influencing 
technologies’. Proponents of this class of technology argue that in a society that is 
increasingly shaped by technology, we should delegate part of our moral decision-making 
to this technology. Some scholars like Achterhuis argued for this stance in developing his 
idea of ‘moralization of technology’ (Veerbek, 2011). Others like Skinner (1972) went 
even further arguing that we should exploit these PTs for social control and engineering. 
Since John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (Hausman and Welch, 2010), many have vigorously 
attacked such paternalistic proposals by arguing that it would amount to an unwarranted 
interference with our autonomy and plea to technocracy instead of democracy (Brey, 
2006). 
   In nudging, however, designers are supposed to leave the “choice set” while taking 
advantage of imperfections in human decision-making abilities. As Suntein and Thaler 
(2008) argue: “it tries to influence choices in a way that will make the choosers better off, 
as judged by themselves” (p. 5, [their emphasis]). Individuals are free to choose, despite 
the architecture of choice has been modified for their good. A core idea is that when 
choice shaping is not avoidable then it must be permissible. Yet, paternalism may still set 
limitations on freedom and this is why it is morally problematic. It is, of course, also open 
to abuse, and this is why Sunstein and Thaler (2008) set the condition of publicity, that 
is, any nudge must be transparent, open to alternative choices and not deceptive. 
However, there remains a ‘paradox of nudging’, namely that it works more effectively as 
long as information is not explicitly given or set in a certain manner. 
   In any case, paternalism can take different forms: soft, libertarian, tolerant, perceived. 
Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak and nonintrusive type of paternalism, because 
choices are not blocked or fenced off. Such libertarian and ‘softer’ approach to 
paternalism and nudging is nowadays embraced by many scholars such as Sunstein and 
Thaler (2003) and, more recently, by Floridi (2016), who advocates what he calls “tolerant 
paternalism” that, in short, aims to modify the levels of abstraction of the choice 
architecture by educating users to make their own critical choices and to assume explicit 
responsibilities. Instead of being a threat to autonomy, tolerant/libertarian paternalism can 
in fact also enhance autonomy. In particular, all those persuasive technologies that intend 
to promote attitude-behavior consistency seems powerful support for one’s autonomy 
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when applied to oneself. The debate, however, is still arguably open-ended. To some 
extent, it has to do with what we mean by freedom. In any case, to paraphrase Winston 
Churchill’s evaluation of democracy as a form of government, persuasion and nudging 
may be the worst method of social control—except for all the others, in primis coercion. 
 
4.3 Personalization Governance 
In this last section we present reflections on the potential governance of mainstream social 
media’s personalization to observe past experiences and alternative approaches to 
traditional regulation and ethical steering. There has been much debate in the last years 
on how to approach social media’s governance. As such, we discuss in this section the 
most significant approaches to provide a critical and comprehensive overview of the 
debate. In the first part we discuss innovative approaches and its debate. In the second 
part, we focus specifically on the (potential) role of the European Public Service Media 
in influencing personalization practices and development as well as to provide standards 
and tools to influence or even help social media mainstream platforms in governing 
personalization. 
 
4.3.1 A Polycentric Cooperative Governance 
The question of regulating personalization is part of a complex regulatory system 
involving many different legislative acts. This also results from the fact that a large 
number of different stakeholders are involved in the development, production, 
distribution, exploitation and marketing of personalized content. The three main 
categories are users, content providers/producers and distributors/platforms, which in turn 
are split into a number of different types of actors – much more diverse in the digital 
environment than in the analogue environment. The regulatory space has also increased 
dramatically due to the borderless nature of the digital world, as has the technical 
expertise needed to create effective, appropriate and enforceable rules. For these reasons, 
and as already argued, the involvement of various stakeholders in regulatory approaches 
has become much more important. 
   Together with the centrality of subnational authorities, there is need to move away from 
homogenous top-down model towards a decentralized, reflexive, effective, collaborative 
and cooperative framework that is ‘polycentric’ (Finck, 2018). Regulatory conversations 
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on social media platforms are already polycentric in that they are transnational and multi-
sectoral. Polycentricity is indeed inherent to new governance models. Unlike traditional 
conceptions of law that rely on a unitary source of authority, new governance is 
predicated upon a dispersal and fragmentation of authority, and rests upon fluid systems 
of power sharing. A polycentric regulatory network, encompassing additional 
stakeholders, would be preferable for it is likely to generate better results and echoes the 
nature of social media’s platform economy itself. 
   Social media governance in fact does not depend exclusively on a single source of 
accountability or regulation, but rather on more complex and multistakeholder systems 
of governance. Helberger, Pierson and Poell (2018) argue that “the realization of public 
values in platform-based public activities cannot be adequately achieved by allocating 
responsibility to one central actor (as is currently common practice)”, and instead 
envisage pursues a “dynamic interaction between platforms, users, and public 
institutions.” Social media policy is in fact moving towards a cooperative responsibility, 
that is, the result of the dynamic interaction between platforms, users and public 
institutions such as PSM. Thus, they identify four key steps to organize the 
(re)distribution of responsibilities:  
1) To collectively define the essential public values at play in particular economic 
activities and modes of public exchange.  
2) Each stakeholder (platforms, governments, users, advertisers, and others) to 
accept that they have a role to play in the realization of these values. The definition 
of the public value(s) and the specific contribution of each stakeholder are 
dependent on the context – the sector, type of service, regulatory situation, and 
socio-cultural sensitivities.   
3) To develop a multi-stakeholder process of public deliberation and exchange, in 
which agreement can be reached between platforms, users, and public institutions 
on how important public values can be advanced. In this case, governments would 
need to give some space to online platforms to experiment and operationalize 
workable solutions, without putting the realization of public policy objectives 
entirely at the mercy of self-regulatory initiatives.  
4) To translate the outcome of public deliberation and agreements into regulations, 
codes of conduct, terms of use and, last but not least, technologies (e.g. ‘by 
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design’).  
Furthermore, Helberger et al. (2018) have also indicated that this can take various 
forms: a) organizational and, more importantly in the context of personalization, 
design responsibility for platforms, b) active participation, empowerment, and real 
responsibility for users, and c) creating frameworks for shared responsibility and 
shared values for governments, considering platforms and users as partners in 
regulation rather than subjects. 
   One of the main problem with self-regulatory measures in fact is that they often lack 
means that would effectively help to measure, evaluate and audit the actions which 
the industry stakeholders have committed to. For example, they are at the moment 
unable to harmonize reporting and takedown mechanisms or shed light on the 
decision-making processes of both automated algorithmic and human content review 
systems. There are further issues at stake. For example, government oversight of 
social media RSs faces many significant challenges, both practical and principled 
(Leersen, 2020):  
• To begin, government authorities are capacity-constrained, particularly with 
regard to the technical expertise required to perform complex algorithmic 
auditing. This is especially true for horizontal agencies such as competition and 
data protection authorities, for whom RSs risk being overshadowed and 
overlooked.  
• Sectoral proposals, instead, would in many cases require the creation of entirely 
new oversight bodies. As said above, what makes this particularly challenging is 
that in Europe media policy is largely a national affair, without a clear institution 
at EU level capable of performing a monitoring role. Indeed, EU governments 
have repeatedly shot down proposals for creating a supranational media authority. 
National-level action could, on the other hand, result in a duplication and 
fragmentation of efforts. 
• Government auditing powers also raise issues of ‘second-order accountability’: is 
the governance system itself sufficiently open to outside scrutiny? If government 
determinations rely on privileged access to confidential data, which is not 
accessible to broader publics, it may be difficult for citizens to fact-check and 
second-guess government policy in this space. Without broader forms of second-
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order transparency and accountability, the legitimacy of a technocratic, command-
and-control approach in such a politically sensitive, value-laden context can 
therefore be called into question. 
 
Despite mainstream social media’s platforms have devised a number of self-regulatory 
measures, these have generally failed to overcome criticisms. The instruments deployed 
so far can be grouped into three general categories, pursuing accountability towards three 
different sets of stakeholders (Leersen, 2020):  
1) User-facing disclosures, which aim to channel information towards individual 
users in order to empower them in relationship to RSs (e.g. Facebook’s ‘Why Am 
I Seeing This’ feature). The aim of such transparency is to inform users about their 
available options so as to help them form their own preferences, appealing to 
values such as individual autonomy, agency and trust. If platforms fail to do so, 
users can take their activity elsewhere. This user-facing approach to transparency 
can be seen in several European instruments, notably the GDPR.  
2) Government oversight, which appoints a public entity to monitor RSs for 
compliance with publicly regulated standards (e.g. auditing agency, public 
disclosures). 
3) Partnerships with academia and civil society, which enable these stakeholders to 
research and critique RSs (esempio data sharing for researchers). Yet, these are 
often met with skepticism for several reasons. Above all, creating meaningful 
transparency arguably runs counter to platforms’ incentives: they have a 
commercial interest in monetizing traffic data and insights, and thus in keeping 
this information exclusive, and a political interest in avoiding negative publicity. 
 
Instead of self-regulation and regulation, it is co-regulation of social media’s platforms 
the likely most effective approach to the governance of personalization systems and 
practices. This would lead to a situation in which the EU defines legislative standards that 
are subsequently implemented by platforms, and it would be characterized by a number 
of features (Finck, 2018), including: 
(i) participation and power sharing, as power is not monopolized at supranational 
level but shared by those participating in the exercise (Helberger et al., 2018);  
(ii) multi-level integration as innovative regulatory solutions have been adopted 
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by subnational actors across the Union that now serve as blueprints for 
regulation elsewhere;  
(iii) diversity and decentralization given that the impossibility of uniform 
regulation is acknowledged;  
(iv) deliberation among multiple stakeholders takes place as the EU doesn’t 
regulate in isolation; the resulting rules would moreover be characterized by  
(v) flexibility and revisability as they are constantly evaluated and rapidly 
adapted; and  
(vi) experimentation and knowledge creation as the various concrete applications 
of the general standards will reveal several indicators as to the suitability of a 
given standard. These features of co-regulatory approaches would be further 
developed if a wider variety of actors were involved. As such, polycentric 
decision-making allows for the concentration of knowledge, which is 
naturally dispersed across society. This would remedy the currently prevailing 
information asymmetries and allow to make regulation fit for purpose.  
   In addition, multi-stakeholder bodies that include governments at various scales, 
industry, consumers and providers but also social scientists and other stakeholders 
provide room for deliberation whereas platform self-regulation and regulation by code do 
not. As such we might argue that co-regulation can be more consistent with democratic, 
participatory, and representative ideals, especially where it operates as a polycentric 
process of cooperative responsibility. A process fashioned in this manner recognizes 
pluralism and allows for decentralization in addition to facilitating experimentation. 
   Co-regulatory solutions bear the potential to marry the benefits of both regulatory 
paradigms in harnessing the effectiveness of platform’s involvement in the regulatory 
process with public oversight. In this process, which relies on cooperation and dialogue, 
platforms and public authorities are collaborators rather than adversaries. Such a process 
can allow for more informed decision-making, easier enforcement, and continuous 
review and assessment. The experimental nature of this process allows for mutual 
learning and the identification of best practices as well as for a dynamic adaptation of the 
relevant rules over time. 
 
4.3.2 Towards Personalization ‘Algorithmic Sovereignty’  
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After having analyzed the politics of mainstream social media over personalization 
practices, it is easy to realize how these explicitly counteract the possibility for its 
participants to gain more sovereignty. Facebook, in particular, denies all possibilities of 
participation in the decision-making process of its own algorithms, as well as strictly 
regulates the opportunities of interoperability for the data it gathers. This is why it is also 
important to speak of personalization algorithmic sovereignty, as the moral right of a 
person to be the exclusive controller of one's own algorithmic life and, more generally, 
the right and capacity by citizens as well as democratic institutions to make self-
determined choices on personalization algorithms and related design choices. Self-
determination is essentially at issue here, and the battlefield is whether or not users will 
be able to exercise their actual will when it comes to personalization. Until now this 
premise – essentially that it matters whether people control personalization and its 
algorithms – has never been seriously commented, stated or even discussed by social 
media platforms. 
   The notion of ‘algorithmic sovereignty’, based on a constructionist approach that posits 
that metaphors organize users’ perceptions and contribute to creating new realities 
(Krippendorf, 1993), might be a fruitful notion to develop further. To effectively address 
new ICT-related challenges it is indeed needed to enrich our conceptual toolbox (Floridi, 
2015). Taking the notion of “algorithmic sovereignty” as a metaphor – firstly explored 
by Roio (2018) – we are interested in what could be emphasized or neglected in its use 
and the extent to which its use may contribute to reiterate or deconstruct mythologies of 
digital infrastructures, with a specific focus on personalization algorithms in social media. 
   In the last years, similar related concepts have been introduced and discussed in 
academia and media (Couture and Toupine, 2017), notably data sovereignty (e.g., De 
Filippi and McCarthy, 2012), digital sovereignty and technological sovereignty 
(DIEM25, 2019). Such increasing interest in the notion of sovereignty has the ultimate 
goal to assert some form of individual and collective control empowerment over digital 
technologies. In particular, the notion of technological sovereignty is used to refer to 
initiatives that create alternatives to commercial and/or military technologies, often with 
a great emphasis on free and open source software and hardware. As such, it is also 
framed as an opposition to a hegemonic power, namely the United States and its biggest 
private tech companies (also called GAFAM: Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, 
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Microsoft). In its broad sense, technological sovereignty is often meant as a rupture from 
“state sovereignty”, while other times – similarly to the notion of “computing 
sovereignty” by Richard Stallman (Couture and Toupine, 2017) –  as the duty of public 
services to keep total control of their computing tasks in the benefit of citizens. 
   We can ideally distinguish between two poles of algorithmic sovereignty – weak 
sovereignty and strong sovereignty – between which different approaches may be 
situated: “weak algorithmic sovereignty” would refer to the negotiation between states 
and social media platforms to enact certain technical conditions, while “strong 
algorithmic sovereignty” would refer to the actual common ownership of algorithms by 
the people. This latter interpretation widely overlaps with the concept of technological 
sovereignty. Algorithmic sovereignty can thus be considered as a sub-group of the 
broader notion of technological sovereignty but, at the same time, it can provide more 
specific conditions on what the individual and social control over algorithms should be. 
    In this context, it is easy to think of the free software movement and the open source 
business models as the paradigms that enable the scrutiny of algorithms by thousands of 
experts, as well the freedom to modify them and distribute modifications (Roio, 2018).33 
Yet, even when the access to algorithms complies to these major ethical concerns, would 
that be enough to verify a condition of sovereignty for all living participants? Is 
transparency, as opposed to secrecy, a sufficient condition to make algorithms functional 
to the creation of an intelligible society? And how to effectively translate these principles 
in the context of personalization algorithms in mainstream social media? 
   Nowadays, the only way for participants to gain more sovereignty in mainstream social 
media is to create an entirely new territory.34 This is hardly suitable due to network effects 
which occur when the value of a platform to any user increases exponentially with the 
number of already present users. Normally, this leads to monopolies (Lovink and Rasch, 
2013). The history of alternative media is indeed a history of enormous challenges, as the 
consequence of a political economy that limits the possibilities for civil society because 
hearing alternative voices is a matter of money and political resources that afford 
 
33 More than 30 years ago the free software movement put forward an ethical and legal framework that establishes four 
fundamental freedom: 1) The freedom to run the program as you wish, for any purpose. 2) The freedom to study how 
the program works and to change it as you wish. 3) The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbour. 
4) The freedom to distribute copies of your modified versions to others. 
34 A directory to all alternative platforms can be found on switching.social. 
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visibility (Fuchs and Marisol, 2015). What has changed in the last decade is the vast 
societal dependency on information intermediaries’ networks.  
   The only opportunities for social media users to gain algorithmic sovereignty lies in 
two possible lines of action (Roio, 2018): either to “fork”35 the project, with great expense 
of resources and effort and with an uncertain outcome – this might even be facilitated 
with the right to portability afforded by the GDPR – either to rely on a strong regulatory 
framework that opens Facebook’s governance to its participants. Yet, both options are 
very uncertain and unlikely to succeed. On the one hand, the ‘critical mass effect’ does 
not make data portability a useful mechanism for migrating to other networks. On the 
other hand, the focus of the GDPR on data consumer protection does not actually 
guarantee the protection of collective rights. 
   The pursuit for more individual agency and social control of platforms is receiving 
increasing attention both in theory and in practice. For example, the European 
observatory on Algorithmic Sovereignty, is a new collective place of documentation 
gathering research, developments, events and projects related to the topic.36 Also, the 
project Fediverse – with roughly 5 million users37 – is an example of a social media where 
users approach an algorithmic sovereignty. The name is a portmanteau of two words 
“federation” and “universe”, a common name for federated social networks running on 
free open software on a myriad of servers across the world. The ‘Federation’ refers to a 
global social network composed of nodes that talk to each other. Each of them is an 
installation of software which supports one of the federated social web protocols. 
Fediverse networks are designed to be run by anybody, free to choose and register on any 
server and choose the person who will be in charge of its data - the administrator of your 
server. Selecting a server for its politics of data, however, is an expert choice one cannot 
expect from the large public. 
  Another significant approach is taken by the project tracking.exposed. By scraping and 
collecting the data individually recommended to the user on supported platforms 
(Facebook and Youtube above all) it collects and stores evidence which is usable in new 
ways. A result of such data reuse is the comparison of personalized experiences. By 
 
35 In software engineering, a project fork occurs when developers take a copy of source code from one software package 
and start independent development on it, creating a distinct and separate piece of software. 
36 See https://algosov.org/ 
37 See https://fediverse.party/en/post/fediverse-in-2019 
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assuming everyone has an individualized perception of the public discourse the project 
extrapolates the topics and let users compare, which might allow for improved critical 
judgment regarding the quality of information received. Also, this data is shared for 
research purposes, with NGOs and academic teams. By creating new profiles, with as 
many of the possible variables (age, friends, pages followed, likes) under control, it is 
possible to test how algorithms lead to divisive perceptions. As a side effect, it has 
collected a library of public information. Inspired by the political concept of the European 
Data Commons (DIEM25, 2019), the project keeps data in the collective interest, as far 
as it does not expose any individual without his or her consent. Yet, full anonymity cannot 
be offered at the current state of research. Therefore, the team has to make a privacy 
impact assessment for each form of data reuse.38 
  Now, considering the above experiences and experiments, we summarize some 
fundamental preconditions for achieving what we defined as personalization algorithm 
sovereignty; 
 
4.3.2.1 Education and Media Diet Awareness 
First of all, and more obviously, there is a general need for ‘algorithmic literacy’. We can 
define it as the basic knowledge on how filtering mechanisms and design choices function 
and what their impact on one’s own life is and may be. This can be cultivated with regular 
updates on personalization research, visualization tools and dashboards. Some 
paradigmatic experiments have already been done: i) in general through browser 
extensions (Reviglio, 2019b), ii) with interactive sliders (e.g. gobo.social) or iii) showing 
users their filter bubbles and help to ‘burst’ them (Nagulendra and Vassileva, 2017). 
Clearly, in order to gain more control algorithmic literacy need to go hand in hand with 
digital and media literacy. 
   Relatedly, an updated and comprehensive media diet awareness is preconditional. The 
development of ‘natural metrics’ usable to evaluate the informative experience produced 
by the algorithm, for example, is a critical issue; the percentage ratio of 
photos/videos/text, the time spent on the platform, the number of posts encountered, or 
which sources have been consumed. This information should be collected on the device 
and given back to the user to primarily increase self-awareness. We might assume that 
 
38 See https://facebook.tracking.exposed/data-reuse  
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negotiating these parameters and design choices should be an effort made and/or 
supported by the current democratic institutions and expert network bodies, such as the 
w3c, IEEE, or IETF. 
 
 
Figure 21. Scoopinion, a browser add-on that displays user’s news consumption habits. Larger circles are 
news outlets that the user consumed the most items (screenshot, May, 2019). 
 
4.3.2.2 Neutrality and Transparency 
Ideally, another significant precondition is ‘content neutrality’, meaning platforms should 
become agnostic towards content. This is extremely difficult to realize, if not impossible. 
A potential way to approximate that is the following; platforms should return machine-
readable, unfiltered, chronologically-ordered data. Then, a reader device would receive 
these data, and an algorithm would filter and prioritize. This could be a fundamental 
architectural requirement for a strong algorithmic sovereignty. By making sure that the 
filtering happens on the client side, it is ensured that the platform becomes effectively 
neutral, and nobody, except the individual, will end up knowing what was watched and 
for how long. Such neutrality would also help to prevent deception by design and, 
eventually, to cultivate a related aspirational goal: ‘algorithmic neutrality’, which is the 
idea that content should spread freely without biases.  
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   Content and algorithmic neutrality might be also achieved with a ‘right to profile 
transparency’, through an infrastructure that supports what the philosopher Mireille 
Hildebrandt has defined as ‘counter-profiling’ (2015). In addition, platforms and 
algorithm developers could routinely disclose to their users and the public any experiment 
that the users were subjected to. An independent board to review and approve experiments 
in advance could also be established. This would be particularly in line with two 
intertwined newly discussed human rights: the ‘right to not be measured, analysed or 
coached’  (van Est et al., 2017) and a ‘right to cognitive sovereignty’ that ought to protect 
individuals’ right to mental self-determination (Yeung, 2018b). 
   More generally, algorithm auditing need to be supported as well as data sharing. In 
particular, it is fundamental to guarantee a strong separation between filtering mechanism 
and data. Filtering mechanisms should be, as much as possible, stateless and idempotent, 
that is, capable to return the same result if executed twice. This is a formal way to describe 
a more easily auditable machine. On the other hand, personalization algorithms that use 
neural networks keep updating their internal state, making it impossible to perform certain 
analyses either ex-post or ex-ante. If the same result can be accomplished using a simpler 
computing system, it would also be simpler to explain, standardize, teach and assess 
outcomes. If it is possible to keep a simpler computing system as standard, the technical 
debt caused by the lack of explainability of algorithms might be avoided. Moreover, 
metadata which describes the content produced is fundamental to control. Functionalities 
of research, analysis and prioritization might perform better with metadata usable by end-
users. Even if it is a laborious process mainly for skilled individuals, metadata represent 
an opportunity to differently index and retrieve content so as to eventually increase 
content quality over quantity. 
 
4.3.2.3 Design Requirements and Information Discovery 
There are, then, user-centered preconditions to negotiate. Being essential to personalized 
information consumption, design choices and affordances should be to some extent 
adjustable, especially for what concerns attention management. For example, disabling 
the auto-loading of posts (similarly to the auto-play function for videos which is usually 
set by default) and decide to scroll n posts anytime one logs in. Another interesting 
example is the possibility to hide metrics in order not to be influenced by comparative 
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quantifications (such as the number of likes and shares).  The quantification and 
maximization of social interactions, in fact, contribute to create a “culture of 
performance” (Castro, 2016) that seems to be negatively correlated with well-being 
(Verduyn et al., 2017). In essence, all those basic design choices that ultimately affect 
information behavior and personalize one’s information diet ought to be socially 
negotiated, implemented and, ultimately, adjustable. 
   Furthermore, there are information self-determination and media pluralism concerns to 
cope with. In particular, the capacity to reach a balanced information diet from both an 
individual and a political perspective (Eskens et al., 2017) and, at the same time, make 
sure that a range of viable ‘perspective widening’ tools are provided (Delacroix and 
Veale, 2019). 
   On the one hand, a ‘right to receive information’ – as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
European Court of Human Rights – recontextualized in the digital context could help to 
establish what news consumers legitimately may expect from the news media with respect 
to the diversity or relevance of personalized recommendations (Eskens et al., 2017). In 
practice, this right could result in an effective explicit personalization – especially related 
to political news.  
   On the other hand, a ‘right to information explorability’ to increase serendipitous 
encounters and to reduce potential filter bubbles and echo chambers (Reviglio, 2019). 
This could be achieved increasing information findability and discoverability, for 
instance with the possibility to choose the accuracy and diversity of information filtering. 
In practice, this might imply more interactive control of the algorithmic outputs and, as 
such, discoverability throughout sliders, topic categories, filters to navigate the 
information by source and keyword, or even algorithmic recommender personae as 
specific avatars to filter information (Harambam et al., 2018). As Hildebrandt (2019) 
advocates, societies must demand companies to explore and enable alternative ways of 
datafying and modelling the same person. Multiple and dynamic profiling could be 
paramount to this scope. 
   By doing this, we should in fact consider new approaches to data collection, such as 
those used in qualitative social science (Greene and Shmueli, 2019). By incorporating 
more diverse forms of personal data into personalized scores, we could be able to reduce 
the gap between one’s identity as a person embedded in social and cultural space and as 
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a feature vector embedded in feature space. In fact, personalization processes will never 
be perfect. 
 
4.3.2.4 Critical Issues 
Certainly, the above outlined general preconditions need to be discussed further as they 
may have potentially unintended and undesirable consequences, impossible to 
systematically assess or even speculate in a short article such as this. Yet, we briefly 
identify some major weaknesses and critical issues.  
    If institutions empower users who can't exercise their algorithmic sovereignty, they 
may rely on default choices, and this may only leave aside the weaker users and enable 
other actors as well as mainstream social media. This scenario is not different from a free 
market where the players are not equal, and it might even legitimize current mainstream 
platform at the expense of potential emerging competitors. Now, if we imagine the 
"liberalization" of algorithms would happen tomorrow, it is not hard to believe that a 
technocratic group of skilled individuals would try to claim their algorithm to be the best. 
By leveraging existing conditions of influences, they might just reproduce the same form 
of algorithm oppression but with a variety of small actors in the market.  
   Also, this liberal market approach might lead to the misleading message that an 
algorithm can be better than another one. The perfect algorithm, in absolute terms, does 
not exist. Every one of us has different priorities, interests and time availability. The 
correct algorithm is the one that best fulfills the needs of the individual, and this might 
not be true anymore if one begins to change. The fitting algorithm thus cannot be 
permanent. Instead, the above mentioned natural metrics, dashboards and tools are 
fundamental, and should be imagined as the regulation imposed in the food industry (to 
declare the allergens, ingredients, kilocalories etc).  
   Because algorithm sovereignty is a political challenge, the solution cannot be only 
technical. Algorithmic sovereignty indeed implicitly calls for more responsibility over 
citizens which ought to be able to decide on their own instead of delegating to someone 
else. We believe that institutions like schools, academia and public service media ought 
to be proactively responsible for the most significant preconditions: digital, media and 
algorithmic literacy. 
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   Altogether, the above projects and technical preconditions question – and to some 
extent disrupt – the current power asymmetry between users and the public towards 
mainstream social media platforms and their personalization algorithms. Yet, they could 
also renew trust between platforms and users. Ultimately, the aim is to discuss, identify 
and test a series of essential technical preconditions to ensure full autonomy, transparency 
and control of users and civil societies. An important player in this context, especially in 
EU, may be Public Service Media which might undertake a new critical role in the 
emerging digital landscape. 
 
4.3.3 The Role of Public Service Media 
In this Section we discuss the role of Public Service Media39 – the digital version of Public 
Service Broadcasting (PSB) –  and attempt to answer the following questions; what might 
be the role of PSM in this emerging personalized media landscape? How can it help to 
counteract the detrimental principles that shape social media today, such as high speed, 
superficiality, tabloidization, short-term pleasure, hedonism and homophily, and to 
sustain Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) traditional values, such as universality, 
publicness and quality? Can it represent an institutional mediator able to steer the 
development and governance of personalization and proactively help to solve the crisis 
of media and, more generally, reinforce democracy and human rights? Last but not least: 
how can PSB and PSM still survive and maintain a relevant role in shaping the media 
landscape? 
   The notion of public service in relationship to media was developed in the early 20th 
century under a specific set of political, technological and social conditions. Perspectives 
on this relationship changed across time and space. Yet there remained ‘an overlapping 
consensus on certain core normative criteria’ that can be categorized into three main 
principles, where the latter two are derived from the first (Picard and Pickard, 2017): (1) 
Enhancing, developing and serving social, political and cultural citizenship; (2) 
Universality; and (3) Quality of services and output. Van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003) 
identified three phases in Western communication policy-making paradigms that show 
 
39 Splichal (2007) gives a concise definition of PSM: “In normative terms, public service media must be a service of 
the public, by the public, and for the public. It is a service of the public because it is financed by it and should be owned 
by it. It ought to be a service by the public – not only financed and controlled, but also produced by it. It must be a 
service for the public – but also for the government and other powers acting in the public sphere. In sum, public service 
media ought to become ‘a cornerstone of democracy” (p. 255). 
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the evolution of these principles: (1) emerging communications industry policy in the 
period before the Second World War (WWII), (2) public service media policy after the 
War until the 1980s, and (3) new communications policy since the end of PSB 
monopolies. 
   The first phase was characterized by public monopolies with the limited goals of 
protecting the interests of government and nation, promote innovation and provide an 
efficient public service, whereas the second phase was characterized more by normative 
and sociopolitical rather than technological and economic considerations. Media policy 
started to promote diversity of ownership and content, limit monopoly and deal more 
effectively with the press. Such policies went much further in Europe than in the US, in 
particular regarding PSB, despite significant differences from one country to another. In 
the last phase, the rise of commercial television, which, from the 1980s, led to a majority 
of private stations by the mid-1990s, gradually reversed the monopoly PBSs used to have. 
Even if it retains some legitimacy and popularity, the normative policy paradigm of the 
postwar era declined in authority and scope and changed in the means for achieving its 
goals. This was not much due to technological changes but mostly to economic and 
political forces legitimized by the ambitions of media companies and governments. As 
soon as PSB became the exception rather than the rule, its activities and funding, if not 
its very existence, began to be considered as a disturbance of market relations (Gulyás 
and Hammer, 2014). PBSs indeed changed their programs to better adapt to audiences 
and advertisers while taking over certain orientations of private competitors, such as 
competition and cost awareness. As a consequence, PSB core values began to be eroded 
(Van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003). 
   Despite differences that relate to the national context of PSBs, it is still widely believed 
that basic functions, such as a low-cost and universally available reliable provision of 
information, education and culture, and the catering for minority tastes and interests, 
cannot or will not be sufficiently served by the commercial market (Gulyás and Hammer, 
2014). Yet, it is believed that PSB should not be restricted to remedying ‘market failures’ 
but to respond to the needs of citizens – which are indeed different from those of 
consumers. Thus, not only should it provide a counterweight to the commercial media 
but it is expected to set quality standards for the whole media landscape. Anyhow, fierce 
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competition and new consumption patterns in the television landscape made it 
increasingly difficult to attract and sustain audiences. 
   At the beginning of the digital revolution, the discussion about the future of PSB 
revolved around two competing visions: those who were critics of the further 
commercialization of PSB and those who simply wanted to save PSB by adapting it to 
the system (most of the PBSs themselves and policy-makers). In particular, the European 
Broadcasting Union (EBU)40 followed the second path. The EBU Digital Strategy Group 
(EBU, 2002) considers PSB as an ‘island of trust’ amidst multimedia companies offering 
linear broadcasts and online programs. Public broadcasters have learned to adapt to 
predominantly commercial media markets, by choosing a middle way between 
popularization and purification in their program strategy.  
   As a consequence of the new emerging landscape, the transition from PSB into PSM 
was debated. In general, this implied the extension of public services beyond radio and 
television to encompass the full specter of the Internet. As a consequence, public 
broadcasters were to redefine their relation to the public. One of the main challenge 
remained the gradually diminishing reach of PSB among minorities and ‘problematic 
groups’ such as younger generations, migrants and the less educated (Burri, 2015). To 
overcome this, many PBSs have started experimenting with new ways of legitimization, 
accountability and transparency towards citizens and society. PSBs initially started using 
social media to reach and engage new audiences. Such turn to the digital environment 
also stimulated PSBs in Europe to experiment with a public version of “social TV”. 
Online participation has been considered a key-strategy to regain position in national 
arenas. Such commitments, though, do not appear particularly effective in shaping 
information consumption, and therefore are often considered insufficient. 
 
4.3.3.1 Towards a New Public Service Media? 
Most scholars agree that PSB as well as PSM require new forms of justification, not 
simply to save its role as a public institution but to educate a generation grown up in a 
global multi-platform world. A new media policy paradigm is indeed needed, and the 
 
40 EBU is an alliance of public service media (PSM) organizations, established on 12 February 1950, made up of 72 
members in 56 countries, yet unrelated to European Institutions. Its main objective is to assist its Members in this 
period of unprecedented technological changes. 
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three main paradigms discussed earlier highlight the deterministic influence not much of 
technology but of social values.  
   How PSM has reacted to the development of personalization so far? A majority of PSM 
in Europe are currently moving in the direction of digital and algorithmic personalization 
(Van den Bulck and Moe, 2017), assuming the role of a “Public Service Navigator”, 
meaning a mechanism for influencing the conditions of access to content, particularly its 
visibility, discoverability, and usability (Burri, 2015). The encouragement of content 
discovery to disrupt filter bubbles has been already stressed by EBU (2017). Actual 
specifications for RSs are, however, still to be developed. Due to fears of filter bubbles 
and echo chambers, the attention of EBU in the attempt to steer such development, for 
instance, was focused exclusively on exposure to diversity—at the cost of considering the 
need for common arenas of discourse, thus the values of universality and publicness, and 
how broadcasting and interactivity/choice can reinforce each other. Moreover, many 
institutions with similar histories and comparable media system frameworks are taking 
up different positions. Some consider the possibility to reach the value of universality 
through personalization, while other consider personalization to work against it. Also, 
some privilege implicit personalization over an explicit one, with very different outcomes 
on PSM goals.   
   This may not be sufficient. Some scholars advocated alternative and more radical 
proposals such as a ‘Public Service Internet’ (Fuchs, 2017) or ‘Public Service Algorithms’ 
(Burri, 2015; Bennett, 2018). Burri (2015) also advocates the idea of a “Public Service 
Navigator”. Yet, other scholars have been skeptical of the possibility to reform the public 
service system as such. As seen in Section 3.1, the debate has thus mainly revolved on 
platforms’ regulation versus self-regulation (Napoli, 2015). In the European media policy 
it is in fact assumed that in most cases soft law promotes self-regulation, even if doubts 
concerning its effectiveness and the transparency of certain tools remain. A paradigmatic 
example is in fact illustrated by EBU which is currently seeking to support its members 
as they struggle with both the opportunities and challenges of Big Data through the EBU 
Big Data initiative, an interdisciplinary network launched in 2015 that aims to guide PSM 
in the implementation of data-driven strategies. 
   To legitimize any more radical policy intervention as well as to guarantee an online 
media environment aligned with the most profound individual and societal needs, PSM 
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should especially focus on the individual cognitive factors that challenge the experience 
of diversity online (Hoffmann et al., 2015). This means to employ a user-centric 
perspective and to especially focus on media literacy. To achieve this, we introduce two 
critical perspectives. Firstly, we argue the need to acknowledge the significance of power 
relations, that is, applying an agonistic approach to media pluralism. This could result in 
providing tools for contestation and for proactively seeking – but also be exposed to – 
challenging and minoritarian information. Secondly, we introduce an often 
underestimated element to improve users consumption: attention which can be translated 
into ‘attention self-management’ to actually counteract the risks of addictive and 
superficial usage of social media and, more generally, the Internet itself, so as to foster a 
slow and more constructive consumption of media (Rauch, 2018). 
    To begin with, media pluralism as a normative principle is vague and under-theorized, 
and it is not a reliable indicator of a society’s level of freedom and it can also create only 
the illusion of content diversity (Karpinnen, 2008). Moreover, in the digital age it is 
becoming less clear in which sense it is meaningful to speak of media pluralism, if the 
consumption is potentially characterized by limitless choice. As such, Karpinnen (ibid) 
advocates the idea of ‘agonistic pluralism’ to the context of media politics. The starting 
point is that media pluralism cannot be conceived only in terms of heterogeneity and a 
diversification of options but it needs to be analyzed in connection with the structural 
relations of power that define the criteria that guide information selection and limit 
available choices. Such perspective helps to defend concrete institutional arrangements 
in media policy. PSM can indeed be seen as a key tool in creating a plurality of power 
structures that is more open to democratic contestation, that resists the hegemonic 
tendencies of the market, and that reduces semantic inequalities. By analyzing digital 
tools that help to burst filter bubbles and weaken echo chambers, Bozdag and Van den 
Hoven (2015) concluded that not all democratic models are represented in these tools, 
and that agonistic elements should also be included so that the needs/voices of minorities 
can be heard.  
   Furthermore, to regain a relevant role in shaping users’ information consumption and 
sustain knowledge acquisition, a special focus must be given to attention and its 
management. Attention management is indeed considered one of the most important 
skills for the 21st century, even replacing time management (Davenport and Beck, 2001). 
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The ability to control distractions and stay focused is indeed essential to produce higher 
quality results in all aspects of life, particularly in hyperconnected societies (Floridi, 
2015). Yet, the Internet is nowadays mostly based on attention as a commodity. The 
attention of the users is, therefore, exploited, as it was – to a much more limited extent –
in the pre-digital era. As such, users hold in a subordinate position. It is therefore 
imperative for PSM to counteract systems that are designed to capture users’ attention 
and to provide tools that give them the autonomy to opt-out from certain design choices 
and better manage their own attention – also called attentive user interfaces. 
Psychological factors and media literacy are indeed paramount to overcome the 
challenges to experience diversity online and, more generally, for public discourse 
(Hoffmann et al., 2015; Carson, 2015). 
   As we argued in Reviglio (2019), PSM could provide affordances and tools for the 
Internet – and especially in social media – according to its traditional values, yet with 
updated goals. As such, the concept of meta-design has been preliminary framed as the 
re-design of a digital environment in order to change design choices as well as to inform 
and educate users; more broadly, as the act to reshape and enrich a website’s or platform’s 
information architecture and design throughout user-friendly tools such as aggregators 
and browser extensions so as to primarily influence and improve user experience as well 
as to sustain media literacy.  
   In such endeavor, a user-centric perspective is implicitly applied to reflect on ways to 
extract value from users’ profiles meaningfully, to illustrate blind-spots, and to ultimately 
sustain the experience of diversity. Importantly, the paper also shows that most of these 
architectural modifications can be done without necessarily dealing with social media 
platforms. In fact, it is possible to help users to navigate the complexities of the new and 
fast-changing media landscape by exploiting the potential of ‘meta-design’. This can be 
primarily enacted through APIs (application programme interfaces). These are in fact one 
of the most important sources of data regarding RSs through which outside researchers 
can download platform data in bulk (Leersen, 2020).  
   Let me give some paradigmatic examples; Social Fixer is an extension that improves 
user experience in Facebook and allows several design choices changes. Interestingly, it 
can set Facebook’s NewsFeed to switch to "Recent Stories First" – the chronological feed, 
which is not to algorithmically curated. By default, in fact, Facebook only shows you the 
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top stories rather than every post made by your friends. Yet anytime one logs out of the 
website, the algorithmic curation reset by default the NewsFeed. Such simple design 
choice would permanently free users from the algorithmic influence of Facebook. 
Another example is the possibility to hide any metrics’ posts in order not to get captured 
into so-called ‘trendism’, that is, be influenced by comparative quantifications (e.g. likes 
and shares). This could help users to self-control more effectively their attention. Yet, not 
only this project highlights the potential for re-shaping certain design choices but also the 
potential to communicate with messages and, thus, inform and educate users during their 
navigation. 
 
           
              Figure 22. Limited Post Loading in Social Fixer Affords (screenshot, May, 2019) 
 
Another example of an exploratory (and serendipitous) tool is provided by the MIT 
project Gobo, a social media news aggregator with sliders that users can control to filter 
information.41 This project sheds light not only on the possibility to provide sliders to 
filter media content based on certain democratic principles but, more interestingly, the 
possibility to aggregate and re-filter the information a user might want to consume in 
social media. Hence, it shows the possibility to bypass the algorithmic curation of 
information intermediaries. This, however, applies only to public posts. Yet, there may be 
implemented specific privacy settings to permit them to opt-in so that their posts may be 
included in the re-filtered feeds. Similar aggregators can be designed also for PSBs’ 
websites and video sharing platforms like Youtube in order to increase information 
discoverability and the experience of diversity. 
 
41 Other similar news aggregators are Newsbird, Allside, News 360, Digg and Flipboard. 
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       Figure 23. News Aggregator Gobo Made by MIT Social Media Lab (screenshot, May, 2019). 
 
More generally, a significant mean to gain more influence over information consumption 
is by being aware of the production and consumption of information (what and why 
information is filtered and how one consumes it) (Thurman and Schifferes, 2012). For 
example, it is possible to encourage blind-spots explorations. In this respect, a notable 
example is the visualization tool developed by Nagulendra and Vassileva (2016) which 
displays to users their filter bubbles, showing them which categories and friends are in 
their bubble and which ones are not, allowing them to control the algorithm by 
manipulating the visualization to escape the bubble, by adding or removing friends of a 
certain category to the filters. To our knowledge, this is the only attempt to show filter 
bubbles to users. Yet the quality of the design can certainly be improved and its scope 
expanded. While data collection may prove to be limited, users may opt-in to provide 
their personal data. Equally important, notifications management could be similarly 
useful to avoid distraction. Eventually, so-called information nutrition labels (Gollub et 
al., 2018) can also help to manage your attention as well as increase awareness. For 
example, they can show the time reading, style and reliability of any article by text 
analysis. 
   The above browser extensions, visualization tools and aggregators provide insights on 
the potential role of PSM in improving users’ experience according to its values. It is by 
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no means a ready-made framework any PSM could operationalize. Yet it highlights how 
certain extensions and tools are bringing innovations that PSM might replicate and 
eventually ameliorate. Despite technical challenges, meta-design can actually help PSM 
to collect data about users to better understand them, then inform, educate and nudge 
them towards its values. If such potential is employed, it might help to set the standards 
on a more mature information consumption, afford novel conditions to participate and 
benefit from social media usage and, eventually, contribute to solve the main challenges 
to experience diversity online (see Hoffmann et al., 2015). At the same time, it would 
sustain the four modalities of expressing voice42 (Harambam et al., 2018). Ultimately, it 
aims to preserve not only media pluralism and users’ experience of diversity but, above 
all, their awareness and autonomy of choice. In addition, it has the potential to help to 
overcome some of the major identified causes of the crisis of PBSs (such as outdated 
values, harsh competition and government control, see Gulyás and Hammer, 2014). 
   One may thus wonder why such tools have not been institutionally employed so far. To 
the knowledge of the author, in fact, there are in fact no noteworthy experiences of public 
efforts towards the creation of similar news aggregators, nudging by design or 
visualization tools. One explanation may be the widespread assumption that users are 
fully autonomous players able to manage the complexities of online information 
consumption. 
   API-based browser extensions have come under significant pressure over the past years 
(Leersen, 2020). Since the Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which academics helped to 
leak and abuse large sets of user data from Facebook, important APIs have incurred major 
restrictions in their functionality. This development, which Axel Bruns has described as 
the ‘APIcalypse’, has caused many widely-used research tools, both commercial and 
academic, to be shuttered. Of course, the quality of API access differs between platforms, 
and here we won’t provide an analysis of these differences. Finally, another significant 
issue is that through technical interventions platforms are able to obstruct independent 
study of their RSs, leaving even the basic outputs unclear.  
   Furthermore, there is a lack of scientific evidence, both about the risks of Internet usage 
and the effectiveness of these tools. Political challenges may also be paramount. Citizens 
 
42 Building on the work of sociologist Hirshman, Harambam et al. (2018) intend ‘voice’ as the possibility to exert 
control over the data-driven processes that shape news provision. 
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may not want to use these tools, while platforms proved to be difficult stakeholders to 
engage with whenever their revenues are threatened. Somewhat paradoxically, another 
significant element is likely to be that such public intervention would more likely account 
for an irrelevant share of investments given to PBS and PSM. Clearly, these tools are 
extremely cheap compared to the content produced by PSB. Thus, economic incentives 
in this respect appear to be very weak for an institution that is especially struggling with 
funding. However, considering the rising awareness in the public opinion of the risks of 
social media and the educative potential of browser extensions, there is room to expect 
their employment in the near future. 
    Despite obvious political challenges, there are certainly several other limitations for a 
more proactive role of PSM. First of all, its effectiveness, in particular concerning 
personalization and the attempt to provide users with exposure to challenging 
information. Interactivity might indeed threaten the principles of publicness and 
universality and not fulfil the goal of maintaining a common sense and belonging. The 
political consequences of exposure to dissimilar views, then, have long been a subject of 
polarization research, but findings are largely mixed. For example, polarized individuals 
may polarize further while exposed to challenging information (so-called backfire effect). 
Another related-risk is that users do not exploit such tools – they do not always want to 
be in control (e.g. the paradox of control). As a consequence, inequality may be even 
strengthened. These issues certainly require more understanding of users’ information 
behaviors as media landscape changes rapidly and steadily. It is not possible to make such 
harsh generalizations: the heterogeneity and nuances of users must be better understood 












The use of ICTs, Internet and, more importantly, social media disrupted – and still are 
disrupting – various aspects of society. It is changing what we do, how we do it, how we 
think, how we socialize, how we believe and how we take decisions. As both individuals 
and societies, we still need to realize and properly grasp these changes. Above all, it is 
emerging a profound need to educate for a new epistemological approach. In particular, 
we should critically understand our everyday media consumption, its challenges and its 
opportunities. Then, it is equally important to develop an effective governance of 
information intermediaries so as to limit undesirable unintended consequences, for 
example of personalization algorithms. The focus of this research was in fact on 
personalization of social media content, its main challenges and opportunities from an 
interdisciplinary perspective. As such, a number of essential conclusions from the above 
analysis are drawn in order to realize the opportunities of personalization, and diminish 
possible negative consequences. 
   The first question of this research was widely descriptive: what are the challenges of 
social media’s personalization for democratic societies? To answer this question, many 
other sub-questions had to be answered beforehand, such as: what is intended with 
personalization? How does it work? How it is employed by users and by mainstream 
social media platforms? Finally these answers are now discussed in a comprehensive way. 
   To begin with, there is still no accepted definition of online personalization. In fact, it 
remains an ambiguous and under-examined concept, lacking consensus on its essential 
characteristics. After all, a personalization system can be said to be composed of a 
recommender system which may also be complemented with certain design choices. 
Thus, it is not only algorithmically-based but there is also a significant influence of design 
choices that ultimately affect its outputs. 
   Personalization is not really ‘personal’. It occurs largely beyond the control of users as 
it is mostly based on implicit data rather explicit ones. Thus, preferences are mostly 
inferred, not expressed. Data used are mostly derived from what is actually observed and 
are, of course, only a small subset of observed and observable behaviors. Also, data used 
come not only from the individual user, but also from other users. The main consequence 
is that current personalization – especially of mainstream social media – is highly 
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‘behaviorist’ its assumptions, taking into account only what can be observed, measured 
and recorded, often not even individually. This is an obvious reductionism. 
   As a matter of fact, profiling technologies that allow personalization cannot produce or 
detect a sense of self. They indeed create a kind of knowledge (i.e. profiling) that is 
inherently probabilistic. Yet, they can influence the individual’s sense of self, especially 
in the long-run daily social media usage. Not only they threat the foundational 
microeconomic principle of preference formation but, more importantly, the individual 
“aspirational self” (or second-order preferences). The complexity and the ‘multiplicity of 
the self’ is likely not computable at all. In fact, not only no personal profile can ever 
entirely identify an individual, but there are always many—and sometimes radically 
different— ways of computing the same person. Personalization actually raises 
fundamental philosophical questions, such as: how to create meaningful digital versions 
of ourselves? Which information should constitute me as a person? And, ultimately, what 
is a person?  
      And yet, for mainstream social media personalization is merely an economic mean. 
In fact, we have seen how the media landscape is, in the first place, not much of an 
enriching space where public opinion is formed. Similarly to the other mass media, also 
social media are characterized by market concentration, infotainment and power 
inequalities. Networks effects have indeed resulted in an oligopoly of platforms that 
ultimately threatens innovation. Facebook, in particular, controls most of the social 
media’s information flows (considering it also owns Instagram and Whatsapp). This 
gives to it ever more power. Indeed, those companies who collected since long huge data 
are also those who have more capacities to extract value from it and, thus, to provide (and 
predict) the best (or most persuasive) services, in a reinforcing feedback loop. After all, 
the primary aim of social media platforms and its stakeholders is not individual progress 
or societal cohesion but, more simply, the maximization of engagement in order to gain 
more computational power and market shares, as well as to sell ever more ads. The 
consequence is the widely critiqued social media landscape in which hate, “fake news” 
and addiction become prominent features. Admittedly, the critical role of mainstream 
social media is incresingly contested by institutions and citizens. 
   Social media users, however, are mostly unaware of personalization dynamics. Of 
course, attitudes towards personalization are very heterogeneous and they change rapidly, 
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thus they need to be better and consistently understood. In general, people across the 
world seem to embrace automatically generated personalized recommendations, often 
because they trust themselves and algorithms more than they trust journalists. For the 
majority of users, in fact, algorithms select neutrally and recommend impartially. Yet, 
research indicates that users are concerned about losing important and challenging 
information and expect to play a more active role in the interaction with personalization 
systems. There is still a long path towards digital, algorithmic and media literacy as well 
as to ensure accountability and to preserve autonomy but a fundamental issue is actually 
trust in media, and in the scientific community and democratic institutions. 
  The potential challenges and negative consequences of personalization of social media 
content are serious and wide. On the one hand, there are evident challenges such as 
privacy, algorithmic bias, manipulation and reduced media diversity. While the formers 
represent broader challenges in the context of digital technologies and algorithms, the 
latter – media diversity – is the most specific to personalization systems and the one we 
focused the most in this research. On the other hand, reduced media diversity due to 
algorithms creates filter bubbles while strengthening echo chambers, and can eventually 
lead to potentially negative consequences both for individuals and societies. These could 
in fact fragment the audience, politically polarize and, at times, even radicalize. At the 
same time, they can help to spread misinformation and disinformation. Consequently, 
they could further reduce trust among individuals, groups and institutions, and, 
ultimately, weaken democratic societies. 
   Thus, we analyzed whether it is possible to burst filter bubbles and weaken echo 
chambers. The answer is not clear-cut. Firstly, there is a lack of scientific evidences to 
act upon and prevent these ill-defined phenomena. As long as researchers and policy-
makers cannot access real-time data of large populations of users, research will be 
extremely limited in unveiling these complex dynamics on a big, meaningful scale. 
Personalization is in fact, to some extent, unique to individuals. Thus, effects are also 
very heterogeneous. Secondly, there are human natural proclivities that trigger filter 
bubbles and echo chambers, such as homophily, selective exposure and confirmation 
bias. Therefore, they are primarily user-driven. As a matter of fact, there are several ways 
to increase own’s own exposure to media diversity online. Yet, they remain phenomena 
that are socially and technologically co-produced. As always, education is paramount. 
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Most users still ignore basic personalization’s dynamics and techniques. Also, re-imagine 
the design of social media platforms and their algorithms remains necessary. There is, 
however, no easy technological fix. More generally, it can be argued that more individual 
control over personalization, more control over the quality of information and more 
‘diversity by design’ can represent fundamental step to mitigate the above risks. 
   In this regard, we discussed the value of diversity and its nuances, such as news 
diversity, media diversity and media pluralism. Diversity is indeed a fundamental value 
for democratic societies and an increasingly important concept to understand the 
contemporary news landscape. Of course, diversity is not an absolute value, but needs to 
be balanced with other public values, such as privacy, autonomy and non-discrimination, 
and faces significant trade-offs, notably society cohesion versus truth finding. Different 
democracy theories in fact value media diversity differently. It is, therefore, extremely 
challenging to eventually agree on how much exposure to how many different content, 
topics or sources can be considered ‘sufficient’ and, eventually, to operationalize that. 
Indeed, in the digital age has become less clear in which sense it is meaningful to speak 
of media diversity if the consumption is potentially characterized by limitless choice. 
There is an evident need for more detailed normative conceptualizations and empirical 
analysis. For example, standardized measures of core “sub-dimensions” of diversity (i.e. 
supply, content, exposure etc.) are highly needed. Also, different methodological 
approaches and measurement instruments need to be combined to better understand actual 
media consumption. As such, the issue of diversity cannot be ‘solved’ objectively or 
definitively, rather, throughout more interdisciplinary experimentations and 
collaborations it could be possible to approximate a social media content filtering and 
consumption that is, ultimately, ‘sufficiently’ diverse.  
   Much of this research has focused on the value of serendipity as a design principle. 
Even though we showed how serendipity is a polysemantic notion and polymorphic 
phenomenon – and thus we attempted to preliminary frame a taxonomy for its design in 
personalized news feeds – it underlies technical, metaphorical and educational values. 
Not only it is a natural by-product of digital environments but it can be intentionally 
cultivated. Essentially, researching and designing for digital serendipity can help to 
fruitfully understand how to improve users’ openness to media diversity by design, to 
expand their information horizons and progressively make them discover new 
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information. Similarly, it helps to design and assess ‘perspective widening’ tools and 
techniques to balance individual media diet without resulting in “backfire effects”. 
Designing for digital serendipity also acknowledges the need for some “bounded chaos” 
in our everyday life, as well as “reliable surprises” in media consumption. Ultimately, 
cultivating serendipity is individually desirable and socially beneficial. It could help to 
burst filter bubbles and weaken echo chambers by halting the risks of an overly 
personalized Internet experience. In theory, its design can sustain media diversity, help 
individuals to better realize and manage personalization practices and strengthen human 
rights, such as freedom of expression and the right to receive information. 
   Similarly to diversity, serendipity works well in theory while in practice shows many 
challenges and limitations. One of the main challenge is certainly its measurement. 
Serendipity is not a purely discrete concept. Rather, it swings in a spectrum and it is a 
really subjective experience. Yet, this might still be complemented with other 
measurements of diversity. Also, the beneficial effects of an architecture for serendipity 
remain uncertain; looking for serendipity may be time-consuming, risk-taking or 
distracting. However, this can be equally true for consonant and highly personalized 
information. Anyhow, being exposed to challenging information (what we termed 
‘political serendipity’) may not necessarily result in experience of diversity, de-
polarization and/or more tolerance. In many cases, the opposite may be true. Therefore, 
while from a theoretical perspective serendipity can be advocated as a desirable and 
ethical design principle, from an empirical perspective it is rather problematic. Not only 
there are still improvements in the understanding of serendipity from a theoretical 
perspective but there is also significant design, psychological and educational research 
gap. 
   To complete the answer on the first research question, to understand personalization of 
social media content and its challenges it is necessary, above all, a shared language and 
basic knowledge of these highly complex socio-technical systems. This is often not the 
case. There are in fact common misconceptions in the public, policy and even academic 
debate that should be acknowledged. Let me now briefly summarize some fundamental 
premises to discuss personalization more fruitfully. 
   Personalization debates should not focus exclusively on algorithms and recommender 
systems but take into account all the stakeholders, the business model, shareholders, 
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users, online newspapers, the broader media landscape essentially and, particularly, all 
the design process. In fact, not only design choices and affordances directly influence 
personalization, such as information findability and discoverability, but they ultimately 
affect public discourse more indirectly but substantially. Moreover, algorithms, and in 
particular “AI”, have become a shorthand for an ever-changing suite of techniques, 
especially in policy discussions,. This reductionism need to be fully acknowledged. 
Policy makers should also resist simplistic narratives that blame for personalization risks 
and challenges exclusively with algorithms. Instead, policy makers should recognize the 
role of users and communities. Any solution to a problem is necessarily multifaceted and 
the responsibility is, to various extent, shared among several actors. 
   Similarly, the fundamental nature of recommender algorithms need to be better 
understood in public debates. Contrary to what many users still believe, there is no such 
thing as a “neutral” recommendation algorithm. Every recommender system embeds 
certain values, thus politics. Their content selections are dependent on a wide range of 
factors, including commercial and, in some cases, political considerations. Conversely, 
policy makers should avoid simplistic mandates for “neutrality” or “non-discrimination.” 
Indeed, recommender systems are not mere code but complex and dynamic socio-
technical systems; they are designed and deployed by specific people in specific contexts 
and for specific purposes. At the same time, they are highly context-dependent and often 
depend on changing parameters: dataset (what the space of options is), values, (what 
counts as a good recommendation) and assessment (how performance can be evaluated). 
   In the same vein, other fundamental metaphors and notions in the context of online 
personalization such as filter bubbles, echo chambers and diversity still need to be better 
understood and further discussed. They are in fact often ill-defined, sometimes 
overlapping and also have different meanings for different disciplines. The major risk, 
again, is to banalize, confuse and reduce the complexity of the challenges faced. Societies 
need to come together in communities comprised of multi-disciplinary researchers, 
innovators, policy-makers, citizens, developers and designers to foster the development 
of common knowledge and understanding. In this sense, it worth to repeat that researchers 
need to access more data. There is, in fact, a crisis with regard to the study of algorithms. 
They are indeed “black-boxed” which means their functioning is opaque and their 
interpretability may not even be clear to engineers.  
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   The second major research question was about regulation, specifically how social 
media’s personalization is regulated and whether the European legislation is able to 
prevent the risks arising from personalization. These issues require very complex answers 
that will be now summarized. 
   Personalization algorithms of mainstream social media are rather novel and complex 
entities and, therefore, they clearly require novel solutions and public discussions around 
their development and regulation. Regulators are faced with two major interrelated 
questions in this context: who should regulate platforms and how they should be 
regulated. Relatedly, a significant issue is which jurisdiction and law are more suited for 
regulation and, also, whether there is a need for modification of existing legal frameworks 
or to create new legislation. So, let me introduce these issues. 
   Platforms are already self-regulating entities. They determine the terms and conditions 
of their intermediary function and define online and offline standards of behaviour. 
Clearly, this paradigm is radically disputed in terms of protecting privacy and properly 
inform users. There is overwhelming evidence that most users neither they (can) read nor 
they understand online privacy policies. According to behavioral sciences as well, 
existing notice and consent model cannot be relied upon to protect the right to privacy. 
More generally, the extensive uncertainty and context dependence imply that people 
cannot be counted on to navigate the complex trade-offs involving terms of services and 
privacy self-management. So, it is this contractual paradigm in the first place that allows 
platforms to base their business model to engage users with personalization. 
   And yet, in the past years European policymakers have undertaken several different 
initiatives to regulate social media, especially their recommender systems. On the one 
hand, this has included horizontal instruments, such as competition and data protection 
law (E-Commerce Directive, E-privacy Directive, GDPR), which are not tailored to 
social media’s personalization in particular but may still have some spillover benefits for 
its purposes.  
   On the other hand, as a more apt legal instrument for personalization there is media law. 
Nevertheless, as platforms used to argue that they are technology companies rather than 
media companies, so far they avoided media regulation and editorial responsibilities. 
Also, considering the special position of media and the preference for self-regulation 
following from media freedom, for some time it has been considered unlikely that the 
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normative principles in the media context would have to directly translate into legal 
obligations. Such context has enabled social media mainstream platforms to actually 
privatize personalization governance.  
   Governments for a long time have been indeed reluctant to take a strong lead. In the 
last years, the EU has adopted some provisions that give consumers the power to manage 
their personal data and not to be subject to automated decision-making as in 
personalization practices. These regulatory interventions – notably e-Privacy and GDPR 
– bring to the fore a reshaping of the traditional landscape of the consumer protection 
rules providing a more comprehensive vision of “data consumer law”. They are expected 
to re-balance the relationship between data subjects and data controllers and to encourage 
competition between companies. Overall, the European legislation provides several 
safeguards but it still has blind-spots and a limited authority over personalization systems. 
Also, it represents, however, an excessively individualistic paradigm of social media 
governance, in which platforms are required to provide an enabling environment in which 
individual responsibility and autonomy can be realized in relation to the production, 
dissemination, and consumption of news and information. 
   The individualistic approach of user empowerment is insufficient. As we have already 
highlighted, there are three fundamental ‘paradoxes’ that highlight the complexities to 
autonomously manage personalization; the ‘personalization paradox’, that is, a trade-off 
between privacy and personalization accuracy; the ‘privacy paradox’, that is, the 
infamous users’ inconsistent will to protect their own privacy; and the ‘paradox of 
choice’, that is, the more choices users have, the more easily they rely on simple-to-use 
personalized tools. In other words, in order for personalization systems to provide a 
‘better service’, users are surveilled and datafied. Even if they would disagree – as they 
more often do – they usually do not proactively react. Even in cases where the users are 
provided with more agency, they are unlikely to take advantage. Therefore, another 
approach that takes more seriously into account individuals’ cognitive limitations and 
information asymmetries is advocated. 
   Nonetheless, the common heritage of European fundamental rights and values can serve 
as an anchor point for regulatory discussions. In the context of personalization, the 
European Court of Human Rights provides several meaningful values such as human 
dignity, freedom of thought, privacy and, particularly, the right to receive information 
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(Article 10 ECHR) that proves an important point of departure to realize democratic 
values in the personalized media landscape. It is indeed an under-theorized right, lacking 
a framework to fully understand the rights of news consumers or the obligations of states 
regarding news recipients. There is a need to further discuss what the right to receive 
information should mean nowadays, how it relates to data protection, and to empirically 
study how people’s information seeking strategies and privacy attitudes influence the 
exercise of this right. Information consumption is indeed deeply changed and needs to be 
reconceived. Given the vast amount of information produced and consumed, to some 
extent users are inevitably passive actors which have to delegate information filtering to 
algorithms and, therefore, to platforms. Regulation thus needs to catch up with newly 
social habits. 
   Finally, it was asked whether social media’s personalization need to be further regulated 
and, if yes, how. The answer is affirmative. Yet, there are several nuances and subtleties 
that clearly deserve further discussion. 
   No policy intervention is without externalities. Above all, regulating recommender 
systems raise free speech risks comparable to outright removal of content and should be 
treated with comparable safeguards. Imposing any kind of information prioritization may 
become a matter of censorship. Content regulation is particularly problematic due to the 
lack of transparency and the potential for unintended consequences for online discourse. 
Therefore, any information block must occur in only exceptional circumstances laid down 
by international law on human rights. The full guarantee of freedom of expression must 
be the norm in the deployment of personalized recommender systems, next to the right to 
privacy and the prohibition of discrimination. Yet, the right to express does not mean a 
right to reach an audience. In this respect, it is important to eventually reach a consensus 
over which information (e.g. misinformation and disinformation) does not deserve a wide 
reach, as it was actually the case in the last decade. It is indeed necessary to keep to a 
minimum of regulation.  
   Self-regulation did not prove to be a reliable and effective approach. This is normally 
non-binding and the rules can be interpreted rather freely by social media companies. 
More and more critics in academia and civil society are arguing that such forms of 
regulation do not provide sufficient incentives. In any case, both the research community 
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and regulators need to collaborate with industry to test the long-term impact of 
personalization. 
   The question of regulating personalization is part of a complex regulatory system 
involving many different legislative acts. The regulatory space has also increased 
dramatically due to the borderless nature of the digital world, as has the technical 
expertise needed to create effective, appropriate and enforceable rules. Government 
authorities are often capacity-constrained, particularly with regard to the technical 
expertise required, for example, to perform complex algorithmic auditing. Thus, instead 
of self-regulation and regulation, it is co-regulation of social media’s platforms the likely 
most effective approach to the governance of personalization systems and practices. In 
the European context, this would lead to a situation in which institutions define legislative 
standards that are subsequently implemented by platforms. There is the need to move 
away from homogenous top-down model towards a decentralized, reflexive, truly 
effective and collaborative framework that is ‘polycentric’. New governance is predicated 
upon a dispersal and fragmentation of authority, and rests upon dynamic systems of power 
sharing. Social media policy is moving towards a cooperative responsibility, meaning to 
collectively define the essential public values at play and to develop a multi-stakeholder 
process of public deliberation and exchange and, eventually, to translate the outcome of 
public deliberation and agreements into regulations, codes of conduct, terms of use and 
technologies. In this respect, we also argued how the European Public Service Media 
might acquire a more proactive and innovative role. 
   The role of ethics has been widely discussed too. Despite its inevitable 
instrumentalization by technological companies, ethics can shape personalization 
regulation and governance through the relation of moral evaluation. On the one hand, 
hard ethics makes or shapes the law as it concerns the discussion of values, rights, duties 
and responsibilities in the course of formulating new regulations or challenging existing 
ones. In this respect, relatively few attempts to frame ethical personalization have been 
done so far. On the other hand, soft ethics concerns what ought and ought not to be done 
over and above the existing regulation. As such, there is a need for the development of 
professional algorithmic ethics. Also, a unified commitment to ethical standards in the 
form of a code of conduct between the stakeholders involved in personalization systems 
need to be established, safeguarding reasonable and responsible use of data access. In 
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particular, since academic research for the public good in this field depends to a large 
extent on data from the industry, there is a need to find a way to exchange data and keep 
the use of data conforming with legal regulations, especially GDPR. 
   In any case, enabling the dual advantage of ‘ethical personalization’— so that the 
opportunities are seized, while the harms are foreseen and minimized or prevented — 
requires asking difficult questions about design, development, deployment, practices, 
uses and users, as well as the data that fuel the whole process. The hope is that ethical 
principles can act as normative constraints. Here it lies the distinction between the ‘what’ 
(ethical principles) and the ‘how’ (technical requirements). Complexity, variability, 
subjectivity, and lack of standardization, including variable interpretation of the 
‘components’ of each of the ethical principles make this endeavor challenging. To make 
a relevant example, the principle of transparency, while a laudable goal in many respects, 
is too vague and runs up against insurmountable structural limitations within the political 
economy of the social media industry. This policy approach is subsumed by a discourse 
of consumer empowerment that has been rendered meaningless in the contemporary 
environment of pervasive commercial surveillance. Comprehensive transparency is 
effectively impossible to implement because privacy asymmetry is a cornerstone of the 
mainstream social media business model. Transparency might become a mere shield to 
deflect the threat of government regulation. 
   European Union, in particular, can become a global leader in developing and using AI 
– including recommender systems – for good and promoting a human-centric approach 
and ethics-by-design principles. Several guidelines, reports and drafts have indeed been 
discussed in the last years. Many of them attempted to discuss the fundamental principles 
that need to be applied in this context. In particular, we discussed how the principle of 
explicability complements the other four major identified principles, namely beneficence, 
non-maleficence, autonomy and justice. Explicability means enabling the other principles 
through intelligibility and accountability. It is in fact that principle that should help to 
explain algorithmic logics. Especially in the context of personalization it is fundamental. 
More research to realize such ethical principles – especially with an intercultural 
information ethics perspective – is thus highly needed. 
   A fundamental issue that personalization raises is the ethics of nudging and the risk of 
manipulation. In fact, individual and mass behavioral change and manipulation are 
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becoming ever more easier thanks to new techniques and types of data such as affective 
computing which help to deliver highly personalized messages. More banally, these 
techniques have been already deployed in the 2016 US elections (notably micro-
targeting). It is therefore paramount to popularize ‘persuasive knowledge’ and to avoid 
addictive patterns of design and the pollution of the public debate, especially under 
elections. Among the proposed solutions, platforms should routinely disclose to their 
users and the public any experiment that the users were subjected to. Independent boards 
could review and approve experiments in advance. And, as for political microtargeting, 
platforms should clearly identify political advertisements and who paid for them and offer 
a transparent repository of all the material used in the campaign provided by candidates 
and political parties.  
   In this respect, we also introduced newly discussed human rights such as the ‘right to 
not be measured, analyzed or coached’, a ‘right not to be deceived’ or a ‘right to cognitive 
sovereignty’ that, more generally, ought to protect individuals’ right to mental self-
determination. Yet, as the Italian political philosopher Norberto Bobbio argued in an 
essay concerning the present and the future of human rights (1988), the serious problem 
of our times is not to create human rights but to protect them and to prevent, despite the 
solemn declarations, that they are continuously violated. More simply, regulatory 
frameworks need to consider the way in which the different more traditional human rights 
interlink. 
   Still, personalization algorithms, particularly of mainstream social media, have a 
collective value that deserve further discussion. In light of all the consequences of 
personalization of social media content, it is fundamental to recognize that these 
algorithms are common goods. Personalization algorithms shape individual identities, 
public opinion and, eventually, political action. Thus, politics in the digital age need to 
consider social media users also as political subjects. To make a substantial example, 
unions should be extended to users. The exploitation of digital labour is in fact connected 
to the commodification of the commons, including personalization algorithms. 
   Many of the “public interest considerations”, however, remain relatively 
undertheorized and underdeveloped, in terms of providing guidance that can be 
operationalized and evaluated in algorithmic systems. So far, regulatory standards seem 
immature, and implementing them would be both technically infeasible and politically 
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controversial. Particularly with such vague and subjective rules, government action, as 
said above, also raises questions about freedom of expression and the rule of law. This is 
why we introduced and preliminary framed the notion of personalization algorithmic 
sovereignty, as the moral right of a person to be the exclusive controller of one's own 
algorithmic life and, more generally, the right and capacity by citizens as well as 
democratic institutions to make self-determined choices on personalization systems.  
   Similarly to other related concepts that have been introduced and discussed in academia 
and media such as data sovereignty, digital sovereignty and technological sovereignty, 
this notion has the ultimate goal to assert some form of individual and collective control 
empowerment over digital technologies. As such we analyzed experiences and 
experiments and framed some fundamental technical and political preconditions, such as 
education and media diet awareness, neutrality and transparency, design requirements 
and information discovery. In fact, these could renew trust between platforms and users, 
which is a fundamental element for social media to blossom. We should indeed be aware 
of the value that these platforms already have for societies; this raise other questions such 
as: what is the value of mainstream social media platform? Are global social media 
beneficial or even necessary? What if the fragmentation of social media would translate 
in an ever more fragmented public sphere?  
   This research certainly faced several limitations. To begin with, it is a qualitative 
research with no empirical data. As such, it is a research that is grounded on various 
theories and concepts and attempts a discursive and critical analysis of the subject of 
personalization. Clearly, pros and cons of an interdisciplinary research need to be 
considered too. Furthermore, no specific social media platform has been analyzed. 
Facebook received more focus but no methodological approach was applied. After all, 
how it is possible to comprehensively grasp, let alone effectively make regulatory 
recommendations on, a rather new subject which is not well-defined, that is employed by 
different companies, that is not accountable and cannot be properly researched, and that, 
at the same time, is global and culturally-dependent? Afterwards, we realize how the 
investigation of personalization requires an inter- and even trans-disciplinary approach, 
where computer scientists are prepared to discuss social and legal theories, social 
scientists show an interest in technical and legal regulatory mechanisms, and legal 
scholars engage with technical and social mechanisms. It is plenty of technologists in 
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civil society that are providing innovative solutions to solve many of the problems current 
mainstream social media are facing. Also, there have been several academic and 
European projects that aim to realize what we defined as personalization algorithmic 
sovereignty. There is indeed hope for substantial improvements. 
   Certainly, more than new regulation media reforms are needed. Social media 
oligopolies should be tackled more effectively; workable data portability and 
interoperability are preconditional to a healthier social media landscape; to sustain at least 
a fair competition, taxing large corporations and channelling the resulting income into 
alternative non-commercial social media could be fruitful too; in any case, the 
foundational mechanism of surveillance capitalism need to be counteracted; a collective 
discussion over alternative data ownership paradigms may be necessary; eventually, the 
ad-based model business ought to be re-discussed too; new institutions to deal with the 
challenges that online personalization entails are ultimately necessary. During the above 
analysis some proposals have been introduced, notably an agency for auditing RSs 
algorithms, an independent review board to evaluate potential experiments through RSs, 
and a ‘public disclosure’ institution providing transparent public records of RSs. In other 
words, experimental solutions and, eventually, updated regulations and new institutions 
may be needed. 
   Still, attempting to foresee the future social media landscape is merely a naïve exercise. 
Consider some of the changes occurred from the beginning of this research; many social 
and technical changes have occurred and new social media entered the arena, made 
famous predominantly by younger generations, such as Snapchat and Tiktok. The latter 
is, at the time of writing, used the same average amount of time of Youtube. In the United 
States it also became the favored app to share videos documenting the ‘black lives matter’ 
movement. This reminds us that technologies are not pre-determined and people make 
often unexpected use of these. Yet, it is also important to consider that the dominant 
positions of certain platforms are still untouched so far and that equally naïve is the idea 
that they will be, one day, necessarily undermined by an invisible hand. 
   To conclude, personalization systems are technologies that inscribe values, thus visions, 
ideas, and beliefs to satisfy individual’s needs and desires, but also to facilitate social 
relations and to ultimately govern the public debate as information gatekeepers. Their 
role is fundamental in information societies. In the last chapter of “The Origins of 
 184 
Totalitarianism”, Hannah Arendt argues that loneliness is the defining condition of 
totalitarianism and the common ground of all terror. Loneliness is the inability to act all 
together, either with others or alone. This, in turn, is linked to the loss of what she calls 
“common sense” – the shared reality that allows us to know ourselves, to know where we 
end and the world begins, and how we are connected to others. Personalization algorithms 
can actually isolate individuals in filter bubbles and groups in echo chambers by limiting 
the breadth of information while threatening our common sense. It is now time to 
reimagine and redefine social media and its personalization systems to preserve human 
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